












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**NYM WALES**

**NEW  
CHINA**



**1944**

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TO THE SPIRIT *of free inquiry in general and  
to one honest and independent co-inquirer in  
particular.*



## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

'New China' is a reprint from 'Inside Red China' written by Mrs. Nym Wales, an eminent American Journalist.

For over four months, from May to September 1937, Nym Wales lived in Yen-an, the Soviet Capital. Here, she came closely in touch with the Chinese Communists. And she saw the last of the Soviets as they had been, for she was present when the Soviet Republic of China abdicated.

This book, therefore, naturally becomes one of the greatest stories of our times—the story of Soviet China: *a brave new world growing up in the midst of the oldest civilisation on earth.*

The purpose of adding an *introduction* to this book is to acquaint the reader, in a general way, with the modern history of China (From 1839 to the present day). This, it is hoped, will help a better understanding of Mrs. Nym Wales' book.

Lastly, a word of thanks to Prof. Nikhil Chakravarty who has obtained on behalf of Eagle Publishers, the author's permission to reprint this book.





## INTRODUCTION

"The logic of history is defeating and will defeat the logic of Counter-revolution."

\* \* \* \* \*

Writing about China in 1937, Edgar Snow declared that JAPAN CANNOT WIN.<sup>1</sup> It was not a riff-raff's reaction to complex 'Eastern Affairs' or the idealised version of a head-strong idealist. China fights on heroically since then. Her chance of ultimate victory has vastly enhanced. Ragged and backward, this China which was "not a state but only a geographical expression" according to Tokyo, this China which the *elite* all over the world contemptuously predicted could not last even six months, is still standing up and "taking it." New bases, far in the interior, have been set up amidst incredible hurdles. The main Chinese forces still elude the Japanese. Every crisis and shock, each licking of her wounds leaves China more determined than ever that the bloodhounds of Tojo shall never deal the knock-out blow.

The effectiveness of Chinese resistance however, depends in the last analysis on the solidarity of her National United Front established, as all the world knows, laboriously after many sad and costly mistakes. We fear, however, that just today Chinese politics once again seems to be moving in a vicious circle. The idea that the National Front in China is not a solid all-embracing front, that conspiring against it are defeatist Fifth Column elements (of the Wang Ching-wei

1. Red Star—E. Snow.

brand) will, perhaps, surprise many of our patriots.<sup>2</sup> But unhappily, that has turned to be a fact. In fact the story of National Unity in China has not been a smooth one and to understand that properly it is necessary to hark back and recollect China's past.

*Opening-up of China: Prelude.*

Students of history are aware, perhaps, that with the beginning of the nineteenth century, the eastern world faced a grave, new problem. As an insurance against future, the Western States were struggling desperately to get hold of new territories. The reason was none other than the growth of *Economic Imperialism*. And the most important stake in Asia was the Celestial Empire consisting of the eighteen provinces of China and various regions more loosely governed such as Manchuria and Mongolia. Since China was both large and rich in natural resources, the Far East became the scene of the keenest competition among the rival Imperialist States. In fact, an abundant supply of anthracite coal, cotton, raw silk and tea, together with the fact that China was still a sleepy oriental state, very decentralised and weak, ruled by an unpopular alien dynasty, the Manchus, enabled the European powers along with America to effect a forcible entry. The question, at first, was simple. The Western World with its cupidity and enterprise, aimed at opening up China to foreign trade. Soon after, however, the trend of events changed. To trade was added empire; to commerce—political aggression. Step by step, thus, *China became the inevitable victim of expansive capitalism.*

2. Who threatens  
China's Unity—Kumaramangalam.

*The period of unequal Treaties and the struggle for  
'Spheres of Influence.'*

So the West came to China not by China's choice but inspite of it.<sup>3</sup> The spectre of full economic exploitation and political humiliation now haunted China. In the China coast, as in the coasts of India and Africa, the reign of the merchant adventurers incorporated in companies as the East Indian Company, was just being replaced by a direct governmental responsibility. The *Opium War* of 1839-40 which followed in the wake of commercial conflicts, proved that China was pathetically going down the slippery slope of enslavement. And the Nanking Settlement (1842) was the first of a series of unequal treaties from which China has had to suffer both political humiliation and material exhaustion. From the Chinese point of view, perhaps, this treaty was simply an admission that they had not been possessed of the material force to keep off a strong alien race. Above all, this treaty declares, as it were, that China which has always absorbed or crushed into the common mould everything that has come to her by land, recognises the sea as her nemesis.

But if Nanking was her first humiliation, the Double Treaties of Tientsin (1858) showed in all nakedness the true designs of the Western Powers in China. The infamous Opium trade was legalised hereby, while the sovereign status of unoffending China was further impaired. Foreigners were removed from Chinese jurisdiction; they enjoyed "extra-territoriality" rights and in their concessions governed themselves. China's tariff system came to be regulated by foreigners. Christian communities formed within China, as it were, so

3. China Calling—Hiren Mukerjee.

many "*Imperium in Imperio*." The International Settlement of Shanghai—to add injury to insult—announced before the world, the flamboyant symbol of China's semi-colonial status. And the Taiping rebellion (1864-65), which followed in the wake of all these events, was the first desperate expression of Chinese 'consciousness'—consciousness of the impending danger from foreign infiltration; and consciousness of her own weakness.

*The first wave of nationalism sweeps over China.*

Torpid China, thus, woke up but not before she was thoroughly ransacked by competing Imperialist States. Towards the end of the century a new menace appeared and darkened the Chinese horizon. *Grafting Western industrialism on her feudal-militarist institutions, Japan now learned to worship power and pelf.* Inevitably, then, Japan dragged herself along the nefarious path of empire-building. Out of her victory over China in 1894-95, Japan seized Formosa, obtained Korea and imposed the cost of war on China.

The "sick-man of Asia" thus passed through a painful process of mutilation and learned that only a profound change—a *revolution*—could save her from complete subservience to the foreigners. She realised the outworn nature of her governmental system which failed to deal with the modern world. The impact of western ideas had unsettled the erstwhile unperturbed Chinese and helped to undermine confidence in Chinese society and Chinese civilisation. The first successive waves of premature nationalist movements—the Taiping rebellion, the Boxer outbreak and the Young China movement—shook not merely the historically mighty Manchu dynasty

but aimed as well, at dislodging the hateful 'Tuchuns' (war lords) from their privileged position.

Chinese nationalism, however, took tangible form with the emergence of the Single Revolutionary Party under Dr. Sun Yat Sen which culminated in the Republican Revolution of 1911. *By faith a Christian, by conviction a socialist of the reformist type*, Dr. Sun Yat Sen was a practical philosopher who knew how to express the aims taking shape at the beginning of the twentieth century in China for the political and social reforms of the masses.

The Republican Revolution of 1911 possessed a threefold objective:<sup>4</sup> the character of an uprising against the Manchus; a movement for reform of the political and administrative system on Western models; and, lastly, a revolt against the foreign economic penetration of China. In effect, however, only the overthrow of the Manchus was achieved. Thus, *just as the impact of western ideas had withered the Shogunate of Japan, so it proved the end of the Manchus in China. But if the ancient and historic Chinese Empire died that year, the Chinese nation was not born till the second revolution of 1926-27.*

### *The Regimes of the Tuchuns:*

Dr. Sun Yat Sen was proclaimed president of the first Chinese republic (1911). But he led a motley crew consisting of the northern militarist, bureaucrats, semi-feudal landlords and radicals as well. This, together with ever increasing foreign interference forced Dr. Sun to abdicate. Circumstances, thus, favoured temporarily, Yuan-Shi-kai and Chang-Tso-lin,

4. Red Star—E. Snow.

the hated militarists, to carry on their anarchic regime. They came to power with the avowed will to establish a second monarchy in China with the help of Japan. The hostility, however, between Chang-Tso-lin of Manchuria and Feng-Yu-Shiang of the South, the sharp contrast in Chinese life against the background of a decadent agricultural system and the rising industrial system; the recurring outbreaks of trouble in the Japanese controlled factories—all together made the *Coup de etat* of 1924 a foregone conclusion which in turn put an end to the "Tuchun regime" in China.

*The birth of the Kuo-Min-Tang and the Communist Party.*

Traditionally in China, the demise of every dynasty had been followed by civil strife. And the post-Manchu period proved no exception. But two things of great importance occurred during this unhappy period of civil strife. One was the growth of the Kuomintang or the peoples' party under Dr. Sun Yat Sen; the other was the birth of the 'Kung-chan-Tang' or the Communist party. We are aware that the Kuomintang stood for Dr. Sun's "San-Min-Chu-I" or the "three principles": nationalism, democracy and living wage for the people. By the first principle an end was to be made of foreign concessions, treaty ports, spheres of influence and the like, and China was to be ruled by the Chinese. The second principle was to turn the Chinese politically conscious. While the third principle, could not be attained without a wholesale economic revolution. In its first phase of activity, the Kuomintang wanted to do without the help of the Communist party. But the three principles were so obviously based on western models that Sun Yat Sen naturally expected that the western powers would help him to carry them out. In 1921 he

appealed to America for help but America refused. He appealed to Great Britain and Japan but Great Britain preferred to back the war-lord Wu Pei-Fu and Japan put her money on Chang-Tso-lin. So the only hope for the Kuo-min-tang was to turn to Soviet Russia.

In the halcyon days of their political emancipation, the Russians proclaimed the right of self-determination of Finland and Poland and sent their (offer) to China. Russia offered to release China from all forms of encroachments on "Chinese rights." In return for formal Chinese recognition, Russia proposed to give up the Boxer indemnity, the settlements in Chinese treaty-ports, extra-territoriality and tariffs, besides converting the Chinese Eastern railway into a purely commercial enterprise which China was in entire liberty to purchase. *This was indeed in startling contrast to the "blood and thunder" of the Imperialist programme.* It was only after this that Dr. Sun Yat Sen admitted the Chinese Communist party into the Kuo-min-tang. He also invited technical advisors from Russia who gave the Kuo-min-tang lessons in organising the labour unions, the river fronts and industrial workers, providing them with slogans, revealing the misery of the Chinese peasants, instructing their peoples' Army in methods of modern and revolutionary warfare, putting their finance in order, and above all *making them conscious of their innate strength.*

Three features now stood prominently in the programme of the government of the Kuo-min-tang. First, the overthrow of the 'Tuchuns' and emergency rule by the peoples' army secondly, political tutelage of the masses under the Kuo-min-tang; and lastly, the introduction of popular constitutional government. (In effect, however, it never got beyond the

first i.e. military rule).<sup>5</sup> At Hankow, a new central government was thus set up. It was a *composite government* but soon afterwards the split occurred between the 'left' and the 'right.'

*Rift in the Lute.*

As events turned out, however, neither the 'right wing' nor the 'left' of the intelligentsia had the final say in governmental affairs. To achieve power, the Kuo-min-tang needed an army. And, as so often happens, the army which began as a servant of the 'Revolution' ended as its master. The Hankow government thus became a military show of the counter-revolutionary brand. Chiang-Kai-Shek thought the moment opportune to renounce Russian help and "swearing by the memory of Sun Yat Sen and exploiting his prestige, but violating every principle for which that great leader had fought all his life,"<sup>6</sup> he led the 'right wing' Kuo-min-tang into the channel of Counter-revolution. In this policy, he was helped by the western interests in China and in Europe. London, Washington and Paris were preparing to recognise in Chiang-Kai-Shek another Kemal Attaturk but were determined to prevent him from becoming a second Lenin.

Acute trouble, now, arose which resulted in the breakdown of the all-party government at Hankow. The majority of the army supported Chiang-Kai-Shek who proclaimed a *provisional government at Nanking*. The Communist party and the all China Federation of labour went underground but they challenged, nonetheless, the legitimacy of *Nanking*. So the *Kuo-min-tang revolution which began as a popular and*

5. Red Star—E. Snow.

6. China Calling—Hiren Mukerjee.



*radical movement ended, like the Revolution of 1789 in France, in military dictatorship.* It was the army which, henceforward, held the balance and dictated the tune.

The Chinese Communist Party, we are aware, entered the Kuo-min-tang only when Sun Yat Sen accepted its two main principles viz. the necessity of an anti-Imperialist policy and an internal policy of anti-feudalism and anti-militarism. Chiang-Kai-Shek now openly ignored these principles and in the name of extirpating the evil of Communism from the Chinese world, he plunged the country in civil wars at an inopportune moment—fascist Japan availed of this chance and quickly overran China. As a result China lost not merely the best part of her soil to Japan but, at home, the constructive programme of social, political and land reforms was thrown to the four winds of heaven. Time and again, since 1932, the communist party proposed peace and union with Nanking on a common ground of resisting Japan. To quote Mao-Tse-Tung: "the fundamental issue before the Chinese people is the struggle against Japanese Imperialism. Our Soviet policy is essentially conditioned by it." The United National Front, however, could not be set up before the futility of Chiang's *anti-Communist drives* had been realised and the Sian incident of 1936 had occurred.

The United National Front epitomises the achievements of the Chinese Soviets. Liquidating voluntarily their separate existence, the Chinese Soviets "changed over to democracy." (to use Nym Wales' expression.) The Red Army became a National Army under the leadership of the "white generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek." All this, however, did not mean "surrender," but the beginning of a new role for the Chinese Communists—to 'liquidate' the fascist hangers-on at home and fight success-

fully their freedom's battle. And, as all the world knows, the United National Front worked miracle against an enemy, armed tooth and nail.

*Whither China!*

Madame Chiang-Kai-Shek once repented: "we are the victims of the feebleness of democracies." The same cannot, however, be truthfully repeated today. But China still continues to be a victim—victim of the Kuo-min-tang reactionaries who are just at present on the ascendant. *Chinese history provides today the best example of the struggle between the forces of progress and reaction.* Perhaps, it suits the Kuo-min-tang reactionaries best to renew the anti-Communist boggy just when the war may be said to have passed on to its last phase with the prospects of certain defeat for the fascists. But the Kuo-min-tang reactionaries will have read history in vain if they persist in believing that *China's destiny* can best be shaped just by dissolving the New Fourth Army, blockading the Eighth Route Army or strangling the Chinese Soviets when all-in-unity is needed to defeat the aggressor. The Kuo-min-tang, by its present folly, is leading China on the path of civil strife once again which will mean the triumph of Fascist—Quislings at home and Japan abroad. China's destiny, therefore, lies in a *new democracy* where the total mobilization of the Chinese people, so necessary for defeating Japan, will be possible and the cause of the United Nations served better.

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" and the Chinese people, like ourselves in India, must doubly realise that under the context of present events at home.

8th May, 1944,  
CALCUTTA.

AMAL BOSE

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
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UNDER THE DOUBLE FLAG OF THE "NATIONAL UNITED FRONT"  
These Three Ragged Little Boy Soldiers Salute the Kuomintang Flag  
Crossed in Unison with the Red Hammer-and-Sickle and Star. Now  
the Red Flag Is No Longer Used at All.

**FIRST BOOK:**  
**THE CHINESE SOVIETS CHANGE  
TO DEMOCRACY**





## 1. THE CELESTIAL RED STAR PASSES

**M**Y TRIP TO THE Chinese Soviet capital happened at a very dramatic historic moment—in time to see the last of the fighting Red republic after ten years that shook China and the insurgent\* Red Army marching under orders of the White generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek.

The Chinese Communists first hitched their wagon to the Red Star in 1927. Follows a decade of such bitterly fought class warfare as human society has seldom engaged in. Retreat from the Soviets in the South, but the Red Army carries on. Red March six thousand miles across a continent. New horizons in the Great Northwest. *Coup de théâtre* at Sian on December 12, 1936. Hundreds of thousands of troops mobilize on newly aligned Red and White fronts. Fifty-five days of armed suspense. Peace without treaty. March, April, May, June . . . July 7—Japan strikes at Liukou-chiao. War or peace? July 15—the Communists set October 15 as the date for the voluntary abdication of the Soviet Republic of China to make way for a nationalist-bourgeois democracy. August—Chiang Kai-shek assigns the Red Army to the Shansi front. Off with the beloved Red Star. The Eighth Route Army marches to fight the Japanese—in Kuomintang uniforms. . . . So ends the long epic chapter of the Peasants' and Workers' Soviet Republic of China. What is the heroic story of the Soviet in China?

The prelude was the "Great Revolution" of 1925-27, when

the Kuomintang and Communist parties marched triumphantly hand in hand from Canton to the banks of the Yangtze River proletariat in the vanguard of the revolution, peasants insurgent in the rear. The bourgeoisie is jittery in the cities, the landlords are terrified in the country. The foreign powers are indignant on the China coast. The Reaction begins furiously recruiting from all three elements. Then the landlords and war lords massacre the peasants in Hunan and Hupeh. The Shanghai bankers hire Ch'ing pong gangsters to massacre five thousand workmen in Shanghai. In the meantime Chiang Kai-shek goes over to the British, leads the "purgation" against Communists and Leftists and thereby gets his Nanking Government recognized by the foreign powers. Split in the Kuomintang. Split between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Split in the Communist ranks, too. Then, after all the miscellaneous "purifying" and "purgation," clear colors separate from the mixture—a divided China, Red and White, engages in a vast civil war.

After 1927 the Communists take independent leadership of the revolutionary movements of the peasants, workers and petty bourgeois young intellectuals. The Kuomintang allies with the feudal landlords and war lords and with the foreign powers on the coast, establishes a one-party military dictatorship at Nanking headed by Chiang Kai-shek and carries on a war without quarter against all insurgent peasants, workers, intellectuals, writers, artists and students—against Communists, Social Democrats, Democrats, anti-Japanese groups and all revolutionary elements, denying even the nationalist principle on which it was founded. Because of the extreme reactionariness of the Kuomintang, the Communists are able within four years to build up an independent Soviet Republic in the

heart of China which challenges the Rightist Government at Nanking for control of the nation.

September 18, 1931. Japan takes Manchuria. The Communist and Leftist movement leading the anti-Japanese agitation at its height in the "White" areas. The Soviet Republic soon numbers a population of 9,000,000 in its Central Soviets and 1,000,000 more in its Szechuan Soviet. Then the bitter war begins in earnest. The Kuomintang bourgeois-landlord bloc adopts Fascist methods from Europe and in 1932-33 in the White areas is able to destroy first the labour movement, next the student movement, then even liberal and militant anti-Japanese opposition. In the meantime the Soviets in the Red areas have triumphantly defeated four major campaigns.

The stage is set for the supreme struggle in 1934: Nanking mobilizes 900,000 troops for blockade and attack in its Fifth Campaign. It is a war of annihilation—for the civilians. Nanking troops move in slowly, burning villages to destroy the guerilla bases, killing the Soviet farmers and their women and children. The Red Army retreats slowly before the inexorable juggernaut, then, when the Soviet population can no longer stand the pressure, makes a break for liberty.

For a year the Red Army battles its way on the Long March to the Great Northwest, with tremendous losses. Arrived in the Szechuan Soviet in the summer of 1935, all the leaders call a council of war—and peace. It is a stormy session. Chang Kuo-t'ao and his Szechuan followers want to keep a Soviet base. Mao Tsê-tung and the new arrivals from the Central Soviets want to give up the Soviet slogan and begin to organize a democratic People's Front against the Japanese instead. The latter is decided upon. The Communist Party issues a new manifesto—on August 1, 1935, anniversary of the

founding of the Red Army and of the adoption of the Soviet slogan.

In the manifesto the Communists make an offer to Nanking and to all progressive elements: they offer to give up their struggle for Soviets if the civil war is stopped and a representative democratic republic is realized, and they offer to form a United Front with all parties, armies and groups willing to fight the Japanese.

There is no response to this kind offer from any armies or parties. The Nanking Government ridicules it—and praises Hitler and Mussolini. But a valiant little group of eight hundred students in Peking agrees with it. On December 9, 1935, the vanguard of the People's Front begins to march on the streets of Peking. When the Communists in the far Northwest hear of this student demonstration, they are delighted. They put a new date in their history textbook: "December 9 marks a new era—the petty bourgeoisie begins to swing over to the United Front."

The People's Front moves fast after this, almost too fast even for the Communists. The Tungpei Army and Yang Hucheng's Shensi troops take a nose dive to the Left and decide to turn the whole Northwest into barracks for the People's Front—and they want to fight! No namby-pamby for them! So in December they arrest the Generalissimo—and the Communists insist on his release! Why the anticlimax?

In October 1936 the Communists had begun a little wishful thinking about a "National United Front" with Chiang Kai-shek's army, the Nanking Government and the Kuomintang instead of a "People's Front" only on the Left. But it is already almost too late to stop the momentum of the People's Front movement against Nanking. However, the Commu-

nists divert it successfully into their National United Front—after negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek in and out of captivity. (Not, however, without having the Tungpei Leftist leaders put Chou En-lai and Po Ku down on their books for assassination because of their insistence upon a peaceful settlement.)

Only thin "threads of talk," as the Chinese say, bind Chiang Kai-shek to the United Front with his erstwhile bitterest enemies after the Sian Incident. Spun out at length throughout the summer, as Chou En-lai flies back and forth between Yen-an and Sian and Nanking, negotiating for terms. Their secret illicit relations seem slightly immoral—until Japan comes along as indignant minister and forces an open and honest marriage upon the pair. . . .

My arrival in May finds the negotiations still in process, and the Communists unwilling to make any public statements on the subject of the "Kuomintang-Communist remarriage," as Wu Liang-p'ing calls it. In an interview with Chou En-lai on June 22 at Military Headquarters, I ask :

"Do you regard the progress of the negotiations as satisfactory?"

"I don't like to reply to this question with one word, 'satisfactory,' " is the answer. "It is a dialectical question, yes and no. I can say that the fundamentals are settled but not the concrete details. . . .

"One must consider the anti-Japanese war preparations and Democracy like two wheels of a bicycle, one before the other—the preparation for the anti-Japanese war comes first, and following it the movement for Democracy."

"If Democracy is realized in China now, this will actually be the accomplishment of the long-delayed democratic revolution, will it not?" is my next question.

"If I should be asked if our fourteen years of political life have been a struggle for Democracy or for a proletarian dictatorship," Chou En-lai answers, "this question can be answered easily: It has been a struggle for Democracy.

"Again, if asked, 'What is the character of this revolution,' we can say it is a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is not a proletarian revolution.

"Third, if asked, 'What was the political system of the past ten years?' we can reply that it was a 'workers' and peasants' democratic system, and not a bourgeois-democratic system.

"Fourth, if asked, 'Now do you want to change that system?' we can reply, yes, we want to change the workers' and peasants' democratic system into a national democratic system which will include the landowners, bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie with the workers and peasants, and exclude only traitors.

"Fifth, if you ask, 'What is the method of the democratic movement?' we can say that during these ten years we have used the revolutionary method—that is, the military struggle—to build up a workers' and peasants' democratic system and now we want to use the political struggle—that is, a democratic struggle—to achieve the national democratic system.

"Looked at from this point of view, we can say that these ten years we have used the revolutionary method to struggle for Democracy. We cannot say we made the political struggle for the national democratic movement. Now we want to create a big democratic movement among all classes of the Chinese people, except the traitors, for the purpose of the defensive anti-Japanese war.



### THE FIRST PICTURE EVER TAKEN OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION IN CHINA

In the Ten Years Which Preceded This Meeting, Half a Million Dollars Was Offered by the Kuomintang for the Capture of Chu Teh and Mao

Tse-tung, Here Shown with Three High Kuomintang Officials. By Their Weather-beaten Faces They Are Easily Distinguished from the Suave Kuomintangites.





"Now the Kuomintang will change its policy to realize the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen,\* so we can now say that we want to give up the Soviet system in order to change into the national democratic system along the road of the Three Principles. This is our way of helping the realization of the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen to achieve democratic freedom, national emancipation and social welfare."

"But suppose the Kuomintang decides to accept only the nationalist principle and not the democratic principle. If Nanking should utilize the anti-Japanese slogan to form a new anti-Communist Fascist movement, could such a movement develop?" I inquire.

"No, because the base of such a movement is too weak. And if it uses the nationalist anti-Japanese slogan, this is good. This would be emancipating an oppressed semi-colonial people. It would be a good slogan and give a stimulus to the masses to fight Japan, even among the troops. If the people, the soldiers and the officers receive the anti-Japanese slogan, it is no harm, for the masses will receive it in good faith and act upon it in the same spirit. If we analyze the character of Chinese Fascism, we find it has no real basis. These Fascists only wanted to study Fascist methods in order to be able to govern the masses."

Two weeks after this interview the war with Japan begins at Liukouchiao.

One week later, the world's second stable Soviet Republic begins the process of abdication. The new democratic elections begin.

\*Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles are: Democracy, Nationalism and the People's Livelihood.

On August 29 I write the following in my notebook :

"As I write this I am sitting in a small room in Yen-an. Today the *hsien*, or county, of Yen-an participates in the first democratic election ever actually held in China. Then this election, which began on July 15 and will be over at the end of October, is completed in all the northwest Soviet areas, the last of the Chinese Soviets will have abdicated and the one-time Soviet Republic of China will be rather undramatically called 'The Frontier Districts of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia.' One of the major social experiments of our generation has ended—a Leninist attempt to establish Soviets in a semi-colonial land.

"Through a small hole in the paper window at which I occasionally watch the life in the courtyard, I can see my bodyguard from the OGPU fingering his new Kuomintang cap in gingerly fashion, rubbing the bourgeois blue-and-white enamel symbol. No doubt he is thinking of the tattered old cloth Red Star that he wore from Kiangsi on the Long March and reseeded with his own loving fingers when it became unrecognizable. But the Red Star is no longer visible on the once-Soviet horizon. Even Chu Teh wears a Kuomintang cap. The whole Chinese Red Army is now clothed in regulation Kuomintang uniforms supplied by Nanking. It has not even a name, but only a number like all other armies under the Central Government; it is the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Armies of China.

"A few days ago I asked Mao Tsê-tung, Chairman of the Military Council, if the Red Army would carry the Red flag as well as the national flag in fighting the Japanese. 'No,' he replied. 'When we change the uniforms of course we must change our flag also.'

"In externals it is now impossible to distinguish China's Red Army from its one-time Kuomintang enemy, and it cheerfully accepts the command of Chiang Kai-shek—of the man for whose death the Communists have shouted slogans in half the provinces of China. The struggle for the Soviets in China is half as old as the U.S.S.R. and has been almost as bloody. Here is a revolutionary army of some 100,000 men, the nucleus of which has fought nearly every day for ten years against everything which the Kuomintang uniform they are now wearing has represented. This army lives on a basis of pure War Communism of the most exacting variety while it carries out orders of the Communist Party to support the ruling class of China in war. Yet here are these 100,000 armed men meekly taking such orders from the Communist Party with no apparent opposition whatever, although most of their families have been massacred by that ruling class. How is this phenomenon possible? It is not so difficult to understand since Sino-Japanese hostilities began on July 7, but the whole question was decided two years ago, and when I arrived in Yen-an in May the change was expected immediately. The answer is that the authority which the Communist Party exercises over the mass is astonishing. But such discipline has not been gained without two years of intensive education in the nature of the Chinese Revolution since August 1935.

"Is this giving up of the Soviets victory, defeat or merely strategy for the Chinese Communists? Here in Yen-an it is not viewed in these terms but is looked at in a very unemotional, matter-of-fact way. Everyone seems to accept it as a part of historical determinism, as a new stage in the development of the unaccomplished Chinese Revolution—which they

regard as a bourgeois-democratic revolution—a passing from the agrarian to the anti-imperialist stage.

"I could quote Mao Tsê-tung, the Chinese Lenin, at great length on this question; for instance, his instructions to the Communist Party Conference in May. 'We support the theory of the transformation of the revolution. The democratic revolution will change to Socialism. In this democratic revolution there are several stages of development, but all are under the slogan of the Democratic Republic and not under that of a Soviet Republic. . . . We are not Trotskyists, semi-Trotskyists nor Li Li-sanists. We are for the transformation of the revolution and not for the Trotskyist "permanent revolution." We are for passing through all necessary stages of the Democratic Republic to reach Socialism.'

"Some look at the change as 'one step backward to achieve two steps forward.'

"I stroll out into the courtyard to ask questions. The little rock-ribbed valley echoes with rifle shots as the soldiers try out their guns for service at the front. Across the wall I can hear some meeting or other singing 'Defend Madrid.' In our compound the Organization Department is digging a bombproof cellar against Japanese air raids. A few days ago two Japanese planes reconnoitered and later five came again. Three little boy soldiers of the *hsiao kuei* variety, called 'little devils,' are sitting on the high earth heap chattering away like magpies about their adventures under air bombs during the Long March from their homes in Szechuan and Kansu.

"One of the ex-Red 'fighters'—the Red Army never uses the word 'soldier—digging the bomb celler is wearing a pair of Mickey Mouse shorts.

"Sitting in front of one of the rooms in the big walled

compound is a group of student refugees from Peiping universities, who have walked many miles in tennis shoes. They are reading about the fighting in Shanghai and the North in the *New China* newspaper—which was until recently called *Red China*. Hundreds of petty-bourgeois non-Communist boys and girls have flocked here since the new policy was announced six months ago, to attend classes at the 'People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy,' once the 'Red Academy.' I have heard it said that the Party membership in the White districts is increasing tenfold under the new situation.

"I interrupt my bodyguard's meditations on the passing of the Red Star to ask what he thinks about the changes in the Soviets. Of course, he knows all the answers. He has had special political training in the OGPU. But I must add that the OGPU is no more. It has been changed to a unit of the Pao An Tui or 'Peace Prevention Corps,' the same organization with exactly the same name as in other parts of China. All Red Guards and partisan detachments are now also incorporated into the Pao An Tui.

"My bodyguard replies patronizingly: 'In this crisis we must support the unification of China in order to fight a successful war against Japan. We cannot have two separate class governments at such a time, so we must give up all forms of Soviet power, of course. Japanese aggression has forced the Kuomintang to have a revolutionary tendency again, so now we can co-operate with it.'

"I have asked many this same question, and they all give substantially the same reply.

"I asked about the attitude of the people in the Soviets in a talk with Teng Pi-wu, now Chairman *pro tem* of the transi-

tional Central Soviet Government. He replied candidly: 'The people all liked the Soviet better. It was simple and easy for them. The landlords will perhaps like the new democracy better, but there are few landlords left here to enjoy it. We find some difficulty in letting the landlord have the right to vote. The people don't understand why it is necessary, and the farmers are afraid their land might be distributed back to the landlords. There are two districts in Kan Lo Hsien, in North Shensi, where this problem is not yet solved and the people won't let the landlords vote. In general, however, the people give up the Soviet easily. They trust the leadership of the Communist Party to do what is right for them. Yet they don't see the necessity for such a complex change, and some don't see how it benefits themselves.'

"I also asked this question of Teng Feng, Vice-Chairman of the Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet Government, which has still some ten thousand people. His reply was much the same: 'The people don't understand the necessity of changing very clearly, but they trust the Communist leadership and will carry out any decisions of the Soviet Government.'

" 'Some of the landlords in our districts,' he added, 'have already sent letters to the Soviet Government asking for special permission to return.'

"In the new elections there is universal suffrage except for minors under the age of sixteen, mental defectives and criminals barred from voting by law. Under the previous Soviet form, landlords and capitalists could not vote, but they now have this right fully. All parties have the right to make public nominations and to carry on propaganda for their political programs in competition with the Communist Party, but so far no other party has availed itself of this opportunity.

Most of the representatives elected are Communist Party members. For instance, in the northern district of Yen-an County eighty of the 109 persons elected were Communist Party members, of whom fifteen were women. In some cases landlord groups organized a campaign in their own interests, but, according to Teng Pi-wu, so far all such attempts have failed because of the opposition of the masses. Voting is done by raising of hands. Originally a secret written ballot was planned, but because of illiteracy this was not feasible.

"The form of democracy selected by the Communists for their areas is unique. Teng Pi-wu told me that 'it is something like the French system of deputies, but it was not taken from any other country. It has developed spontaneously out of special local needs.' It is, in fact, just a start in the fluid process of experimentation. On July 15 the election of village representatives was begun. When this was completed in August, election of representatives of the *ch'u*, or district, was begun from the group of village representatives. Then the *hsien*, or county, representatives were elected from the ranks of the district representatives. From these the Assembly for the whole area of the 'Frontier Districts of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia,' will be chosen. The election ratio is one representative for every twenty electors in the village; one to every fifty in the district: one to every two hundred in the *hsien* and one to every fifteen hundred for the Assembly. This Assembly for the 'Frontier Districts of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia' will have at least five hundred members, Teng Pi-wu told me. It will elect a governor, who will then be confirmed by the Nanking Government. The Assembly will be the governing body of the Frontier Districts area, with full legislative powers.

"At this writing the elections are not completed, but are expected to finish about the end of October. No general statistics are yet available because communications have been nearly cut off owing to heavy rains, but Teng Pi-wu estimated that between 60 and 80 per cent of the eligible population is voting in the election. Only the old men and women show no interest in their new government.

"So ends the long heroic chapter of the Chinese Soviets which began ten years ago, when the Soviet slogan was decided upon at the first Communist Party Delegate's Congress held just after the Nanchang Uprising in August 1927. The first Soviet, which was organized at Hailofeng, Kwangtung, on August 17, 1927, was annihilated on February 29, 1928. On December 11 of the same year was formed the Canton Commune, which was destroyed in three days. From this time until 1930 was a period of uprisings and partisan warfare, culminating in the disastrous 'Li Li-san' six months' period from June 1930 to the end of the year, during which time the Red Army tried unsuccessfully to capture the big cities. After the Li Li-san line was corrected, the agrarian Soviets developed rapidly, and the year 1931 marked a new period of the transformation of partisans into Red Army regulars and of the partisan areas into Soviets. The period from the election of the Central Soviet Government on December 11, 1931, to the Second Soviet Congress, held February 1, 1934, marked the height of the Soviet power.

"Then Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in the Fifth Campaign in 1934 in forcing the Communists to give up their Central Soviets and march the Red Army to the north. The decision to give up the struggle for Soviets was made in the manifesto dated August 1, 1935, but the Kuomintang refused to nego-



tiate on the terms asked. There was little development in the United Front movement until the whole national crisis came to a point in the Northwest Revolt at Sian on December 12, 1936. The Communists took almost full responsibility for the peaceful settlement of this revolt in the interest of co-operating with the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. After this, negotiations were conducted secretly, but the final agreement was made only after the fighting with Japan began. Early in August the Red Army received its order to go to the front as part of the national forces.

"In place of their previous Soviet program, the Communist Party is now trying to realize a ten-point program in co-operation with the Kuomintang:

- "1. To fight Japan thoroughly and decisively and drive Japanese imperialism out of China;
- "2. To stop all diplomatic negotiations with Japan and oppose the compromising and wavering attitude of the Nanking Government;
- "3. To mobilize the armies of the whole nation on the front to fight against the Japanese;
- "4. To mobilize the whole body of the masses to join the war front against the Japanese, to give the people the freedom of patriotic activity and the freedom to arm themselves;
- "5. To organize a national defence government of all parties, clearing out the traitors and other forces of Japanese imperialism in China;
- "6. To establish an anti-Japanese diplomatic policy, enter into a military agreement with the U.S.S.R. and into a Pacific anti-Japanese agreement with England, America and France;

"7. To adopt an anti-Japanese financial policy, the principle of this financial policy to be that everybody who has money must support the nation and that all the property of Japanese imperialism must be confiscated. The principle of the economic policy should be to boycott the use of Japanese goods and to increase the use of national goods;

"8. To improve and reconstruct the life of the people, including removal of the many unjust surtaxes, decrease of taxes and decrease of rent;

"9. To develop the anti-Japanese national defence education;

"10. To organize a united front of the whole country with the unification of the two parties (Kuomintang and Communist) as the basis for the struggle against the Japanese.

" 'This is our great program for resisting Japan,' Mao Tsê-tung added, when he told me the ten points. 'These ten points have been sent to Nanking, with the request that the Government accept them. If we realize them, we can strike down Japanese imperialism; if not, China will perish.' "

Behind the long and complex political and military struggle of the Chinese Communists for their various united fronts, splits and reunited fronts lies a broad political philosophy of revolution and a hard-won experience in tactics and strategy for its realization.

What is this philosophy? And what has been the experience of this struggle? What is the nature of the Chinese Revolution which the Communists have inherited from two generations of failure? What have been its historical stages? What is the future program for realizing their Socialist dreams? Let us seek the answers from the veteran leaders of the Chinese Communist Party itself, from Mao Tsê-tung,

Lo Fu and Chu Teh, and let them dissect for us the anatomy of the Chinese Revolution.

## II. THE ANATOMY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

### (I) ITS NATURE: MAO TSE-TUNG

MAO TSE-TUNG IS THE cool-headed political leader of the Chinese Communists, distinguished among them for his far-reaching vision and unerring judgment in estimating given situations. His opinion usually determines the bold strokes of policy, while flourishes and footnotes are added by others.

This Chinese Lenin has had a long and active experience as a leader of revolution, and it is this comprehensive experience, as well as any natural endowments, which equips him for his present position. He was first a normal-school student leader in Changsha, Hunan, which became the mass center of the radical petty-bourgeois student, as well as workers' and peasants' movement, and helped organize the Work-and-Study groups which went to France in 1920, a second most important nucleus for Communist activity. Then, while studying in Peking National University, he worked with Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu in organizing and founding the Chinese Communist Party in May 1921. As Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee he was later active in organizing the most militant revolutionary province in China. In 1925 he was editor of a Kuomintang magazine and Chief of the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang in Canton.

When the Split between the Communists and the Kuomintang began, Mao opposed Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Right Opportun-

ist line in wanting to virtually surrender to the Kuomintang, and in 1927 started his own policy of organizing a revolutionary army and forming Soviets. The other Communists deprecatingly called this "the rifle movement." But Chu Teh joined Mao at Chingkanshan, and their base eventually took over leadership of the whole Communist movement. In 1928 Mao won a campaign against "putschism" in favour of a moderate regular development, and in 1930 opposed the Leftist Li Li-san line, which was a sort of swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction from that of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. All political affairs being by that time in order, Mao then became first Chairman of the Soviet Republic of China in 1931. In 1934-35 he led the Red Army on its Long March to the Northwest.

It was Mao's opinion that the time for the war with Japan was rapidly approaching, and in August 1935 the Communist Party began its movement for co-operation in a democratic anti-Japanese United Front in exchange for giving up the Soviets, though at first Mao's estimation of the anti-Japanese situation was opposed by another veteran Communist, Chang Kuo-t'ao. Again, when the Sian Incident occurred in 1936, Mao threw his weight into the balance for enforcing a peaceful settlement, and a peaceful settlement it was. Bringing all the Communists and the Red Army into line with this United Front policy undoubtedly required first-rate political statesmanship and Mao Tsê-tung succeeded without causing a split in his Party. Throughout all the confusion and obscurity of the period in China between 1935 and the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937, Mao held fast and unwaveringly to his thesis that the anti-Japanese problem came first and that a war with Japan was not only inevitable but imminent, and cam-

paigned heartily against potential Trotskyists and Leftists who did not want to co-operate with the Kuomintang. He was correct again. And when the Liukouchiao Incident occurred on July 7, 1937, everybody in Yen-an looked worshipfully at their "genius," as they always call Mao Tsê-tung, and heaved a sigh of relief. Their apparently quixotic magnanimity in liquidating the crisis in Sian when there were no Japanese war clouds on the sultry horizon had looked like a desperate gamble—but Chairman Mao was in league with the Marxist gods. Mao Tsê-tung's achievement in carrying out his line so successfully would appear to be almost as great as when Lenin's single iron will bent the wavering Bolsheviks of Russia in the direction of a proletarian seizure of power in the October Revolution.

But the test of leadership for the Communists is only now beginning. China is today, after six months of war with Japan, reaching the gravest political crisis in its immediate history. What will be the course of the future? This is a very problematical question. Will there be a split in the Central Government? Will there be civil war again? In relation to this situation, Mao Tsê-tung's analysis of the relation of class forces in China is extremely pertinent.

Because Mao Tsê-tung is fitted by experience to be able to make first-hand pronouncements on the problems of Chinese society, I was very anxious to get a complete analysis of this complex question from him. I made up a long list of questions dealing with (1) the nature of Chinese society and of the Chinese Revolution, (2) the historical stages of the Chinese Revolution, and (3) the perspectives for the future. Chairman Mao was interested in dealing with the subject and agreed to write a "handbook" of the Chinese Revolution, which would

have been extremely valuable at the present moment, especially for all outsiders to read. He gave me the first interview on July 4, but when the Liukouchiao Incident occurred on July 7, had no time to continue and referred me to Lo Fu, the official Communist historian, and Wu Liang-p'ing, Mao's right-hand man.

Recently a good deal of scholarship has been brought to bear upon the study of the nature of Chinese society, and in particular upon the nature of Chinese "feudalism," notably by K. A. Wittfogel, the German authority on China. And various studies have been made of the "quadrilateral" character of the Chinese landlord and such. Therefore Mao Tsê-tung's comments are of particular interest. The nature of the Chinese Revolution was, in 1927, one of the major matters of dispute between the Trotskyists and Leninists in the Soviet Union and still seems to be agitating their stormy Marxist seas.

In this interview Mao Tsê-tung makes clear two complex features of the revolution in China which often are not understood by non-Marxists (nor indeed by Marxists themselves for that matter: (1) the fact that communists are leading an avowedly bourgeois-democratic-nationalist revolution in China with or without the aid of the bourgeoisie; and (2) why they claim to be a proletarian party, while most of the leaders are petty bourgeois and most of their mass movement for ten years has been in the peasantry. One point in Mao's interview, which interested me in connection with the answer to the latter question, is that the Chinese Communists seem to consider their Party itself equivalent to direct participation by the proletariat; that it maintains a proletarian program nationally and internationally, and so long as it keeps disci-

pline over the Red Army, can realize this. That is, objectively their whole movement is under proletarian leadership through control by the Communist Party, though subjectively its main constituent elements may not be rooted in the proletarian class. Of course, the proletariat is a given quantity for the Communists in China; they have had control of it from the beginning.

Here is Mao Tsê-tung's analysis of the elements in Chinese society and the driving forces of the Chinese Revolution:

"In order to understand the nature of the Chinese Revolution, it is, of course, first of all necessary to understand the nature of Chinese society.

"The nature of Chinese society may be summarized in a single phrase: It is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society. Different economic forms exist, but the feudal petty-commercial form is dominant, based mainly on rural economy. By petty-commercial economy I mean that stage of self-sufficient economy preceding the capitalist form and going back to the most backward stages, when goods are produced for self-consumption and not for commodity sale.

"However, China is also already in a stage of capitalist economy. To deny the existence of capitalist economy in China is incorrect. But this capitalist economy is made up of three parts: (1) individual capitalists, (2) the National Government, and (3) the imperialists. These three elements combined together form the capitalist structure of Chinese economy.

"This capitalist form is a new form of economy in China, and it is in conflict with Chinese feudal economy. Its power lies in the metropolitan cities, in communications, industry, mining, etc. However, capitalism is not yet in the dominant

position in Chinese economy because of imperialist oppression which creates a condition under which the native Chinese individual and National Government capitalism have no possibility of further development. In many phases of production the imperialist element is greater than the Chinese. Even in the case of the National Government enterprises such as railways and various industries, the capital resources came also originally from imperialism. Added to this is the fact that the Chinese customs are also restricted by the imperialists.

"From the above analysis, it is clear that the capitalist economy in China, as a whole, is under imperialist control. Likewise, the existence of a feudal form of economy hinders the development of capitalism in China.

"Looking at the economy of China as a whole, the feudal economy is in the dominant position. Looked at from the viewpoint of capitalist development, the colonial economy is the dominant form. This colonial economy, therefore, determine the nature of political and other relations with the imperialists and private capital, such as in the case of control of the customs, etc.

"From the above, we must conclude that Chinese society is semi-feudal and semi-colonial.

"Because these are the characteristics of Chinese society, the question of the nature of the Chinese Revolution is very easy to answer: It is an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, bourgeois-democratic-national revolution.

"One group does not agree to this analysis. the Trotskyist. In 1927, after the failure of the Great Revolution, they arrived at the following conclusion: that the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in China are already completed; the independence of the customs proving that the anti-feudal,



anti-imperialist stage of the revolution was over. The Trotskyist theory developed further to the point of declaring that the capitalist, and the feudal, form was dominant in Chinese economy. I noticed that recently, in a Trotskyist magazine, they have changed their viewpoint on the problem of imperialism, i.e., they agree that China is still under the domination of imperialism, but still affirm that the nature of Chinese economy is capitalistic. That capitalism has the leading role in China is a very queer viewpoint to come out with suddenly, when referring to a society which has been for so long dominated by imperialism.

"In accordance with their estimation of the nature of Chinese society, the Trotskyists conclude that the nature of the Chinese Revolution at present is not bourgeois but proletarian. Without any hesitation we are opposed to this viewpoint. We restate our position that the nature of Chinese society is semi-feudal and semi-colonial and that therefore the Chinese Revolution is anti-imperialist and anti-feudal.

"It will require a long period of struggle by the Chinese people to achieve the overthrow of the imperialist and feudal forces. The completion of these tasks of the revolution means, no doubt, the clearing of the road for the development of capitalism. But at the same time we hold that there is a possibility for the Chinese Revolution to avoid the future of capitalism and to turn into a Socialist revolution. Our reasons for this now follow.

"Now, in our discussion, we reach the third problem—the nature of the driving forces or dynamics of the Chinese Revolution. The main forces of the Chinese Revolution are the proletariat, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. Under certain circumstances the national bourgeoisie have the possi-

bility of joining this revolution. Under certain other circumstances they have the possibility of wavering. The enemies of the revolution are the imperialists and the Chinese landlords. Sometimes the national bourgeoisie are enemies of the revolution and sometimes not.

"The Chinese Revolution is led by the proletariat. Why, in a bourgeois revolution, is the proletariat in the leadership instead of the bourgeoisie? Why is the Chinese Revolution different from the bourgeois revolutions of past history? The reason is that China is in a state of semi-colonialism. Therefore, the force of the proletariat is relatively greater than that of the bourgeoisie. This is because the imperialists control the big industrial enterprises in China, instead of our native bourgeoisie. The combined workers of these big imperialist industries, together with the workers of the National Government and privately owned industries of China, are strong enough to take hegemony of the leadership over the weaker bourgeoisie.

"The working class in China numbers over two millions. Compared with the whole population, it is small in numbers, but compared with the bourgeoisie, it is a superior force. Under the combined pressure of the imperialists, the Chinese capitalists and the feudal forces, the Chinese proletariat has developed the strongest revolutionary character. Also, the Chinese proletariat is affected by the world revolutionary forces—that is, the development of proletarian revolution in the world as a whole. The establishment of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., especially, gave stimulus to the proletariat of China. After the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the Chinese proletariat rose to a politically conscious position and also began to play a role on the political stage

of China. Beginning at that same time, the Chinese Communist Party was also created.

"Summarizing the above, we may say that the proletariat and the Communist forces together in China, though numerically very small, are the most energetic and strongest single force.

"Fortunately the Chinese proletariat has had a very strong ally in revolution: that is, the peasantry. The peasants include over 80 per cent of the population of China, and because they are under the double oppression of both the Chinese feudal elements and the imperialists, their revolutionary character is very strong. Under the combined exploitation of the imperialists and the Chinese landlords, the Chinese peasantry must bear the burden of paying from 50 per cent to 80 per cent for land rent, and from 30 per cent to 100 per cent as usury interest rates. That is, if a peasant's land produces 100 *tan*, he must pay 50 per cent to 80 per cent to the landlord. And if he borrows money, which he must, he pays from 30 per cent to 100 per cent to the usurer.

"The problems before the peasantry are to own the land they till and to abolish the exploitation of imperialism. These problems cannot be solved by the bourgeois class. The peasant problem of China can only be solved by struggling decisively against imperialism and the feudal forces, under the leadership of the proletariat. Therefore, we say that the peasants are a strong, determined ally of the Chinese proletariat.

"The third driving force of the revolution is the city petty bourgeoisie. This includes the board mass of the students, the cultural intelligentsia, the small producers, the petty merchants and many free professionals. The majority of these forces can stand by the side of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution.

"The national bourgeoisie occupy a special position in China. They stand in a position of being either enemies of the revolution or part of the revolution itself. Sometimes they stand by the revolution. Sometimes they waver and stand by the side of the imperialists and such counter-revolutionary forces. Sometimes they stand by the side of the landlords. Sometimes they stand by the side of the petty bourgeoisie. The reason for this is that many of the capitalists have the nature of being compradores and semi-landlords. We do not include compradore bourgeoisie in the class of the national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie of China have their own capital for the most part, but it has a special relation to imperialist capital and also to the land. Those who rely chiefly on imperialist capital are to be classified with the compradore bourgeoisie, or, on the other hand, with the landlords. The landlords and compradores are fundamentally related with imperialism, so they become one of the main enemies of the revolution.

"The nature of the present Nanking Government is an alliance of landlords, capitalists and compradore bourgeoisie.

"Under a situation of the direct occupation of China by imperialism when the landlords and compradores face a direct menace to their own interests by this certain imperialist, these two have the possibility of not opposing the anti-imperialist struggle, and in an emergency they can stand by this struggle—except, of course, those whose interests are either not affected by this aggression or whose interests are united with that particular aggressor.

"From the above, it is clear why our anti-imperialist national United Front is actually national—that is, why it includes all Chinese except traitors. This is the special charac-

teristic of our national front as compared with a 'people's front.'

"The second characteristic of our United Front is that it is initiated by the political party of the proletariat, and in its later development it is only under the leadership of this proletarian party that its organization can be completed and its tasks accomplished. This is because the proletariat is the only conscious and decisive revolutionary force in China. The bourgeoisie cannot take up responsibility for this task.

"Because of the nature of the political and economic conditions of China, there exists this possibility: that after the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal bourgeois-democratic-national revolution succeeds in a certain degree and the democratic revolution reaches a certain stage, this revolution will conclude its victory by transforming into a Socialist revolution. We Communists believe that such a possibility exists.

"The first stage of the revolution is the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. During its transformation it will pass through the Democratic Dictatorship of the Peasants and Workers.

"All of the above opinions are in agreement with the analysis of the nature of the Chinese Revolution as made in resolutions of the Communist Party at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern."

## (2) THE HISTORICAL STAGES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION: LO FU

Lo Fu is the National Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which has had its headquarters in Soviet territory for several years. He is consi-

dered to be one of its best Marxist theorists, along with Mao Tsê-tung and Po Ku. He has been Secretary since 1934, those preceding him being: Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 1927; Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, 1927-28; Hsiang Chung-hua, 1928-31; a Secretariat committee (no secretary), 1931-33; Po Ku, 1933-34.\*

In appearance Lo Fu is a most unusual intellectual type. "Bumps of knowledge" stick out all over his massive head, he wears thick-lensed spectacles, and his thoughtful features are very irregular. He is tall and thin and gives one the impression of being very much overworked. He is at present the only important Communist leader to have studied in America, incidentally, and also, I think, the only one born in Shanghai. He speaks good English and was once a fancier of literature and novelist.

Lo Fu has had a long background of study, and it is of interest to record his own account of his life:

"I was born of kulak peasants in Nanghuei, Shanghai, south of the Whangpoo River on the Pootung shore. I studied at the Woosung Middle School (a fishery school) for three years, then went to the Yellow River Conservancy College in Nanking three years, my teachers all being returned students from America. I left school to participate in the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and began to read for myself in literature, philosophy and social science. Formerly I had studied mostly natural sciences—physics and mathematics. Returning to Shanghai, I became an editor in the Chung Hua Book Company and edited a series of New Culture books. At

\*Of these secretaries, it is of interest to observe that Ch'en Tu-hsiu was imprisoned, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai killed in Fukien with the Red Army, and Hsiang Chung-hua arrested and executed in 1931, Po Ku is now in the Soviet districts with Lo Fu.

that time I had become a bit of a *littérateur*. Mao Tun [the famous Chinese novelist] was a good friend. We worked together in publishing houses, such as the Commercial Press. I also met Mao Tsê-tung through his brother, who was a Leftist.

"Then I went to Japan for six months and on to San Francisco, where I worked on the *Ta Tung Pao* newspaper for a year and a half as translator. In 1921 I studied in the library of the University of California. I had always been very much interested in America.

"While in America I joined the New China Party, a bourgeois-revolutionary party, made up mostly of merchants, but having also some students. It was dominated by the *pong* and *tang* men there. I resigned from this party and returned to Shanghai, after which I taught school in Szechuan during 1923-24. In Szechuan I organized a New Culture and revolutionary movement among the students in a girls' normal school. Because of this I was expelled from this school, and I got a new position in a boys' normal school, from which I was also expelled. I then started a newspaper, together with some students. I was working with Communists at that time but had not joined the Party. I then had the petty-bourgeois attitude of wanting personal freedom.

"I returned to Shanghai, and by then understood that the reactionaries could be conquered only through organized force, so joined the Communist Party in 1925. I worked for a while in Shanghai and Soochow, then went to Moscow in 1926 and studied at Sun Yet-sen University there for five years, after which I joined the Institute of Red Professors for three years. I then taught in Lenin College a short time and returned to Shanghai in 1930.

"After the arrest of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a temporary Politburo was formed in Shanghai, in which I worked for two years. One of the members was arrested and betrayed my address, but I had a lucky escape. I fled to the Soviet districts in 1933 and made the march across Szechuan to Shensi.

"My first interest in Communist theory began when I read *The A B C of Communism* in 1925. Ch'en Tu-hsiu had a great influence on me, as also on many others. After my studies in Moscow, I lost interest in literature as such and centered all my attention on Marxism and revolutionary work. I once translated D'Annunzio's *Gioconda*, Oscar Wilde's *Ballad of Reading Goal*, and some things from Tolstoy and Turgenev, and published a novel called *Journey*. I have written many articles on Soviet construction, theory, policy, tactics, etc. At present I write chiefly on the Japanese question."

Lo Fu wrote the textbook on the history of the Chinese Revolution which is used in all the Communist schools and academies, and has made a special study of this subject. Therefore his analysis of the historical stages of the revolution has special value as explaining the guiding principle by which the Chinese Communists have been directed during their long tumultuous struggle.

After I had interviewed Mao Tsê-tung on the nature of the Chinese Revolution, he referred me to Lo Fu for the second interview on the historical stages of the movement. The following talk was on July 14, Bastille Day, just after the Liukouchiao Incident of July 7:

"The prelude to the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution was the Reform Movement of 1898, but the revolution-



ary movement did not begin until 1911. During what we call the 'Great Revolution' from 1925 to 1927, the proletariat took the leadership of this bourgeois revolution.

"The T'ai'ing Rebellion in the middle of the nineteenth century, which preceded the bourgeois revolution, was a peasant uprising, but it was different from the agrarian rebellions of the past because it was the result of imperialist aggression in China. It broke out just after the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and during the negotiations between China, France and Great Britain in Tientsin. This rebellion failed because it was fundamentally a peasant movement and there was neither an industrial bourgeois nor a proletarian class in China at that time to give it leadership. Such a peasant revolt can succeed only under two conditions: (a) under the leadership of a bourgeoisie as in France, or (b) under the leadership of the proletariat as in the U.S.S.R.

"When the T'ai'ing Rebellion failed, imperialist aggression in China was very successful and caused a great change in Chinese society, especially after the Sino-Japanese war. The intelligentsia began to realize the danger of national subjugation. This consciousness was reflected in the 1898 program of the Emperor Kuanghsu, which was an attempt to save the fate of the nation by reform from the top down to the bottom. This was the first expression of the realization by the bourgeois intellectuals of the need for reform, but they did not recognize the potentialities of the force of the masses and had no mass support—so their Reform lasted only one hundred days. The situation was comparable with that in Russia in 1812 under the Decembrists. The demands of the bourgeoisie were just beginning to be reflected in the upper strata of the bourgeois intelligentsia. This 1898 Reform

was only a reflection of capitalist ideas among the ruling class. K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were both bureaucrats and semi-feudal in their ideas.

"At the time of this political change in 1898 Dr Sun Yat-sen also began his political activity. He did not participate in the movement then, but in a letter to K'ang Yu-wei expressed his political opinions.

"Not long after the Reform Movement, another peasant uprising occurred—the Boxer Rebellion. This opposed imperialist aggression, but it also remained a peasant movement because it had no bourgeois leadership and was utilized by the reactionary Empress Dowager; therefore it failed.

"After this time the true imperialist penetration into China began with the investing of foreign capital in railways. The previous relation of imperialism to China had been one of market and commodity. Now the period of capital export to China started.

### *I. The First Stage of the Chinese Revolution*

"In the meantime the native Chinese bourgeoisie was gradually developing and the party representing its interests was organized—the Tung Meng Hui. The Manchu regime was weak and degenerate, and the bourgeoisie led a united movement against the monarchy. The Tung Meng Hui united all the elements in its own bourgeois class with the landlord and officials, and this opposition to the Manchus resulted in the 1911 Revolution.

"The nature of the 1911 Revolution was bourgeois, but it failed because the bourgeoisie had formed a united front not only with classes which opposed the monarchy and the Manchus, but also with feudal forces such as Yuan Shih-k'ai. It

first compromised with the feudal forces, and secondly, because it expected help from the imperialists to overthrow the Manchus, compromised also with imperialism. Therefore, after successfully overthrowing the Manchus, the revolution took no further steps toward destroying the feudal forces, nor did it develop into anti-imperialism. It was too weak, and was soon subjugated by the feudal-imperialist forces. None of its fundamental problems were solved, so Sun Yat-sen was obliged to retire from the presidency of the so-called Republic, and Yuan Shih-k'ai, the leader of the reactionary elements, was substituted for him. Yuan represented feudalism and was the subject of imperialism, also, so after he became president he was supported by foreign loans and enabled to forcibly repress the revolutionary struggle in the South.

"The weakness and compromising subjugationist nature of the bourgeoisie of China was clearly shown in this 1911 Revolution—quite unlike the strength of the bourgeoisie of France in the French Revolution, which guarded its own interests.

"Shortly after 1911 the imperialist World War began, in 1914, and the general imperialist pressure on China was relaxed, except that of the Japanese, which increased. Because of the negligence of the imperialist powers in the East during the World War, the real Chinese national bourgeoisie was able to have a comparatively rapid development. This was the golden age of the bourgeoisie of China.

"Because of the strong development of capitalism in China during the World War, the bourgeois May Fourth Movement was possible in 1919. This anti-feudal, anti-imperialist movement was led by bourgeois intellectuals. The leadership, however, failed to recognize the *real* feudal forces and

the *real* imperialist forces, and its two slogans were only against Confucianism on the one hand and Japan on the other. They attacked only the agents of Japanese imperialism represented by the Anfu Clique, such as Tsao Ju-lin, Liu Tsung-yu and Chang Tsung-hsiang, and only barely started their struggle against feudalism. Therefore, after the few outstanding Japanese agents were driven out, the movement stopped before realizing the central revolutionary tasks of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism.

“However, during the May Fourth Movement the new proletarian class also developed, and its political party was organized when the Communist Party was formed in 1921, the first National Delegates Conference being held in July. The Pinham Railway Incident of February 7, 1923, marks the first big step forward of the Chinese proletariat in struggling for leadership with the bourgeoisie. From then on the proletariat had its role on the political stage of China. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who had been the leader of the May Fourth Movement, was a Leftist bourgeois intellectual fighting for Democracy and Science. Communist theories had no influence in this May Fourth Movement, though Ch'en Tu-hsiu soon afterward became the leader in organizing the Communist Party. The study of Communism and the Russian Revolution in China began only after May Fourth.

“In order to achieve its liberation, the Chinese proletariat—and its Communist Party—realized that it could not depend upon its own power alone for success, but must unite with other forces in order to overthrow imperialism and feudalism—that it must join the national revolution. Therefore in 1923 the Communist Party proposed to Sun Yat-sen that a United Front be formed against the imperialist and feudal forces.

"Sun Yat-sen said truly enough that he had struggled for revolution 'forty years.' But during all those years he somehow never found the central revolutionary tasks of his revolution. He at different times united with this militarist or with that imperialist, and then exchanged these alliances for new ones. Only under the leadership of the Communist Party did he begin to understand the nature of the Chinese Revolution.

"Sun accepted the proposal for a United Front and on January 30, 1924, called the First Kuomintang National Congress to recognize his party in accordance with his new understanding of the tasks of the revolution. This began the period of co-operation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

"Under this United Front the Chinese revolution advanced by leaps and bounds, such as in the May Thirtieth Movement, the establishment of revolutionary sovereignty in Canton, and the organization of the National Revolutionary Army. In 1926 the revolutionary army started the Northern Expedition and scored immediate victories. Within six months it had reached the area south of the Yangtze River. This was the high tide of revolutionary victory.

"In the meanwhile the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for leadership in the revolution had become very serious. The *real* leadership was in the hands of the proletariat, and the Chinese bourgeoisie utilized every method to try to win this away from it. During the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek became alarmed at the fast development of the mass movement and the strengthening of the leadership of the proletarian party. He could not control this development, and this was the first reason for his

betrayal of the revolution. The second reason was that the imperialist powers utilized their influence and money to threaten, bribe and induce the bourgeoisie to betray the United Front. For instance, when the National Revolutionary Army entered Nanking, the imperialist gunboats bombarded it because they were terrified of the advance of the revolution. The third reason for the betrayal is that when Chiang Kai-shek reached Shanghai, the city was in the hands of the armed proletariat following the third uprising there. Shanghai was the centre of the national bourgeoisie, and they were frightened and felt uneasy, so demanded that Chiang Kai-shek disarm the armed forces of the proletariat. This resulted in the April Twelfth Incident in 1927, after which the bourgeoisie withdrew from the United Front, betrayed the revolution and began their big slaughter, though only a few hundred were killed on April 12, and not many were killed until after the Canton Commune.

"This marks the end of the first stage of the Chinese Revolution.

"After the national bourgeoisie ran away from the United Front, the remaining forces in this front—the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and peasants—joined together, forming an alliance under the Wuhan Government. But soon the upper leaders of the petty bourgeoisie followed the lead of the bourgeoisie and also betrayed the revolution, such as Wang Ching-wei.

"In July 1927 the Communist Party and the Kuomintang finally split.

"Under the successive betrayals of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, the Chinese Revolution suffered a serious

setback and great losses. The betrayal of the Wuhan leaders concluded the 1925-27 Great Revolution.

"Although the remaining revolutionary forces—the soldiers, workers and peasants—suffered losses because of these betrayals, they attempted to recover the revolutionary situation. This effort was expressed in the Nanchang Uprising of the soldiers and in other uprisings which followed after that. The Canton Commune was the last battle in the retreat of the revolution, and concludes this revolutionary stage. After the Canton Commune, the Chinese Revolution was at its ebb, and China fell into a period of Reaction.

"This reign of Reaction continued for two years, from 1928 to 1930. During this time many civil wars broke out, such as Chiang Kai-shek's fighting with Kwangtung and Kwangsi and the North, etc. In the period of Reaction, Chiang Kai-shek did not solve any of the national problems. All of the problems which created the Great Revolution of 1925-27 remained, and the livelihood of the people became even worse, at the same time that the influence of the imperialists became greater. Therefore in 1930 the new revolutionary tide began.

"To put it briefly, during this time the Nanking power was made up of an alliance of the landlords and bourgeoisie. This already differed from the governments preceding the Great Revolution because *the bourgeoisie now participated* in the government. But it was a reactionary government, and opposed any kind of revolutionary movement of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. This government also opposed any kind of revolution, including the bourgeois democratic movement itself, but still talked in revolutionary phrases. In suppressing the revolution the two classes were

united and on the same line, but there still remained within this unity the conflict between landlordism and the bourgeoisie. Even between the bourgeoisie and the imperialists there was also a conflict. The Chinese bourgeoisie was subjugated to imperialism, but still in conflict with it.

"The bourgeoisie hoped to use the method of peaceful compromise to relieve themselves from feudal and imperialist pressure, but this method only put them under subjugation to the feudal and imperialist forces. This is why the bourgeoisie still had so many slogans such as, 'Recover Customs Autonomy' and 'Reform the Unequal Treaties.' They actually did make a declaration modifying the Unequal Treaties and formally abolishing extraterritoriality. But, of course, with these national reformist slogans and the method of peaceful compromise they could not possibly solve any of their problems.

"In China the bourgeoisie has only two alternatives: (1) to co-operate with the proletariat and the peasantry to fight for revolution, or (2) to be subjugated to the forces of imperialism and feudalism. Since it did not co-operate with the peasants and proletariat, it had to be subjugated—so all its slogans and peaceful solutions achieved nothing.

"It was because of their failure during this period to solve any of the revolutionary problems that the livelihood of the people became worse, the condition of imperialist pressure worse, and the militarist wars worse. Therefore in 1930 a new rise in the revolutionary movement began.

"At this time the Li Li-san line of the Communist Party began—in June 1930. Li Li-san estimated this new revolutionary rise as a high tide of revolution, and based on this erroneous estimation, under his line the Party had uprisings



everywhere, and ordered the Red Army to capture the central cities, such as Wuhan and Changsha. All these attempts failed with great losses, and the Li Li-san line ended after six months—at the end of 1930.

“After the correction of the Li Li-san line the Soviet Revolution developed greatly, and now we come to the stage of the Soviet Revolution.

## II. *The Soviet Stage of the Revolution*

“During 1928 and 1929 many uprisings followed after the Canton Commune. The nature of these uprisings was self-defensive on the part of the proletarian and peasant forces in order to protect their own interests. Partisan groups developed everywhere, which turned into partisan warfare.

“The Soviet slogan was decided upon by the Communist Party only after the reaction and betrayal of the bourgeoisie. The purpose of forming Soviets was to continue the national-bourgeois revolution after its betrayal by the national bourgeoisie, because its tasks still remained and none of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles had been realized. The original revolutionary United Front had had the four elements, the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, peasants and workers. Now the bourgeoisie and upper petty bourgeoisie betrayed, so only the peasants and workers remained to carry out the tasks of the revolution. These tasks remained the same as under the Kuomintang, but in the new stage were carried out by the Soviets of peasants and workers, together with the city poor and some petty-bourgeois elements—of course, the peasants are part of the petty-bourgeois class. The bourgeoisie would not join the Soviets because this class was then counter-revolutionary.

"The Communist Party decided upon the Soviet slogan at its First Congress held just after the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, and used it first in Hailofeng, Kwangtung, in the last months of 1927.

"The adoption of the Soviet slogan in China meant opening the struggle for seizure of power and the overthrow of the Kuomintang. This Soviet program obtained until after the Sian Incident of December 12, 1936, but it does not obtain now. The Soviet form still existed after the Sian Incident but not for the purpose of overthrowing the Kuomintang and seizing power—it continued only pending the completion of negotiations with the Kuomintang and the finish of the democratic elections in the Soviet regions. The changing of the Soviet slogan must naturally be accompanied by giving up also all symbols of the seizure of power, such as the Red Star and the independent name of the Red Army.

"The Soviet in China was different from that in the U.S.S.R. The Chinese Soviet was a workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship. The Russian Soviet was a form of proletarian dictatorship. It is true that there were Soviets in the bourgeois Kerensky period in Russia, but these were also different from the Soviets in China. These Russian Soviets were a proletarian-peasant dictatorship in form but had not seized power. They were attached to the Kerensky Government, and this Government depended on the support of the Soviets for its maintenance. If at that time Kerensky could have carried out the program of the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship, the revolutionary transformation could have been achieved without bloodshed. But the Kerensky Government became reactionary, and the Soviets turned reactionary with it and helped in the slaughter of the peas-

ants and workers. The Soviets became the instrument of the bourgeoisie, so Lenin abolished his slogan of 'All Power to the Soviets.' When Lenin first proposed the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' he expected the Soviet sovereignty to break away from the influence of the bourgeoisie and to become a real organ of the peasants and workers, through the medium of which the transformation to the proletarian dictatorship could be realized peacefully. This plan failed, so Lenin changed that slogan to slogans demanding armed uprising and the overthrow of the Kerensky Provincial Government. Lenin did not again put out the slogan of establishing Soviet sovereignty until after the October Revolution had changed the Soviets into a real proletarian base.

"The Kerensky period in Russia was different from that in China because the feudal Czarist regime was overthrown and the bourgeoisie had already gained power, so the Russian bourgeois revolution was fundamentally achieved. Because of this Lenin changed to the slogan of demanding a proletarian revolution. But in China the bourgeoisie only participated in the class bloc of the United Front and did not solve any of the revolutionary problems. Because these tasks were not accomplished, the problem of the Chinese Soviet movement was how to complete these bourgeois tasks, and not how to change to the stage of the proletarian revolution. Only should the Soviet movement be victorious in the whole of China would the problem of transforming to the Socialist Revolution arise.

"In this analysis the Communist Party disagrees with the Trotskyists, who think that after the 1925-27 Revolution the Chinese bourgeoisie already began their rule, so that by 1930 the nature of the Chinese Revolution was no longer *bourgeois*;

that the bourgeois stage was fundamentally completed and the nature of the revolution from then on should be a Socialist Revolution. Even during the Wuhan period the Trotskyists proposed the Soviet slogan, and the Communist Party refused to accept this because it meant the overthrow of the then still revolutionary Kuomintang, and this would have been wrong.

"The Communist Party now gives up the Soviet slogan because we think the progressive change within the Kuomintang has already begun. To continue with the Soviet slogan would be to demand the overthrow of the Kuomintang, which would mean civil war and make it impossible to realize the anti-Japanese struggle.

"The Soviet Revolution in China may be divided into four stages:

"1. The period of uprisings and of self-defensive partisan warfare under the leadership of the Communist Party, from 1927 to 1930;

"2. The period of the transformation of the partisans into the Red Army and of the partisan areas into Soviet areas, from 1930 to the end of 1931;

"3. The period from the First All-China Soviet Delegates Congress at the end of 1931 to the Second Soviet Delegates Congress in February 1934, which was followed by the retreat from the Central Soviet districts;

"4. The period from the beginning of the Long March to the concentration of our three Front Armies in the Northwest in October 1936, just before the Sian Incident.

"The uprisings of 1928 and 1929 soon transformed into partisan warfare for self-defense, and after the Li Li-san period in 1930 the partisans were transformed into the regular Red Army and the small partisan areas became Soviet-

ized. At the same time we shattered the first three campaigns of the Kuomintang. This phase lasted until September 18, 1931, when Japan took Manchuria. During this time the Soviet base became established.

"After the first three Kuomintang campaigns had been destroyed, the First All-China Soviet Delegates Congress was held on December 11, 1931, the anniversary of the Canton Commune, and for the first time a Central Soviet Government was established.

"The years between the First and the Second All-China Soviet Delegates Congress, held in February 1934, mark the period of the highest Soviet power. After the defeat of the Fourth Campaign in 1933, Chiang Kai-shek concentrated all his forces, changed his tactics, and began a Fascist movement and the Lushan Training School in order to destroy us. This Fifth Campaign obliged us to change our locality. But it must be pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek could not have organized this grand Fifth Campaign had he not received sufficient support from the feudal and imperialist elements interested in defeating the Soviets.

"All During the period after 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had relied on imperialist support, but at first the Soviet movement was not regarded seriously by the imperialist interests. After it had developed, they felt the menace, and the conflicts which had formerly existed between the imperialists and the Chinese bourgeoisie and landlords decreased in the face of common danger, so they co-operated more intimately against the Red Army:

"The Kuomintang Reaction was greatest just after the Great Revolution in 1927, but reached its second most reactionary point at the time of the Fifth Campaign in 1934. This

Reaction is peculiar to the Chinese militarists and bourgeoisie. It began in 1927 because they were afraid of the revolution and turned against the peasants' and workers' movement. Then, after this, their internal conflicts resumed, during which period the revolution developed again, taking advantage of these internal conflicts. Again, when the Soviet power rose, the new Reaction caused a new alliance to form within the ruling powers in order to suppress the revolution.

"At the time of the Fifth Campaign in 1934 the reactionary methods of the Kuomintang had all greatly improved over those used previously, because a Chinese Fascist movement began which utilized the experience of the foreign Fascists in suppressing revolution, even to the organization of Blue Shirts, etc.

"The nature of the Kuomintang did not begin to change until 1935. After the Ho-Umetzu Agreement in 1933 the Chinese bourgeoisie began to waver, and this wavering was greatly increased after the December Ninth Student Movement in 1935. But though the bourgeoisie was wavering during those dark days in North China, there was no decisive change until after the Sian Incident in December 1936.

"The changes within the Chinese bourgeoisie cannot be plotted on a regular curve, but only in a line with many rises and falls. Changes occur abruptly because of inherent contradictions, and the bourgeoisie will follow this same line in the future.

"The fourth stage of the Soviet Revolution began with the Long March in October 1934. This was a great movement to change our locality from one place to another in China. The first Front Red Army left the Kiangsi Central Soviet district, the Second Front Red Army left the Hunan-

Hupei Soviet district, the Fourth Front Red Army left the Szechuan-South Shensi Soviet district, and the 25th Red Army left the Ouyüwan (Hupei-Anhui-Honan) Soviet district, all joining in this Great Migration. In this Great Migration we suffered a loss, but Chiang Kai-shek also failed. He wanted to destroy us—and could not.

“The period of the Great Migration ended only when all three main Red Front armies had completed the Long March and concentrated together in the Northwest in October 1936, just before the Sian Incident.

### *III. The United Front Against Japan*

“The Sian Incident started a new stage in the Chinese Revolution. There the development of the Soviet movement ended, and the new period of a United Front began, which will continue in the war against Japan.

“This new period of the United Front may be divided into two phases: (1) The period beginning with the December Ninth Student Movement in 1935 to the Sian Incident one year later, on December 12, 1936, which may be called the preparatory period for the realization of the United Front; and (2) the period from the Sian Incident to the war against the Japanese, when the co-operation on the United Front program actually began.”

#### (3) THE STORY OF THE RED ARMY: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CHU TEH

After the Split between the Communists and the Kuomintang in 1927 the decade of Soviet Revolution began. This started with the Nanchang Uprising in 1927 and ended when all the main Red Armies had left their original Soviet bases

and concentrated in the Northwest in October 1936, just before the Sian Incident, completing their Great Migration northward. Shortly after this interview with Chu Teh, the fighting with Japan began, and in August 1937 the Red Armies were reorganized under the Central Government forces of China as the "Eighth Route Army."

In the beginning this Communist-led armed movement was only an attempt to salvage what remained of the "Great Revolution" of 1925-27 after the Kuomintang Reaction. The disastrous defeat of the Canton Commune in December 1927 was the last gesture of the Chinese proletariat in self-defense, and by the end of 1927 the revolutionary "Kuomintang" soldiers' movement was likewise annihilated, when the troops from the Nanchang Uprising were destroyed. Until 1930 the partisan uprisings of the peasantry were also self-defensive. Then the Soviets took the offensive, and by the time of the First Soviet Congress in December 1931, the partisan units had been transformed into the regular Red Army and the partisan areas converted into Soviets, so the Soviet Republic of China was proclaimed and its independent government set up in opposition to Nanking.

It is of interest to note that when the Split occurred in 1927 the Communists took away the best units in the Kuomintang armies—the "Ironsides." And later on others of the best Kuomintang soldiery deserted to the Red Army: in 1931 the Ningtu Uprising occurred when the whole 26th Route Army formerly under Feng Yu-hsiang joined the Reds. Chu Pei-teh's soldiers had deserted to the Communists almost daily during the fighting in Kiangsi, and in 1929 Lo P'ing-hui, one of Chu Pei-teh's commanders, led an uprising of *min' t'uan* in Kian and deserted to the Reds.



The finest military unit during the Northern Expedition of 1926 and 1927 was the Kuomintang's 4th Route Army under Chang Fa-kuei, which won the name of the "Ironsides." This "Ironsides" army consisted of the 11th, 20th and 4th Kuomintang armies, having altogether about fifty thousand troops, the 11th and 20th armies numbering some thirty thousand. During the Nanchang Uprising the two divisions of the 20th Army followed their commander, Ho Lung, and all of Yeh T'ing's 24th Division of the 11th Army followed him in the uprising together with two regiments (under Chou Shih-li) of the 25th Division of the 4th Army, who joined with Yeh T'ing. All together Yeh T'ing had ten thousand followers during the Uprising. The entire number of "Ironsides" troops participating in the uprising was about twenty-five thousand.

The new 9th Army organized by Chu Teh during the Nanchang Uprising was made up of seven hundred cadets from the Military Training School in Nanchang, of which Chu Teh was Principal, together with some porcelain and railway workers. The 9th Army, according to Chu Teh, had all together three thousand men originally. Later on, workers from the Canton Commune and other cadets joined Chu Teh.

After the Nanchang Uprising the insurrectionary troops marched to the "home of revolution," the province of Kwangtung, hoping to re-establish a revolutionary base there, but they were almost annihilated in the fighting. After the defeat of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing in Swatow, Kwangtung, they together had only two thousand men left. Of these, three hundred of Ho Lung's forces escaped and joined Chu Teh. Most of the rest went to Hailofeng to help establish the Hailofeng Soviet, where they were annihilated. Chu Teh himself

lost a thousand men in San-ho-pa, north Kwangtung, alone, and fought in the Tungkiang (East River) district later with only fifteen hundred troops and a thousand peasant partisans, of whom 80 per cent were women (whose husbands had emigrated to the South Seas and left the farms for their wives to take care of). Chu Teh collected some of the remnant troops, which, including the remnants from Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, numbered only twelve hundred men, and retreated to South Hunan, where he led a peasant revolt and increased his army to ten thousand. Just before this South Hunan Revolt in January 1928, Chu Teh could muster together only two regiments, two thousand men. Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing were lucky to escape singly with their lives. Yeh T'ing helped organize the Canton Commune in December, then went abroad and has not been heard of publicly until 1938, when the New Fourth Army was formed, of which he was given superior command. Ho Lung escaped to Shanghai, then made his way to Hunan, where he organized a new army entirely from peasants.

The main force of the Canton Commune was also one of the best Kuomintang units, the Chao Tao Tuan (Special Training Regiment), who were students from the Wuchang branch of Whampoa Academy called the "Central Political and Military Academy." Only twelve hundred of the Chao Tao Tuan escaped from the Commune and went to Hailofeng to help defend the new Soviet there. They were reorganized as the 4th Division. The other military unit at Hailofeng was the 2nd Division, made up of eight hundred soldiers, who were all remnants of the armies which had participated in the Nanchang Uprising. They had escaped to Hailofeng from the disastrous defeat in Kwangtung. These

two thousand soldiers were annihilated almost to a man when Hailofeng was destroyed.

Therefore, of the whole twenty-five thousand of the Nanchang Uprising, only twelve hundred remained at the end of 1927, and the Communists had to make a fresh start among the peasantry. These twelve hundred Nanchang veterans, together with some survivors of the Canton Commune, were later organized into the 1st Division of the First Red Army Corps, commanded by Cheng Ken—the Red Army's finest, which has never been defeated. This was a tragic loss, not only because of the sacrifice of first-rate soldiery, but because nearly all of the armed proletariat were also annihilated.

The proletarian constituency of the earliest Red Army movement must be noted. For instance, Yeh T'ing's 24th Division of the 'Ironsides' had originally been organized by him, beginning with one regiment of Kwangtung peasants in 1925. In Hunan he increased his men to five regiments of two thousand men each, and was joined by many miners from Hanyehping and Anyang, as well as some railway workers. At one time nearly all the soldiers in Yeh T'ing's division were Hanyehping miners, many being killed in the attack on Wu-chang in 1926. It so happened that the biggest iron mines in China, the Hanyehping Mines near Wuhan (composed of the Anyang, Hanyang and Tayeh mines), closed down in 1925, and threw a hundred thousand proletarians out of work, free for armed revolt. These had all been trained by the famous Communist Li Li-san, and were very militant revolutionaries. Mao Tsê-tung's first worker-peasant army in 1927 had three regiments, of which the first was made up of Hanyang miners, the second of peasant guards, and the third of insurrectionary soldiers from Wuhan. Therefore the Commu-

nists were correct in calling their first army the "Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army," for the proletariat certainly had leadership in it.

While Ho Lung, Chu Teh and Yeh T'ing were suffering defeat in the south, Mao Tsê-tung had started his own army in Hunan and after heavy fighting saved a thousand of his troops, which he led to the mountain fortress Chingkanshan. In May 1928 Chu Teh joined Mao at Chingkanshan and combined their previously isolated forces. The "Chu-Mao" pair then set forth to organize Soviets with their 4th Red Army. From his time on the history of the Red Army was one of brilliant successes against great odds, until the defeat in the Fifth Campaign in 1934.

Here is the account of the development of the Red Army, given to me by Chu Teh, its commander-in-chief:

"The history of the Red Army of China may be divided into three periods:

"*First*, the period from the Nanchang Uprising in 1927 to the First Soviet Congress in December 1931, which included (a) the establishment of our first base on the mountain Chingkanshan in Kiangsi to the Nanking Government's First Campaign against us, and (b) the period from this First Campaign in December 1932 to the First Congress;

"*Second*, the period from the First Soviet Congress to the beginning of the Long March to the north in October 1934; and

"*Third*, the period from the long March to the present.

## I

"The original nucleus of what later became the Red Army derived from four main sources: (1) the Nanchang Uprising

of August 1, 1927; (2) the Autumn Uprisings in Hunan (i.e., the Autumn Crop Uprising led by Mao Tsê-tung on August 15, 1927, and the South Hunan Revolt led by Chu Teh on January 1, 1928); (3) the Canton Commune of December 11, 1927; and (4) insurrectionary revolutionary troops deserting from the White armies generally.

• *The Nanchang Uprising*

"The movement to form a Red Army began when certain of the best revolutionary troops of the Kuomintang rebelled against the counter-revolutionary swing of the bourgeois class toward betraying the Great Revolution of 1925-27. The Nanchang Uprising in Kiangsi was the first expression of this. This was the revolt of part of the troops of the finest Kuomintang army corps of the Northern expedition, Chang Fa-kuei's 'Ironsides.' This was the strongest army, militarily and politically, of the whole Expedition, and consisted of the 4th, 11th and 20th armies. Ho Lung, commander of the 20th Army, together with Yeh T'ing, a division commander of the 11th Army, led their troops in the uprising. These were joined by a new 9th Army created during the Uprising, of which I was vice-commander.

"After the Nanchang Uprising we marched from Kiangsi to Kwangtung on our 'Eastern Expedition.' Defeated in Kwangtung, we retreated in two routes. One route went to Hailofeng, where it later helped organize the first Soviet there with P'eng P'ai. The other route under my command, went to Kiangsi and Hunan, where we organized the South Hunan Revolt and expanded the army. We fought a hard struggle against the White every day at this time. As a re-

sult of the South Hunan Revolt we were able to form a new army of ten thousand men, and changed our name to the '1st Division of the Peasants' and Workers' Revolutionary Army,' carrying red banners.

### *Chingkanshan*

"In the meantime Mao Tsê-tung had led the Autumn Crop Uprising and failed. He then led his troops to the mountain Chingkanshan on the Kiangsi-Hunan border. During this time, therefore, the Red Army was in two groups. From January to May 1928 I led the forces in Hunan and Mao Tsê-tung those at Chingkanshan. At this time there was civil war between Chiang Kai-shek and T'ang Sheng-chih, and I took my troops to Chingkanshan to join with Mao. This was in May 1928. We combined our forces as the 4th Peasants' and Workers' Red Army, with myself as commander and Mao as political commissar. This new 4th Army had three divisions, the 10th, 11th and 12th. Each Division had two regiments, but only two of these regiments were well equipped and trained. One of these had survived from the Nanchang Uprising, and the other derived from deserters from the Kuomintang armies in South Hunan.

"During the time at Chingkanshan there were three small campaigns against us, all of which we defeated. The first was organized by the war lords and provincial troops of Hunan, Kiangsi and Kwangtung provinces. Each province sent two armies against us. The diameter of Chingkanshan was about 120 *li* and we were in an excellent strategic position, being between the borders of all three provinces. Our tactics were to attack the Kiangsi troops only. We selected Kiangsi for attack because in the Kiangsi troops under Chu Pei-teh we

still had some Party workers, so his men often, deserted to us and were influenced by our ideas. We first defeated the expedition from Kiangsi, then the Hunan and Kwangtung armies retreated without fighting.

"The second drive was commanded by Chu Pei-teh, and we concentrated all our forces to annihilate his expedition. The Hunan troops did not co-operate with Chu Pei-teh because of mutual antagonisms, so he failed to maintain his power.

"During the third of these small campaigns, P'eng Teh-huai led an uprising of his Kuomintang troops in P'ingkiang, Hunan, Liu Yang *hsien*, and joined the Red Army. This helped us at Chingkanshan very much because it made the Kuomintang troops immobile and they could not maneuver. So we were able to take a rest on Chingkanshan and reorganize our forces.

"After the third campaign, we attacked Fan Shih-tseng's division of Kuomintang troops and occupied Ch'engchow. Then we left Ch'engchow to attack Linghsien and Tsalin. The enemy tactics were to use long-time blockade and to pursue and follow us unceasingly. The Kuomintang blockade policy began at this time and also the policy of economic blockade. The enemy sent ten divisions to surround Chingkanshan. P'eng Teh-huai had at the same time brought many new troops to Chingkanshan, so our material position was very difficult because of lack of sufficient resources. We decided, therefore, to come down from the mountain, leaving P'eng to garrison our position there with his newly organized 5th Red Army. At this time we also received the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow, agreeing with the Soviet policy in agrarian areas.

*Formation of the Soviets*

"Forced to leave Chingkanshan, the period following was a very critical time for us. We broke the blockade and marched into Kiangsi, pursued by the enemy every step of the way. The numbers of our men decreased very much, but at the same time the masses around Chingkanshan formed Soviets, which gave us a new kind of strength. Linghsien, Tsalin, Hsueh'uan and Lienhua were Soviet villages then.

"When the 4th Red Army left Chingkanshan to march into south Kiangsi and west Fukien, the enemy moved armies of several provinces against us, including those of Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung and Hunan, relentlessly following on our heels. Our policy then was to avoid giving battle, and to resist only when attacked. It was in this extremity that we developed our tactics of maneuvering warfare to a high efficiency. Our path was from Chingkanshan to Chungyi, Tayü, Hsinfêng, Huich'ang, Juikin and Ningtu. Between Juikin and Ningtu there was heavy fighting, so we went to Tungku to rest for one week. After recuperating we went east to Kwangch'ang and Shihch'en, on the boundary of Kiangsi and Fukien, and then to Tingchow in Fukien. We defeated four regiments of the local Fukien army under Kuo Hung-min, and occupied the city of Tingchow. Volunteers from Tingchow added three regiments to our forces. We then organized the 24th Army. At this time there was a civil war among the provincial forces of the enemy, as the Kwangsi troops were just returning from the North, so we were able to take a rest from April to May 1929.

"When P'eng Teh-huai's 5th Red Army at Chingkanshan left for Juikin, it was defeated by the Kuomintang forces.



We of the 4th Red Army then met the 5th Army between Tingchow and Juikin. At this time we still had two military branches. The 5th Army then took our 4th Army's original route in order to collect new volunteers and went back to P'ingkiang. The 4th Army stayed in Kiangsi and west Fukien to organize partisan war. Then the Central Committee of the Communist Party appointed three places in which to develop Soviets—in west Fukien, south Kiangsi and in the Tungkiang (East River) district of Kwangtung.

"In 1929 our Soviet district expanded greatly. The Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwangtung armies then organized a new 'annihilating' campaign against us, which included Chang Chun's divisions, the 19th Route Army and Chu Pei-teh's army. The Fukien army was very weak, so we chose them for attack and were victorious in every engagement. We destroyed the two divisions of Ch'eng Kuo-hui and Kuo Feng-min and killed Kuo himself, nearly annihilating the whole Fukien forces sent against us. Chang Chun's troops were almost annihilated in this campaign also, and the Red Army occupied Changchow, Fukien. Our tactics were to defeat the weakest forces first, then after they retreated the other two lines were in an exposed position, so they were forced to retreat, too. When we defeated the Fukien forces so badly, they saw that they could not maintain power in Fukien Province so appealed to Kwangtung for help. We then attacked Tungkiang (East River) district in Kwangtung. However, the 19th Route Army here was very strong. Our strength was about equal, so the struggle ended in a stalemate—there was neither victory nor defeat. The Red Army occupied Meihsien in Kwangtung, then returned westward to Kiangsi, then back to Fukien to our old Soviet district.

"It was at the end of 1929 that we left Tingchow in Fukien, went to Shihch'en, then to Kwangch'ang and to Chi-an at the beginning of 1930. By this time the Soviets had expanded greatly, and they had collected enough partisan troops to establish the 3rd Army, of which Huang Kung-liu was commander. The 3rd Red Army included the *min t'uan* troops of Lo P'ing-hui (previously under Chu Pei-teh), who had mutinied and joined us, as well as part of some Ching-kanshan forces. The 3rd and 4th Red armies marched together. From Kian we went to Hsingkuo, destroying many enemy forces en route, and then to Tingchow. At this time the Li Li-san line began, and a Party delegate arrived in Tingchow to bring us these new instructions. We then organized the 3rd, 4th and 12th armies together into the First Army Corps under my command. The 12th Army, made up of Fukien partisans and regulars, was put under the command of Lo P'ing-hui and the 4th Army was under Lin Piao. At this time we also had the 35th, 20th and 21st armies, these three being all partisan troops.

"On August 1, 1930, anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising, we attacked Nanchang, as the city was empty and the enemy's power there very weak. Chang Hui-chang and T'ang Tao-yuan were the Kuomintang commanders at Nanchang, having two divisions. We did not occupy Nanchang but organized the peasants in the Kiangsi regions of Anjen, Hsinfeng, Kwang-an, Yifeng and Kao-an. This was a very important period for us. We expanded the Red Army greatly, collected money for resources, and organized the masses, many new villages joining the Soviets.

"At the same time, P'eng Teh-huai, on July 27, had occupied Changsha, capital of Hunan. However, we then had no

radio, and our intelligence work was very poor. P'eng held the city for only one week, and no reinforcements arrived. He was then forced to leave and went to Liuyang, where he met the First Army Corps marching to his aid. Our forces together then destroyed four regiments of the Hunan army and captured many thousand rifles. We also captured the much-needed radios for the first time, but we could not use them as we had no operators. The First Army Corps had expanded to twenty thousand men. P'eng Teh-huai's 5th Red Army then joined with the 8th Red Army to form the new Third Army Corps of some ten thousand men, under P'eng's command. Together the First and Third Army Corps had thirty thousand men and five armies. We again attacked Changsha, but this time the enemy had made full preparation against such an assault, and after ten days of unsuccessful attack we retreated to P'inghsiang. However, we had several victories during those days. We then established the First Front Red Army, made up of the First and Third Army Corps. I was made commander-in-chief, with Mao Tsê-tung as political commissar. I also kept command of the First Army Corps.

"In September we marched back to Liling and P'inghsiang and occupied Yichün. At this time the Li Li-san line was causing a great dispute. Li Li-san wished to attack the big cities of Chôchang, Yochow and Hankow, but Mao and I disagreed with this line. We wanted to rest and reorganize the armies. Our opinion finally prevailed. At Kian (Chian) we had expanded the Red Army to fifty thousand fighters, and had accumulated some \$3,000,000 in our treasury. Our financial resources during the First Campaign were based on this money. In my opinion, if we had not received the Li

Li-san line before the First Campaign, we could have achieved a much greater victory during this campaign.

### *The First Campaign*

"When the Yen Hsi-shan-Feng Yu-hsiang war against Chiang Kai-shek finished in October 1930, the Central Government turned its attention to special preparation for suppression of the Red Army. At the end of December 1930 Nanking's First Annihilation Campaign against us began, which we had completely routed by January 1931. For this offensive, Chiang Kai-shek collected a great number of troops, such as T'ang Tao-yuan's division, Wang Ching-yu's army and the 19th Route Army. Then, though the Red Army had no radio service, our intelligence work was better and we estimated the enemy positions very correctly. The Kuomintang was in fact very foolish. They even published news of their troop movements and plans in the newspapers, which we promptly read. Our base was then in Tungku.

"At this time our strategy was to decoy and ambush the enemy. We coaxed them into moving forward, the surrounded and annihilated them. We decoyed the Kuomintang troops into occupying many villages in this way, and in the meantime we used our free time to train raw recruits in the rear. This was lucky because at this time the Red Army was practically all new recruits. The enemy was very foolish at this time, having had no experience with this type of guerrilla warfare. Each Kuomintang commander wanted to win the approbation of Chiang Kai-shek, so they greedily pursued the Red Army units into its own territory. Thus T'ang Tao-yuan and Chang Hui-chang stupidly followed the Red Army nearly to our base at Tungku. We then promptly

pounced upon our prey. The Red Army annihilated these forces easily, because they had invaded the heart of the Soviet districts and our information about them was exact while they moved forward blindly. They were surrounded by high mountains, so it was easy for us to cut off their rear. We concentrated all our forces to attack Chang's troops, so we had fifty thousand men to Chang's ten thousand troops and it was a simple matter to defeat them. Chang Hui-chang, whom Chiang Kai-shek had put in command of this First Campaign, was himself killed, and we captured nine thousand rifles, two wireless sets and his entire division of men intact! We did good propaganda work among these captured soldiers and afterward released all of them. In the meantime, we attacked T'ang. T'ang did not know what had happened to Chang's troops. He knew only that the radio connection was broken. However, even so he was apprehensive and wanted to retreat, but we stepped up, cut off his rear and practically annihilated his troops. T'ang 'gave' us four thousand rifles. After these two smashing victories the remainder of the enemy retreated in a rout. Thus the First Campaign was a complete victory for us. We then carried on our program of expanding the Soviet areas.

### *The Second Campaign*

"This defeat alarmed Chiang Kai-shek, and caused a reversal of his strategy. Ho Ying-ch'ing sent recommendations to Chiang which he accepted, appointing Ho as commander of this new campaign. Ho's new tactics were to move slowly to the attack. From January to May, the Kuomintang concentrated on preparations for the new offensive against us. We also prepared and trained for the Second Campaign.

On May 19, 1931, this Second Campaign began. The offensive line of the enemy stretched 800 *li* from Chi-an (Kian) Kiangsi, Kwangch'ang, to Chienling in Fukien Province. The enemy mobilized two hundred regiments (about two hundred thousand men) in this campaign.

"However, our experience in the First Campaign served us well. At this time we had the aid of radio communication also. The Red Army sent troops to the rear of the enemy forces to attack. In fifteen days we had covered the line of 800 *li* and broken the enemy offensive, capturing thirty thousand rifles. We destroyed the armies of Wang Ching-yu and of Chu-Hsiang-liang, so the Second Campaign ended in a Red victory, too. The Red Army's strategy in this Second Campaign was the best modern tactics possible in breaking an offensive line. This victory increased the Red Army's faith in itself immensely, and at the same time the Soviet masses responded with great help to the army.

### *The Third Campaign*

"Chiang Kai-shek was furious at the destruction of his Second Campaign, and personally organized the Third Campaign, leading the army himself from Nanchang. Chiang planned to strike again immediately, and in July launched the Third Campaign. The Red Army made an error of calculation here, not expecting Chiang to be able to strike so soon. However, on the other hand, Chiang, in his high temper, also miscalculated and was in too much of a hurry for his own preparation. Chiang moved forward in four parallel lines to attack. We promptly occupied the spaces between these four parallel lines and worried and harassed them continually. The weather was extremely hot, and the soldiers were very

tired from the unaccustomed fast marching, so our tactic was very successful. Hao Meng-lin was in command of Chiang's second line. His army was the weakest, so we first destroyed him, capturing many rifles and supplies. We then destroyed the divisions of Mao Ping-wen and Hsü K'e-hsiang. Chiang Kai-shek was doubly infuriated at this, so tried to concentrate all his forces instead of the previous strategy. We used our strategy of removing all food and leaving the villages empty for the enemy. Thus the Kuomintang's food supply was very difficult, especially because of their concentration of troops. We then concentrated all our own forces at Tungku, leaving the partisans everywhere to trouble and harass the White army, so they had no idea where our exact strength was concentrated and missed direction. Surrounded on all sides by partisans, the White troops were panicky and worried to desperation. We easily destroyed many units of the enemy in this way.

"At this time, we attacked the 19th Route Army of twenty-four regiments. This was a blunder, because the 19th Route Army did not actually want to fight us, their purpose being only to save Chiang Kai-shek and give him support in getting out of his dangerous position. We, however, flushed with many victories, were too proud and happy to be cautious, so we foolishly attacked the 19th Route Army. The 19th Route Army troops were fresh, having just come to the front. Again our encounter with this army, as the year before, resulted in a stalemate, with neither victory nor defeat for either of us. They finally withdrew and we also withdrew.

"We had just destroyed the 52nd and 9th Kuomintang division at Tungku when the September 18th Mukden Inci-

dent occurred. Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to retreat, unable to concentrate attention on his anti-Red campaign. So both sides took a rest. At this time the troops of Sun Lien-chang revolted in the famous Ningtu Uprising on December 14, 1931. This was the Kuomintang's 26th Route Army at Ningtu, these troops having previously belonged to Feng Yu-hsiang. Over ten thousand men deserted to the Red Army, and from them we established the new Fifth Army Corps. This uprising was led by Tung Tseng-t'ang and Tsao Pao-sun.

### *The First Soviet Congress*

"We then held the First All-China Soviet Congress on December 11, 1931, anniversary of the Canton Commune, which formed the first Central Soviet Government. There was much development everywhere, and the regular Red Army was organized with myself as commander-in-chief. During 1931 Soviet districts had developed on the Kiangsi-Fukien border, the Hunan-Kiangsi border, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border and on the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border, and these Soviet districts were able to make connections for the first time. We had radio communication everywhere in 1931.

"The first Soviet Congress marks the end of the first period in the history of the Red Army, beginning with the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927, and carrying through a period of spontaneous uprisings and partisan self-defense fighting until the partisans were finally transformed into a regular main Red Army under co-ordinated command and the partisan areas changed into Soviet districts at the end of 1931.



## II

"The second period begins from the establishment of the Central Soviet Government and of the co-ordinated Red Army in December 1931 to the Long March undertaken in October 1934.

"Our most important work in 1932 was in 'reddening' the new areas, that is, in penetrating further and in consolidating and deepening the Soviet movement. We co-ordinated and connected the Soviet movement in all different districts, united the various armies and established schools, as well as doing much other work of this kind.

"At this time the Second Front Army under Ho Lung had no close connection with us in the Central Soviets, as they had no radio communication. Each different Soviet district had its own special conditions, of course. For instance, in the Soviets of the Hunan-Hupei area and in the Hupei-Honan-Anhui (Ouyüwan) bordering districts there was a firm mass basis because in those areas the 1925-27 Great Revolution had already roused the people, and these revolutionary masses formed their own Red Armies. However, in Kiangsi, the Red Army had the special task of creating the Soviets and rousing the mass movement. Nevertheless, this developed very quickly and strongly. If the armies and Soviet districts in the three provinces (Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupei) had been able to establish close communication and co-ordination, we should have had much greater success in our Soviet movement, that is, we might have possibly taken leadership in all in China.

*The Fourth Campaign*

"In April 1933 the Fourth Campaign against the Red Army started. By this time the Kiangsi economic situation

for the army was not good because we had already expropriated all the landlords and had no further sources of revenue in this way. Also, the Red Army's strategy was not good. We made the mistake of first attacking Kwangtung and then Chiang Kai-shek. We first attacked Nanshiang on the Kwangtung line of offensive in order to decrease the threat to our rear, then marched north through the northeast part of the Kiangsi Soviet area and met the 10th Red Army.

"At this time Chiang Kai-shek had not yet established a strong blockhouse system. He was in too much of a hurry to 'exterminate the Red menace.' Having a pro-Japanese tendency at that time, he wanted to settle 'the internal problem' immediately. Chiang, therefore, sent his strongest army, three divisions under Ch'ên Ch'êng, into action. The 11th, 59th and 52nd divisions were Chiang's best troops. He wanted to quickly cut the Red Army's line, while we wanted to break the enemy's line before they took action. This was a very heavy war. We destroyed the 59th and 52nd divisions of the Kuomintang troops, and captured thirteen thousand White soldiers. We captured also the rifles from twelve regiments, together with many light machine guns and three million rounds of ammunition. The 11th Division was also disarmed and eliminated from the field.

### *The Fifth Campaign*

"Then Chiang Kai-shek became thoroughly alarmed at our victories. He stopped the 'Great Wall' fighting against the Japanese in the north and made the Ho-Umetzu Agreement with them. Chiang himself then rushed to Nanchang in Kiangsi to prepare for future campaigns. After the defeat of Ch'ên Ch'êng, Chiang saw that it was necessary to change

his whole strategy. He got many foreign advisers, and relied upon economic blockade and the blockhouse system, in offensive-defensive strategy. Chiang at the same time reorganized his armies. Under the new strategy, he attacked only our periphery and not the central Red Army. He attacked the Honan-Hupeh-Anhui Red Army, which was forced to retreat. We thereby lost a main force in diverting and dispersing the enemy forces sent against us. During the last half of 1933 there were no major engagements, as Chiang Kai-shek utilized all his forces to prepare for the grand Fifth Campaign. By this time the economic condition of the Soviet districts was not good, due to the blockade against us. Then Chiang Kai-shek sent three hundred regiments against the Red Army, and the great war of the Fifth Campaign was on in October 1933.

"In November 1933 the Fukien Rebellion against Chiang Kai-shek occurred. In connection with this rebellion we did not act wisely. We did not give the support that we might have given to help the 19th Route Army. They did not have full trust in us, because this situation occurred just after we had been fighting each other, and our United Front tactics were not well organized. Also we had not expected the 19th Route Army to collapse so quickly.

"In July, August, September and October of 1934 the war was very heavy, with great losses on both sides. Chiang Kai-shek's new Fascist training for his officers was fairly good, for they went into battle more determinedly—the result being, however, that we were able to capture and kill a great many officers, including many brigade commanders.

"Perhaps the main reason why Chiang was able to defeat the Red Army in the Fifth Campaign was that he was aided

from the outside by resources which he ordinarily could not command. Chiang Kai-shek received sufficient help, both economically and militarily, from the foreign imperialists to enable him to organize this big campaign. For instance, his troops were reorganized by the German General von Seeckt and other foreign advisers, utilizing the tactics used by France in resisting Germany in the World War.

"The Communist Party was obliged to decide to withdraw the Red Army from the Soviet districts in the South and to begin the Long March in October. The Red Army first broke the line of the Kwangtung army in the South, then passed through Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow and middle Yünnan. We originally planned to connect with the Second Front Red Army, but the Kuomintang troops blocked our way in Hunan and Hupeh, so we decided to return to Yünnan and to march to Szechuan from there. In Szechuan we met the Fourth Front Red Army and then continued on to the Northwest.

### III

"The third period of the history of the Red Army begins with the Long March on October 16, 1934, and continues to the present. Before beginning the Long March we estimated that the political situation had reached a new stage, so we marched northward to begin the anti-imperialist struggle against the Japanese and to re-establish ourselves in the broad areas of the Northwest, where the first units reached North Shensi in October 1935, after one year of constant fighting and struggle. The account of this Long March has been collected and is now being published in Shanghai, in a volume of three hundred thousand words.

"In October 1936 the Second Front Army under Ho Lung and the Fourth Front Army under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien met with the First Front Army in Kansu, the former two armies having marched from Sikong (Tibet) since spring. All our main forces now being concentrated in the Kansu-Shensi-Ningsia area in the Northwest, we were ready to organize our anti-Japanese United Front."

• *Perspective After a Decade*

I then asked Commander Chu Teh what he thought had been the main accomplishments of the ten years' struggle of the Red Army and Soviets. He replied:

"The main things we have achieved, I think, are these:

"1. We now have the Red Army itself, which we did not have before we began the armed struggle.

"2. Ten years ago the Communist Party was not so strong as at present, because our comrades now have long and valuable experience behind them and are solid revolutionary cadres.

"3. The success of the Soviet system and laws has made a deep impression among the peasants and workers of China.

"4. Our struggle itself has had a great political influence on the morale of the peasants and workers, not only in China but elsewhere.

"5. We still have several Soviet and partisan districts.

"6. Because of the above factors, we are at present in a position favorable to the realization of a United Front, though different from that in 1925.

"7. As a whole, our Communist Party and the Chinese masses in the ten years' struggle have had a valuable collective education and experience together."

My next question was to ask Chu Teh what he regarded

as the main reasons for the success of the Red Army in China. He answered:

"The most important reason is that the Red Army is led by the Communist Party and the Party members are models for the fighters to follow.

"Second, the Red Army has been and is supported by the masses.

"Third, the Red army is one integrated whole, united as one man.

"Fourth, the Red Army fighters are brave and heroic because they belong to the oppressed classes.

"Fifth, the Red Army is militarily efficient because our tactics and strategy have been developed through long, hard years of battle and experience.

"Sixth, because the mass of the people support the Red Army and give us complete and accurate information, we are always familiar with the topography of the country and the movements of the enemy, while the enemy is blind, having no such voluntary support.

"Seventh, every Red Army man is fighting for the same purpose, so the command is followed as one man and discipline is perfect. Therefore, the Red Army is not only militarily but politically well disciplined and conscious.

"Eighth, our propaganda among the White troops has helped us very much. We treat captives well, and they carry back favorable reports. In general the White troops themselves are not enthusiastic in fighting the Red Army, because the common soldiers are oppressed by their officers.

"Of course, one basic reason why the Red Army was able to develop in China is the necessity of agrarian revolution in China and the need of protecting the land afterward. An-

other reason is the contradictions in Chinese society, which cause many civil wars to occur, thus making the position of such an army more favorable for continued existence. The Chinese ruling class is weak and cannot control some areas. This, together with bad communications and complex topography, created a situation favorable for the Red Army to maintain itself."

I then asked what, in perspective, had been the lessons learned by the Chinese Communists during their long struggle. He thought awhile, then stated:

"1. In the anti-imperialist fight in semi-colonial countries the struggle for Democracy must be emphasized and a United Front with the bourgeoisie realized.

"2. The feudal society must be destroyed by a preliminary realization of Democracy. Feudal social forms cannot be changed without the democratic principle. The peasants and workers must first break their chains in feudal society, then join in the revolutionary struggle. In this effort, if the United Front policy is adopted the struggle is easier.

"3. Such a revolution must have an armed force, but this army must belong to the people.

"In 1925-27 our mistake was in not being independent, but in following after the bourgeoisie. Therefore, when the bourgeoisie betrayed the revolution, we found ourselves in a difficult position. After 1927 the radical policy of blind action in uprisings according to the Li Li-san line was a mistake, though this radicalism was created by the pressure on the peasants and workers. After the Soviet movement began, in some parts of the Red Army the militarist tradition was still partially retained, and because of this our work tended to become isolated from the mass. On the opposite

side, we also made errors of permitting wide partisan fighting without strict army discipline. This tended toward individual action not in the broad interest of the mass. It permitted some of the peasant ideology of an inclination toward revenge to remain. The mass is always more radical than the Red Army and wants more killing than we permit. Although the Red Army comes from the mass, it does not reflect this peasant tendency toward revenge because of the strict education it receives.

"But perhaps the greatest lesson we have learned is that a people can fight victoriously with what resources it happens to have. The masses can get their guns if they have determination. It is easy to capture arms from the enemy by sudden attack and night battles. The people can fight with bad arms, or even without formal arms at all. Any kind of weapons, if utilized correctly, can defeat the enemy, if the revolutionary spirit is there. The Red Army's mobility and ability to arm itself out of thin air have already become almost a legend in Chinese history, and some of the peasantry even think our power is magic because of the apparent miracles we have been able to accomplish. Actually, our magic power lies only in the fact that we attack swiftly at night and withdraw as swiftly so that the enemy can never find us unless we ourselves wish to engage them."

### III FIELD GLASSES ON THE FUTURE

THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS on the complex subject of the Chinese Revolution are dialectical in the polar extreme. Indeed "dialectical" is a generous term to apply to such a hard problem in finding identities in oppositions. I cannot imagine a more delightful tournament of the intellect than gathering



together at this moment around a Chinese tea table all of the famous dialecticians of various ages and laying the subject open for free discussion (all heads guaranteed safety in advance, of course). With Plato, Aristotle and Hegel on the Right, Marx, Lenin and Mao Tsê-tung on the Left, with Stalin engineering from the chair, and anarchistic old Lao-tzu eating watermelon seeds on a bench at the foot of the table and making sly sabotaging remarks out of turn—everything should flow and spiral to nonconclusions in the proper dialectical manner. While all this philosophical spiraling is in process, however, we may as well get on with more workaday answer....

Mao Tsê-tung and Lo Fu have already, in the preceding chapter, discussed the nature and historical stages of the Chinese Revolution and indicated the general course which the Communists expect to follow in the future. And Chu Teh has outlined the history of the Red Army and expressed his opinion on what has been accomplished in the past decade, why the Red Army was able to develop, and what lessons had been learned during the struggle. But certain points require more detailed discussion. The question of immediate importance which remains is, of course, how can Chinese Communism find its identity in the vast opposition now confronting it? How do these Communists expect to realize Socialism in the face of such tremendous obstacles—and when? When I asked for elucidation on these concrete "details," most of the Communists I talked with put me off by announcing, "It is non-Marxist to make decisions about the future." Finally, however, Wu Liang-p'ing agreed to draw for me a rough sketch of the immediate tactics for the realization of Democracy and the future transformation to Socialism, according to his personal opinion.

As nearly as I could make out, the Chinese Communists generally had several speculations about how Socialism would possibly come about in the future, but they hoped for a "peaceful transformation to Socialism" through the medium, not of a Soviet, but of a Democratic Republic. This republic was to be of a "new type," patterned somewhat after the anti-feudal Spanish Republic before the Fascist revolt. Whether they thought a Spanish type of civil war would result, I could not determine, but they were hoping that Japanese pressure would flatten out the reactionary side of the class war to the point where a transformation to a Democratic Republic would occur spontaneously and peacefully—and the later transformation to Socialism would come about somewhat in the same friendly spirit in the distant future. Just when the feudal elements would object to the new democracy was not clear. As Mao Tsê-tung said in an interview with us: "When the mass movement develops and the peasants make demands upon the landlords up to the point where no compromise is possible, there will be a split." Or as Wu Liang-p'ing put it: "Our opinion is that without a serious struggle the remnants of feudalism cannot be uprooted."

The Chinese Communists had been intensely interested in the struggle in Spain and were very much impressed with two things: first, with the overwhelming victory of the new democracy in the Spanish elections and the loyalty of the bourgeois elements to this liberal democracy—which gave the Chinese hope for a similar peaceful victory for their new democracy; and second, with the rallying of the Fascist powers behind Franco, which caused the Chinese to realize the importance of not pushing their potential Rightist Francos into the arms of the Fascists and the Japanese, and of absorb-

ing them in a liberal republic instead. Spain has, therefore, already had an influence on another great revolutionary movement. On May 15 Mao Tsê-tung wrote a message to the Spanish people, which included the following:

"We do not believe that the struggle of the Chinese people can be separated from your struggle in Spain. The Communist Party of China is now supporting and emulating you, the Spanish people, by struggling against Japanese Fascism. . . . Each day our press here in the Soviet regions publishes reports and articles about your struggle. Through our radios we receive the latest daily news about your heroic struggle. We firmly realize that the unity of your various parties in the People's Front is the basis for your final victory. We have read and fully support the ten-point program proposed by the Spanish Communist Party.

"Your struggle is similar to our own in the Far East because, apart from other similarities already mentioned, there are traitors and Trotskyists hiding in our ranks, just as they hide in yours. Only by the most determined measures against such traitors can we consolidate our Front. . . .

"As many of you know, the Chinese Red Army has carried on a ceaseless and hard struggle for ten years. We fought without resources, through hunger and cold, without arms and ammunition, save that which we captured, until at last we won our present victory. . . . 'Our ten years' struggle has proved to us that if a revolutionary people and their revolutionary army are not afraid of suffering, but continue to fight heroically against the enemy, they will be victorious.

"We . . . express our deepest solidarity and comradeship with you. . . . Also, we express our deepest solidarity and comradeship with the International Volunteers who are

offering their lives for the emancipation of their Spanish brothers and sisters and through them for the oppressed nations of the world.

The Chinese were also impressed with the amount of international support received by Spain in its fight for Democracy and hoped to mobilize a broader basis of such support for themselves under the democratic United Front. The Chinese Red Army itself had only one "international volunteer" in its ranks—Li Teh, the German—aside from Koreans, Formosans and other oriental cousins. And they had had to suffer, all during those ten years under the Soviet banner, the enmity of the democracies, as well as of the Fascist states.

"Spain is a country very much like China," Mao Tsê-tung commented, when I discussed Spain with him on the evening of May 14.

"Do you consider Spain a colonial country?" I asked.

"Yes, Spain is semi-colonial like China. Its general revolutionary problem is similar. The enemies of the Spanish people are feudalism and imperialism, the same as in China."

"What is the difference between the People's Front in Spain and the United Front in China," I then asked.

"We have a United Front instead of a People's Front in China because Japanese aggression also subjugates our capitalist class. Because the rice bowl of the Chinese capitalists is being broken by the Japanese, they can join the broader United Front.

"In reality there is no great difference. The Spanish People's Front also includes the Left wing of the capitalist class, while the Right wing of the Spanish bourgeoisie, related to the big landlords and the reactionary Catholics, went over to Franco. Later on, when the problem became more radical,

the center of the capitalist class left the People's Front. Nobody has the illusion that the Right wing will stay permanently in the revolution.

"Spanish industry is more developed than that in China. Spain has 1,500,000 industrial workers to a population of 24,000,000, while China has only 3,000,000 to a population of 450,000,000. Therefore the proletarian proportion is different."

"Who will be the Chinese Franco if a Fascist movement splits in the Democratic Republic?" I then asked.

"Maybe Ho Ying-ch'ing," Mao Tsê-tung replied. "The Japanese want a Pu Yi, not a Franco, however. Chiang Kai-shek cannot now be their Franco because he represents the national bourgeoisie and the army, as well as the compradores and landlords, and he could not maintain a government position by Fascist support as in the case of Franco; on the contrary this would cause his downfall."

The victory of Socialism in China is far away; however, Mao Tsê-tung did not consider it so distant as might be imagined. When our interview ended he remarked:

"In the world revolution the backward countries will be victorious first. America will probably be the last."

And now let us discuss the Socialist future of China with Wu Liang-p'ing.

In spite of his youth, Wu Liang-p'ing is considered one of the Communists' best Marxist theoreticians, and he is Mao Tsê-tung's man Friday. Only twenty-seven years of age, he has already had a long career in revolutionary work. He is one of the very few rebels produced by the "Ningpo more-far" area near Shanghai, which has contributed most of the

Shanghai phenomena such as compradores, foreigners' house-boys, amahs, merchants and traders. Wu Liang-p'ing came of merchant stock, but his father was an intellectual and principal of the Ningpo Normal School. The son studied at Ching Ch'i Primary School in the village of his birth, Fenghua, which was Chiang Kai-shek's primary school, too. He was betrothed to one of Chiang Kai-shek's relatives, but refused to marry the girl when he came of age. Wu was an active student leader at Nanyang Middle School in Shanghai, then at Amoy University, Amoy, and finally became one of the insurgent student leaders who founded a university of their own in 1924—the Great China University, Shanghai. During the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925, Wu led student propaganda tours and was the delegate from his university to the Shanghai Student Union. He joined the Communist Youth and went to Moscow to study in 1926, returning to Shanghai in 1929, after spending several months in Berlin, France, Belgium and England. In Shanghai he did secret Party work for a year and a half and translated three of the Marxist classics—*The History of Socialism*, *Anti-Dühring*, and *Historical Materialism*. Betrayed to the police by a former schoolmate in Moscow, he was arrested in the International Settlement in 1931 and imprisoned in Ward Road Jail for over a year. After his release he took the dangerous trip to the Kiangsi Soviet district in 1932. In Juikin, the Red capital, he was People's Commissar of Economics of the Central Government for a while, then went on the Long March with the Red Army, during which time he worked in the Political Department of the First and Third Army Corps. Upon arrival in Shensi, he was made Chief of the Agitprop Department. When I met him in Yen-an he was still functioning at top speed in the Agitprop

Department, and writing many articles on various political subjects for the Party magazines and newspapers.

Wu Liang-p'ing was tall, and his sensitive intellectual face had rather Western-looking features. (I was told that while he was in Moscow the Russian girls had found the handsome young Chinese student very attractive, and indeed one of them had become his Great Romance.) He spoke excellent Russian and spent a great deal of time reading *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, and when I asked him about the future of Socialism in China, he replied in his excellent English:

"The main task of the Chinese Communist Party in realizing the transformation to Socialism in China is to get the hegemony of the new Democratic Republic to be formed during the new phase of the bourgeois-democratic-nationalist revolution. Whether this transformation will be peaceful or not peaceful, we cannot say. If we have the hegemony we can realize a more or less peaceful transformation to Socialism, and will not need another revolution. It is more possible, however, that one part of the Right bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie will fight against us. The landlords would already have been liquidated by the Republic.

"In the transformation to the Socialist revolution a small part of the bourgeoisie in power under the Democratic Republic, together with other elements, will struggle and a new civil war will possibly continue. But this will be easy to liquidate. We would then have the leadership in the government of the Republic and could simply envelop them. But the struggle must continue even if it does not require war. If we have international help from the U.S.S.R., Spain and France, our struggle will be much easier.

"At present we have the hegemony only of the peasants

and the Red Army. During the anti-Japanese war we must win over all of the masses and troops and the whole Leftist movement, either outside or inside the Kuomintang, and educate them. Not only must we drive away the imperialists, but the agrarian problem must also be solved. Then a new type of republic will be established, which will liquidate all feudalism, carry out the agrarian revolution, confiscate Japanese property in China, control the large industries, railways and communications, and maybe establish control over the imperialist interests of the foreign powers in China. The peasants and workers will thereby be prepared for the future and educated to be conscious of Socialism as an aim. Only *after* the democratic tasks are realized, when national independence and the agrarian revolution are realized, and the hegemony is in the masses and the army—only then will the transformation to Socialism be realized.

"I repeat, only *after* the agrarian and anti-imperialist struggle is won will the transformation to Socialism occur. And first we must drive away the Japanese, then let the revolution develop spontaneously as the situation makes necessary.

"This agrarian revolution and the anti-imperialist struggle are intermingled. How can we fight the imperialists? Only by organizing the workers and peasants. In order to organize the peasants, their interests must be taken care of. At a certain stage in the anti-Japanese war, the agrarian problem must be settled. But this is not Socialism. It is part of the bourgeois antifeudal revolution.

"This is why the Trotskyists are wrong in wanting an immediate Socialist revolution: In order to fulfill the Socialist revolution, the proletariat must have friends, must mobilize a reserve army of allies. This means the peasantry.



To attempt to have Socialist revolution in the village means to liquidate the rich peasants. This in turn influences the wavering middle peasants as allies in the democratic movement. So far the Communist Party has kept the alliance with the middle peasants, and if the rich peasants do not obstruct us and will support the anti-Japanese struggle we will welcome them to join with us.

"We must utilize all democratic elements, the petty bourgeoisie and even part of the national bourgeoisie in realizing the revolution. If we Communists should start a Socialist revolution now, this would mean that we would have to fight against these elements, especially against the capitalists, Chiang Kai-shek and the national bourgeoisie. Such a conflict would endanger the anti-Japanese struggle.

"Therefore our line is to unite with the peasants and city petty bourgeoisie, and if the bourgeoisie will participate in the anti-imperialist struggle, we should also like to unite with them. The first thing to be done is to utilize all elements to overthrow Japan. Afterward we can talk of different tasks. Unless we go slow with the democratic steps of the revolution, we may liquidate the revolution itself because we would have no friends, no reserve allies to support us. It is Utopian to rush into a Socialist movement, and such a step is therefore against the proletarian revolution."

**Question:** "Is a program of agrarian reform enough to realize a mass war against Japan?"

**Answer:** "Reform is possible, but not thorough. Now we Communists demand only reforms, but the agrarian question cannot be limited only to reform. Under the terms of the United Front we want decreased rents and taxes. This will help the poor and middle peasants, and even the rich—by

destroying the bureaucracy. But we do not now touch the land problem. We ask only that the Government give aid to the farmers by loans, seeds, fertilizer, organizing cooperative, etc."

*Question*: "Will reform hinder the future transformation to Socialism by reducing the revolutionary necessities of the masses and maintaining the status quo?"

*Answer*: "The feudal remnants cannot be liquidated by reform. Our opinion is that without a serious struggle, the remnants of feudalism cannot be uprooted. Moreover, in leading the masses to demand reforms, we know that such reforms must be realized by the masses themselves and cannot come from above, so the struggle for reform is good experience for the masses. In the process of organizing the workers to realize reforms, they get organization and experience and we get authority among the masses. Therefore, the struggle for reform helps the transformation of the revolution into Socialism."

*Question*: "Briefly, what is the theory of the United Front in China now in terms of class relations?"

*Answer*: "We estimate that at present the class lines of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry all coincide on the anti-Japanese problem."

"In capitalist countries the United Front is against Fascism and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. This means that the proletariat unites with the petty-bourgeoisie and all democratic elements to fight against Fascism. Lenin said that to fight against the main enemy, we must win the petty-bourgeois elements."

"The other kind of United Front is in colonial countries. To fight the imperialists, the proletariat can unite with the

bourgeoisie in a certain stage if it will really fight against imperialism and not obstruct the freedom of education for the masses. Our national program is in accordance with Lenin's theory of the national question. In one stage the bourgeoisie is more afraid of the Japanese than of the revolution."

*Question:* "What are the concrete tactics for realizing Democracy?"

*Answer:* "Our general slogan is for the establishment of a Democratic Republic. We struggle for this in two ways:

"First, we demand democratic rights and civil liberties so the masses can be mobilized. We want the Government to abolish the Emergency Laws of 1931, and to reinstitute the original Provisional Laws. We demand the abolition of the censorship of the press, and freedom for all expression not harmful to the democratic revolution. But we do not want freedom for the pro-Japanese traitors. We want an 'Anti-Japanese Democracy'—just as Spain has an 'Anti-Fascist Democracy.' Spain gives no freedom to Fascists. We have made the demand to the Kuomintang that very kind of pro-Japanese organization be dissolved at once and their freedom taken away. All political prisoners must be released except pro-Japanese traitors. The peasants and workers must have the right to organize unions, and all parties and groups which are not pro-Japanese must have freedom to work legally. There must be freedom of academic thought in schools and freedom for those with political beliefs other than the *San Min Chu I*. In short, we demand that all kinds of measures for suppression be stopped, except those against the pro-Japanese elements.

"Second, we demand an improvement in the present government structure. We ask that all except the Pro-Japanese cliques shall have representation in the Government and certain

government organs be reformed to get rid of corrupt elements. The Government must realize universal suffrage and call a parliamentary assembly which will elect a democratic central government. In every province there must be a provincial assembly elected by the people, and militarist leaders must be prohibited from intervening in civil affairs and obey the civil power of the Government. Every party must have the right to name candidates for direct election, somewhat as in the case of the French Chamber of Deputies. The aim of the above is to realize a democratic parliament and government and to achieve universal adult suffrage—with no limitations of property, race, level of culture, religion or sex. This is the kind of democracy we are now instituting in the Soviet districts.

"These two steps can gradually bring about a Democratic Republic during the process of struggle. We don't worry so much about laws as depend upon mass pressure.

"We cannot say exactly what the nature of the new republic will be, but we know that it will be a new type of Democratic Republic, just as Spain is now fighting for a new type of parliamentary democracy. It is not the old classical French type of democracy, but a new 'Anti-Fascist, Anti-feudal Parliamentary Republic.' Our Chinese republic, however, will be different from that in Spain, because the 'bourgeoisie will participate more fully in our democracy.

"The Spanish Republic is anti-Fascist and anti-feudal in character, so it clears away feudalism by confiscating the land and property of the Church, which is part of the base of Fascism and nationalizes the big banks and industries, which are also the base of Fascism. It also institutes democracy and reorganizes the old army to get rid of feudal remnants in it.

"The class basis of this new type of republic is a combination of the working class, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie in the cities. One part of the democratic-bourgeois elements which are progressive can participate, but they will not represent one of the main forces in the Government."



**SECOND BOOK:**  
**A SOVIET SUMMER IN CHINA**





## I. YOUTH SERVES ITSELF

AGAIN AND AGAIN in China everywhere you are impressed by the potentialities of the insurgent youth of the nation. But in the areas under protection of the Red Army, the children and young boys and girls have demanded and been given a life of their own. More than any other one thing in the Soviet districts I think I was impressed by the independence, the courage and sheer heroism of the Soviet children. Everywhere you turned you found them—they made up the personnel of the dramatics troupes, they were an important part of the courier service, they were in the vanguard at the front and in every kind of activity at the rear.

The activities of youth were co-ordinated under the Communist Youth, of which Fang Wen-ping was secretary. Actually the first revolutionary activity along any kind of Socialist lines in China was under the Chinese Socialist Youth formed as early as 1918, and active both in France and China. The Socialist Party in China was practically a non-entity, but the S.Y. was very active from the first. In May 1920, according to Fang Wen-ping, exactly a year before the Communist Party was founded, the S.Y. leaders held a meeting and decided to join the C.Y. International. The founders of this branch of the C.Y. International in 1920 were Chang T'ai-lei, Shih Tseng-tung, Hui Tai-yung, Shao Chu-nu and four others. By the time of the second conference, called in August 1923, the S.Y. was already organized in most of the provinces, but it was then limited only to students. At that meeting they made a

decision to expand the movement to include other groups and classes, and also to establish a close relation between the S.Y. and the C.P. of China.

"In 1924 the Central Committee called an enlarged meeting and proposed that the C.Y. should be proletarianized," according to Fang Wen-ping. "In February 1925 the third delegates' meeting was held in Canton and voted to support the C.P. program. It turned its attention to the mass and labor movements. The slogan then was 'The S.Y. must be proletarianized!' and at that meeting the name was changed to the 'Communist Youth of China.'

"In August 1927, the fourth delegates' congress was called in Wuhan and adopted resolutions condemning Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Opportunism and voting against continuing the C.P. co-operation with the Kuomintang as in the past. In the same year the fifth congress was held in Moscow, just after the meeting of the Chinese C.P., and adopted a new line in accordance with the resolutions of the C.P. During the Li Li-san period in 1930 the C.Y. was abolished and became a department of the C.P. This was the gravest crisis in the life of the C.Y. However, in January 1931, at the fourth meeting of the Central Committee, the C.Y. was revived and began organizing in the Soviet districts and the Red Army. After that however, there was no new All-China Congress of the C.Y."

Several of the consecutive National secretaries of the C.Y. have become front-rank leaders in the Communist movement. Let us see what happened to them:

The first secretary, Shih Tseng-tung, gave up the Communist movement and joined the Kuomintang;

The second secretary, Chang T'ai-lei, was the No. 1 leader in

the organization of the Canton Commune on December 11, 1927, and was killed in action at that time;

The third secretary, Jen Pi-shih, became political chief of the Hunan-Hupeh Soviet, and in 1937 was appointed Chief of the Whole Political Department of the Eighth Route Army;

The fourth secretary, Kuan Shang-yin, a Manchu, became political commissar to Ho Lung;

Of the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth secretaries, Yuan Ping-hui, Wang Yung-sheng and Hu Chin-hao were all active though not so distinguished as the others;

The ninth secretary, Ku Tso-lin, was elected one of the seven Central Executive Committee members at the formation of the Soviet Republic in 1931, together with Jen Pi-shih, another secretary, Mao Tsê-tung, Chu Teh, Han Ying, Teng Fa and Wang Chia-hsiang; he died from overwork while ill in 1933;

The tenth secretary, K'ai Feng, became Chief of the Agitprop Department;

The eleventh and present secretary, Fang Wen-ping, elected to this position on July 30, 1936, organized the whole C.Y. United Front movement.

Fang Wen-ping was only twenty-six when I met him in Yen-an. He had worked in a match factory in Shanghai as a child, together with his father and sister, and joined the C.Y. in 1927. After that he was an apprentice in a coal company and became active in trade-union activities. He entered the Soviet regions in 1930.

The heroic years for the C.Y. had been in the South, of course, before the Central Soviet Republic had been given up. According to Fang Wen-ping, in 1933 the C.Y. organized a "Movement for Expanding the Red Army" and by their propaganda brought 70,000 new recruits to the Army.

Again, in the eight months from January to August of the strenuous Fifth Campaign in 1934, the C.Y. brought 60,000 new recruits to the army. Of these 130,000 recruited by the C.Y., about one third were C.Y. members. Altogether in 1933 the C.Y. had 60,000 members and in 1934, 100,000 members. •In Kiangsi the C.Y. Brigade in the Red Army, led by the C.Y., had 8,000 soldiers. These composed the whole 15th Division. The C.Y. members took special care of their 15th Division and cheered and comforted them during the fighting as their own particular heroes.

There were three youth organizations in the Soviets:

1. The Communist Youth, with members from sixteen to twenty-three years of age (Chinese reckoning)\*;
2. The Young Vanguard, sixteen to twenty-three years of age; and
3. The Erh T'ung T'uan, or Children's Brigade, eight to fifteen years of age.

The Young Vanguard had their own Slogan Squads, Singing Squads and Dancing and Dramatics Troupes. Whenever the Red Army passed by the villages, it was they who organized entertainment for them and marched out to welcome them with songs and flying banners.

Fang Wen-ping said that 50 per cent of the soldiers in the Red Army were under the age of twenty-three (or twenty two in Western reckoning), and of these, 50 per cent were C.Y. members. The C.Y. had its own *hsiao* and *ta* Ch'ing Nien Tui or "little" and "big", Youth Brigades in every company and regiment of the Red Army. These had their own

\*According to Western reckoning these ages would be one year younger, because the Chinese consider a child a year old at birth and ages are reckoned accordingly.

cultural groups, "Lenin corners," educational and political work and entertainment.

The Young Vanguards were all little busybodies, and enjoyed nothing so much as seeing that all regulations were complied with, demanding *lu-t'iao* or being spies in the enemy camp or self-appointed critics at home.

At one time the C.Y. even had what it called the "Light Disease Brigades," which functioned as a kind of "critic squad," M. P.'s or political gendarmerie, as you will. The purpose of these was to report all abuses and criticize pathological conditions in the life of the army. If, for instance, an officer were overbearing—"not comradely," they called it—the "Light Disease Brigade" would send its agents to report to headquarters. Their criticisms received careful attention on the part of the command.

In the Central Soviets in the South the Young Vanguards had numbered 400,000 members, of whom 30,000 were model cadres, and Erh T'ung T'uan also 400,000. Here in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Soviet in the Northwest the C.Y. had 200,000 members, Fang Wen-ping told me. How many there were in the whole of China he would not say, as the number was kept secret, but he added: "The Vanguards are developing fast in Peking, Changsha, Hankow, Shanghai, Taiyuanfu, Canton, and even among the Chinese in Lyons, France, we have a branch." The Erh T'ung T'uan numbered 80,000 children.

The Young Vanguards organization was attached to the C.Y. and resembled it in form. It had been changed in character after the Long March to become a wide, open mass organization. It was originally a semimilitary organization, supplementary to the Red Army and the C.Y. They helped

the OGPU with its espionage work, acted as nurses for the Medical Department at the front, recruited soldiers, held sentry posts whenever necessary, did inspection and policing work and various other duties. It even had "Saturday Brigades" to till the fields of the families of Red soldiers in their absence at the front, and a "Swatting Flies Brigade." They were graded and promoted in accordance with military regulations. Of course, they all wore the regulation Red Army uniforms with a special red kerchief, called their assemblies with a great fanfare of bugles and military drill, and considered themselves generally the main feature of the Red Army.

The purpose of the Erh T'ung T'uan, or Children's Brigade, was to train the children in the spirit of Communism in playing games, study, sports and everyday life. Their slogan was "Be Prepared Every Minute." They had a special salute—the open hand touching the forehead outward, the five fingers symbolizing "the fraternity of the proletariat on the five continents"—but wore only a red necktie with their ordinary clothes usually. Their special duties were to learn to read and write (so as to encourage their fathers and brothers at the front, with letters), to help their families with production in the rear, and to support whatever project happened to be under way at any time. They also practised drilling with wooden guns, and on the anniversary of the founding of the Red Army on August 1, the three hundred members of the Erh T'ung T'uan in Yen-an put on quite an impressive parade at the drill ground. Many of them were ragged but proud little urchins whose fathers were partisans or Red Guards from the near-by Soviet villages.

All the various branches of the C.Y. obeyed the "Three Musts" and the "Three Don'ts." These were :

Musts : Obey Discipline  
Keep Public Health  
Be Polite  
Don'ts : Don't Drink Wine  
Don't Smoke Cigarettes  
Don't Drink Cold Water\*

A great change was taking place in the Communist Youth organization while I was in Yen-an. When the Soviets abdicated and the name of the Red Army was given up, the C.Y. also changed its name in order to take in a much broader mass of members, although the Young Vanguard and Erh T'ung T'uan kept their names. The C.Y. was going to call itself "The Youth Union for the National Salvation of China," and to make a drive for membership in all the areas of China as well as in the Soviet districts.

"Anyone can join the new Youth Union," said Fang Wen-ping. "disregarding whether he believes in Communism or not. The purpose of the Union is to build a broad mass basis for the United Front to fight the Japanese."

On April 12, 1937, just before I arrived in the Northwest, the C.Y. had called a big Youth Congress in Yen-an which organized "The Alliance of Northwestern Youth for National Salvation." Three hundred delegates had come from various provinces, including Mohammedans, Mongols and Koreans. An Executive Committee of eighty-five persons had been elected, of which Fang Wen-ping was elected a member of the Presidium of seven. The "United Front Youth Congress" was the first big congress to be called by the C.Y. since the Fifth Congress held long before. It pointed out that the

\*This is because of the danger of infection. All water has to be carefully boiled.

"closed door" policy of the past was a mistake, and that now they wanted to open wide a new mass organization, and to unite with all youth organizations throughout the country.

One heroic branch of the Young Vanguard deserves special mention indeed. These are the Young Vanguard nurses who came on the Long March. Every time I discussed the Long March with anyone, he never failed to tell stories about the courage and splendid service of the boy nurses and other Young Vanguard who carried on so gallantly during that terrible ordeal. This is what Dr Chi P'eng-fei, Chief of the Medical Department of the Military Council, had to say about these nurses:

"The real heroes of the Long March were the Young Vanguard who came along as nurses. There were one thousand nurses with us, and all were little boys from eleven to seventeen years of age, except about a dozen women. The whole Red Army is more than proud of its nurses.

"Perhaps you can imagine how difficult any kind of medical work was at such a time. The sheer labor involved in nursing made this work extremely taxing. Yet the nurses worked as steadily as in ordinary times. They kept up not only their own spirits but those of the wounded that crowded in on them every day, and never showed anything but courage and unselfish endurance of hardship.

"We were, of course, in the rear, on the Long March. The rear was the most dangerous place of all because the White armies pressed us closely, and all who lagged behind were lost or killed. After marching all day themselves, when evening came and others could rest, the real work of the nurses only began. Because they were such little boys, they would be so fatigued in the morning that many could not wake up



and were left behind. The nurses always lagged in the rear, and as soon as they caught up with the column they had to hurry on to keep up again, so could never take any time to rest as those in front were able to do from time to time.

"Besides a countless number lost in the rear, many were captured or killed in battle, many died from sickness or fatigue, and others were drowned crossing the rivers. The rivers were very deep and swift, and the boys could not swim. Often the soldiers had to cross hand over hand along a rope bridge. The children were not strong enough, and their little tired arms gave away. When they fell in we usually had no way to save them.

"The most difficult time for the nurses, as well as for everyone else, was in the boggy Grasslands. After making camp and building fires for their patients at night, the nurses had to heat the ice-cold water to wash the feet of everyone, or they could not walk next day because of the poisonous minerals in the mud. They also had to take special care of the patients, such as rubbing their bodies and feet to keep up circulation. Because of the rarefied air it was difficult to breathe, and many of the wounded died. Any extra exertion caused great pain in the lungs and heart—but the nurses could not spare themselves. At the same time the problem of getting food was serious. We had only raw wheat. This the nurses had to cook specially in washbowls with great difficulty and give to the patients.

"There are so many stories of the brave little boys on the Long March that I wouldn't know where to begin telling them. You know, the *hsiao kwei* and nurses never rode but walked every step of the way. Not only did they carry all their own blankets but also things belonging to others. Many

had to fight in battle, and they never showed any fear. We in the Red Army ourselves were astounded at their courage and determination during the Long March. Our nurses saved the lives of hundreds of soldiers only by a little timely attention. Their cheerful presence had so much influence in keeping up the morale of the wounded that I could not estimate how important even their little jokes and songs were. Often when a wounded soldier could no longer walk and there were no stretchers, two little nurses would volunteer to stay behind for a while to encourage and comfort him. Often also they gave their scanty rations to their patients when food was scarce. The patients all loved the little nurses like brothers, and they earned the respect and gratitude of the Red Army for all time to come."

Dr Chi P'eng-fei could not tell me how many of the thousand nurses died on the Long March—but there were only about three hundred left in the Red Army as far as I could find out. In addition to the nurses, there were about a thousand or more *hsiao kuei* generally on the March Dr Chi said he thought "about two thousand children altogether started out."

I must confess that the particular part of the Soviet youth which won my heart were the *hsiao kuei* proper. "*Hsiao kuei* [little devil]" is a generic, not an organizational, term. It referred to those tiny little boys, usually orphaned, who had elected to share the fortunes of war with the Red Army. They had many different duties, but their hearts and homes were always with the Army. Most of them said they were about eleven or twelve years of age, but they looked younger to me. There were as many heroic tales about them as there were *hsiao kuei*. I was always accidentally discovering a new boy hero beneath

a ragged nondescript cast-off uniform. Everywhere you turned there was one or another of these boys—busy about something. You often saw them going through the streets intent on their business but swaggering a little just as if their ill-fitting uniforms were specially tailored to impress the public with proletarian nonchalance. Most of them came from Szechuan, Kansu, Hunan, Shansi, and a few from Kiangsi.

For instance, there was Ho Ta-ch'ing.

One afternoon I was returning from the tennis court along the city wall when a small boy with enormous soft brown eyes came up and took hold of my hand with a grimy little paw as he walked along with me.

"How do you like Yen-an?" he inquired politely.

"It's not bad at all," I replied.

"The front is much better," he volunteered.

"What did you do at the front?" I asked.

"Not much," was the answer. "I was with Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien's Fourth Front Army. I haven't been at the front since August."

"How old are you and when did you join the Red Army?"

"I am eleven. I was an apprentice to an old-fashioned doctor in Ch'eng Lai *hsien*, Szechuan, but I ran away and joined the Red Army as a water carrier when I was eight."

"Come to see me some time," I invited, on parting.

"All right. I'll come as soon as I have time. I work in the Communications Department,"—he pointed at a package of letters—"I'm busy until late afternoon."

A few days later he kept his promise. After that he came several times. I could never get him to say anything about himself. He merely sat around for a few minutes, then saluted and went away again.

By accident I discovered that Ho Ta-ch'ing had been captured by Kuomintang troops in battle in Kansu in August 1936 and imprisoned in Sian, together with forty-nine of his comrades in the Children's Brigade, for four months. On January 1, after the Sian Incident, Chang Hsueh-liang's officers had released them,\* given them new uniforms, and paraded them through the city singing revolutionary songs.

It had been a terrific battle, I knew, and many children had been killed.

"But you're a real hero," I exclaimed admiringly, after I learned who he was.

"No, I'm not," he commented dryly. "The real heroes are those who get killed, not captured."

Another day I was buying some candy at a street stall when two little *hsiao kuei* walked up with their arms around each other, curiously and a little hungrily eyeing the transaction. I tried to give the candy to them, but they refused it indignantly and marched off with their noses in the air.

"Anyway, let me take your picture," I demanded, running after them.

They didn't want their pictures taken, either.

"I like those little boys," I said to Demmy-erh, my guard.

"Help me to get a picture of them."

After a long argument they finally consented to pose. One of them looked particularly neat in his uniform, with puttees wrapped around his legs in a very fine design. The *hsiao kuei* inherited the cast-off puttees and would never cut off an inch, hoping to grow into them almost immediately. When

\*Later on I found a picture of Ho Ta-ch'ing taken at the time of the release of the forty-nine prisoners.

they got these frayed bandages wound around their little legs, they usually looked almost like bowlegged mummies.

"Well, come to see me some time," I invited, in my most intriguing manner.

"Maybe," they said. "We're busy all week."

"Then I'll come to see you," I insisted. "Where do you work?"

"In the Red Academy. I'm Liu Ting's orderly. He's head of the Motor School."

"I know him," I said. "I'll be there."

I went around next day to keep my assignation. Chou Yang-ch'ing, for that was the name of this proud and handsome young man, was practising broad-jumping in proper white trunks and sweater.

"I would like to have an interview if you can take time off," I said.

He rushed away and soon returned—the puttees nicely wrapped and his hair newly combed.

We went into Liu Ting's room and sat at a table very formally.

"I was a cowherd in the Soviet district in Nanchiang, Szechuan," he explained as I prodded him with numerous questions. "Now I am twelve. I joined the Children's Brigade in 1933 when Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien's Red Army came. My father took care of the landlord's cows. He didn't get any money for this, but only food. He was very happy when the Red Army came and was glad when I joined. About a thousand other boys from my district joined when I did, but only six from my own village came on the Long March with me. Some rich boys joined, too. We poor boys used to fight with the sons of the *t'uhao*, who didn't join.

"We left on the Long March in April, and in the Grasslands I was wounded on the leg by a shot from a Man-tzu cavalryman. The cavalry followed us in the rear, and I had to walk fast to keep up with the column. But a doctor put on a bandage and some medicine, and I was all right after a while."

"Didn't you ride a horse while you were wounded?"

"No, the children never ride horses. We always walk. During the Long March I was orderly for Commander Ch'en Chung-sun of the 8th Company of the 93rd Division, and I carried a blanket and food for us both all the way.

"It took us twenty days to cross the Grasslands. One of my comrades named T'o Wu-tzu got sick and died there, but not very many children died.

"We spent the winter in Sikong [Inner Tibet], and the snow was cold, but I had a fleece-lined coat, so it didn't matter. We had good food, much better than here in North Shensi—butter and mutton and beef.

"I spent most of the winter knitting woolen socks for the commanders."


"Did you ever fight with a gun?"

"No, I wasn't supposed to," he replied a little unhappily. "One time I did, though. When we were fighting T'ien Tsung-yao's army in Szechuan, they all ran away, so I went out and picked up a gun one of the soldiers had thrown down and ran after them, firing it as fast as I could. But many *hsiao kuei* do fight with guns. I know several who were killed fighting."

"Wouldn't you like to come back to America with me? You would be a little hero there."

"No, I don't know much about foreign countries—except Soviet Russia."





COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CHIU TEH

Addressing a Mass Meeting in Yen-an, the Red Capital in North Shensi, in June, 1937. Chu Teh Is Famous for His Ability to Address His Men in Simple Language Easy to Understand.



"How do you like changing the red star and wearing the Kuomintang button?"

"It's all right for a while, so long as we are fighting the Japanese. We *hsiao kuei* don't have to change for a long time, anyhow, because we wear the old cast-off caps."

"You seem to have quite a few friends here," I remarked. By this time, the room was crowded with *hsiao kuei* of every size and description.

"Yes. The Red Academy now has four companies of *hsiao kuei* working here. There are one hundred in each company. We have to clean all the rooms, take care of the food, carry hot water and all such things."

"I'd like to take a picture of all of you," I said.

They were all fifty delighted, and although it was a cloudy day, we spent the next hour thinking up ways and means of taking photographs.

## II THE LIFE STORY OF CHU TEH

CHU TEH HAS ALREADY become almost as legendary in China as the ancient heroes of the "Three Kingdoms." As commander-in-chief of the swift-moving and elusive Red Army whose maneuvers seem to the enemy to be as miraculous as a mirage on the landscape, he is declared by the more superstitious to be possessed of magic. He is a figure clothed in all those colorful fancies with which the Chinese love to invest their folk heroes: nine-times-nine-league boots, eyes that can see ten thousand *li*, invulnerability to any kind of weapon and suchlike. Some of the more credible tales circulated about him are even repeated by his comrades in the Red Army, for every story of his life told by them reveals startling divergencies from every other. As the accounts of his life so far

published are incomplete, I was lucky enough to prevail upon the "legend" to render an account of himself. The following simple outline of his career is bare of dramatic detail and does not do justice to Chu Teh as the historic personality that he has already become, but it is invaluable in its plain authenticity.

Chu Teh came to call on me as soon as I arrived in Yen-an in May. I found him the complete opposite of the popular picture of himself as a ferocious warrior leading his legions on to the attack with the wave of a red-tasseled big sword. He is fatherly, kind, quiet-spoken and above all modest, even to the point of self-effacement. He is one of those persons who could never write an autobiography because for himself his personality does not exist apart from his work.

In appearance Chu Teh is of average height and very sturdy and well built. The most remarkable feature that one notices is his liquid brown eyes that seem infinitely compassionate. I had the impression that he is at heart that rare thing in China, a humanitarian; and even rarer, that he is a military man to whom war is not a business but a means to an end of suffering. He is undoubtedly a person of feeling and great generosity. Commander Chu is a grizzled veteran of fifty years, at least half of which have been spent in active fighting, and in the deep furrows of his much-lined face the tragic stories of all the campaigns of the endless civil wars in China seem to be written. His mouth is habitually set in a rather sad and serious expression, but when he smiles his face lights up in a surprisingly charming manner, which I happened to catch in a photograph. Chu Teh has none of the mannerisms of the military. One could no more imagine him with a gilded saber dangling around his legs, than Von

Hindenburg in one of Chu Teh's unpressed, faded cotton uniforms, with tennis shoes and puttees. His movements are not brusque, but gentle, slow and deliberate. He seems as calm and imperturbable as a contemplative Buddha.

Chu Teh is a popular leader rather than an authoritative commander, by nature and habit unaffectedly democratic. When I asked his wife, K'ang K'e-ching, what she considered Chu Teh's distinguishing characteristics, she thought awhile, then said:

"His primary characteristic, I think, is that he is extremely kind by nature. Second, he takes full responsibility for everything, great and small. And, third, he likes to be a part of the life of the common fighters and to spend his time talking with them.

"He is really loved by the mass of the army because he lives the simple life of the common soldier and does the same work if necessary. His nickname is 'Hou Fu-t'ou,' or 'Chief Cook,' because he is like a common fighter. He originally got this nickname in 1927, when he was in Tsalin, South Hunan. The Kuomintang troops made a surprise attack one night, and Chu was in a small house with only one bodyguard when the enemy soldiers came in demanding, 'Where is Chu Teh?' Comrade Chu promptly stood up and pointed down the street, saying: 'He is not here. I am the cook. I know Chu Teh is still down the street there.' When they left in a hurry to look for him, Chu Teh was able to escape.

"Chu Teh speaks in a very plain way to the men, and they understand him clearly. Sometimes he helps the farmers to plant their crops when he is not too busy, and he used to carry grain from the valley to the mountain. He is very strong and healthy and likes to play basketball and to watch

the track meets. He eats any kind of food, and doesn't care for any special thing except plenty of pepper, for he is a Szechuan man. He does not go to bed until eleven or twelve at night, but always gets up at five or six.

"He likes athletics, but he is studious, too. He always has a carefully planned reading schedule of books on politics and economics, and reviews his German one hour every day now, as well as teaching at the Academy. He also likes to talk to friends and is not always serious, though he is not humorous like Mao Tsê-tung.

"He has no temper ordinarily, and I have never had a quarrel with him, but he gets angry in battle. In fighting, Chu Teh always takes command at the front, but he has not been wounded."

The Red Army is an army of extreme youth, entirely new to the background of old China. For this army Chu Teh is a symbol of stability and a link with tradition and past history, for he has experienced the whole revolutionary movement since the Manchu Dynasty in its slowest but most fundamental phase, in the interior. He lived in the two most backward provinces, farthest in the interior, Yünnan and Szechuan. By the time the mercurial coastal changes reached these backwaters, they had to be valid and proven. Unlike many dominant figures in modern Chinese armies, Chu Teh is not a "returned student" from Japan, Russia or Germany. His experience is rooted deep in the bedrock of native interior China, and this is not the least of the reasons why he has the complete confidence of his men, as well as the respect of old-style Chinese generals in China's armies. He knows intimately most of the terrain of this interior from north to south, as well as its people and general conditions.

Chu Teh was trained under the brilliant Yünnan republican general, Ts'ai Ao, at one of the first modern military schools in the country. He then learned the special guerilla tactics, which served the Red Army so well later, in his garrison duties on the French Indo-China border and in the mountain fastnesses of Szechuan and Yünnan. Politically, he began fighting for democracy as a member of the Tung Meng Hui in 1909, later joining the Kuomintang and then, entirely on his own initiative, searching out and becoming one of the earliest members of the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. Chu Teh's expedition in search of the Communist Party in Shanghai, Peking and then Berlin reveals the intellectual initiative and sure determination of purpose that have made him a leader in three revolutions.

It would be difficult to imagine the course of the history of the Communist movement in China without its twin-genius "Chu-Mao," which many Chinese actually think of as one person. Mao Tsê-tung has been the cool political brains and Chu Teh the warm heart of the struggle which gave it life-action. One of the reasons for the surprising discipline which the Communist Party maintains over the Red Army is Chu Teh's loyalty and submission to "civil" control. There is no struggle between the military and political power from Chu and Mao down to the army commanders and their political commissars. The Chu-Mao combination was fortunately not competitive but perfectly complementary. Chu Teh is not politically ambitious in any way; he accepts orders and is therefore able to give them in turn—a factor of no small value in the command of a revolutionary army.

Chu Teh has that rare kind of personality which is immediately and universally appealing to nearly everyone. It

seems to come from a modesty which perhaps derives from his consciousness of solidity and personal integrity.

It was on May 21, 1937, that Chu Teh gave me the following autobiographical sketch, together with an account of the development of the Red Army.

"I was born in 1886 in a Szechuan village called Ma-an Ch'ang, which is in Yi Lung hsien. My family were poor tenant farmers. For the existence of its twenty members we rented twenty *mou* of land. When I was six years of age I attended the tutorial school of the landlord, named Ting. For this he demanded a fee and treated me as badly as if it were charity. I ate and slept at home, walking three *li* to the school every day. After school hours I worked at various tasks, such as carrying water and tending cows. I studied in this school for three years.

"Then the large family could no longer survive under the pressure of the landlord, so it was broken up for economic reasons. I was adopted by an uncle and moved to Ta Wan to live with him. Although my own father had been very unkind to me, this uncle loved me as his son and sent me to school to study the Classics for six or seven years. I am the only one in my family who received an education, and in order to achieve this I was obliged to work at various tasks while attending school.

"I took the state examinations in 1905 and in 1906 went to Hsun Ch'ing hsien, where I attended a higher primary school for six months and then a middle school for six months. In 1907 I went to an athletic school in Chengtu for a year, then returned to my native Yi Lung hsien to teach athletics in the higher primary school there. In 1909 I went to Yün-nanfu, the capital of Yunnan Province, and entered the Yün-

nan Military Academy, where I remained until the 1911 Revolution. My ambition was always to be a military man, and this Academy was perhaps the most progressive and modern in China at that time. It had stiff requirements, so I was very happy to be admitted there for study.

"I had always worshiped modern science and felt the need for China to have an industrial revolution. I was also very much influenced as a child by the stories of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion told by weavers and other itinerant workers, who were news carriers in those days. Having a revolutionary bent, I joined the Tung Meng Hui, Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Party, during my first few weeks at the Academy in 1909.

#### *The Militarist Period After the 1911 Revolution*

"In 1911, being then a company commander, I participated in the uprising to overthrow the Manchus as part of the Yünnan troops led by Ts'ai Ao, the famous Yünnan governor. The 1911 Revolution began on October 10 in Hankow, and twenty days later our Yünnan uprising was held. I was then, in the same year, sent to Szechuan to fight the Manchu governor there, Chao Erh-fêng. We defeated Chao and returned to Yünnan the next April or May. In the latter part of 1912 I was ordered to take the post of detachment commander over the students in the Yünnan Military Academy, and there I taught war tactics, field maneuvers, marksmanship and rifle practice.

"In 1913 I was appointed battalion commander in Ts'ai Ao's troops and stationed on the French Indo-China border for two years. In 1915 I was ordered to Szechuan as regimental commander to fight against Yuan Shih-k'ai's military

forces there. After six months of fighting we were victorious I became a brigade commander, and my troops were stationed at Hsuifu, Luchow, on the Yangtze River in South Szechuan. Mine was the crack 13th Mixed Brigade of the 7th Division (later changed to the 7th Mixed Brigade), which gained some fame at this time. However, we sustained heavy losses, over half the brigade being destroyed in the fighting. I stayed in this region for five years, fighting continually against the old traitor troops under orders of the Peking Government of Tuan Chi-jui.

"At the end of 1920 I returned to Yünnanfu to fight against the reactionary T'ang Chi-yao, as Ts'ai Ao had died. Ts'ai Ao, one of the most progressive young republican leaders of the South, had had considerable influence over me. He was first to raise the standard of revolt in defense of the Republic against Yuan Shih-k'ai's plot to become Emperor in 1915.

"From September to October 1921 I was Commissioner of Police of Yünnan Province. Then T'ang Chi-yao staged a successful comeback, and I escaped with only one company of troops, though T'ang pursued me for twenty days. Another comrade who had left with me, taking one company with him also, was caught by T'ang and tortured to death. I led my company of refugees to Sikong [Tibet] along exactly the same route as the Red Army took later in the Long March of 1935. We crossed the River of Golden Sand, went to Yachow, near Tachienlu, stopped at Huilichou and entered Szechuan. I went to Chia Ting and then to Chungking, where I was received by Liu Hsiang, the governor-general, and Yang Sen, Chungking garrison commander, and saw the Dragon Boat Festival with them in June 1922. These two



militarists of Szechuan were, of course, later attacked by the Red Army. However, at this time, instead of offering a reward for my head, Liu Hsiang was anxious to give me an appointment as division commander, which I refused because I had already decided to find a new revolutionary way for myself in searching for the Communist Party. Liu Hsiang's interest in procuring my services derived from the fact that my special tactics had already become known and feared. These tactics, which I had used with signal success against the troops of the monarchy, were mobile partisan tactics which I learned mainly from my experience on the Indo-China border and in fighting the Man-tzu tribes and bandits. I learned from a hard school of experience in fighting against mobile groups of bandit deserters from the armies, which was especially valuable. I combined with this guerilla experience, of course, what I had learned from books and in school.

"My own particular tactics in leading an army were these : I was myself physically strong, so I lived with my men and kept the closest contact with them, thus establishing confidence in them. Before any engagement, large or small, I looked over the topographical situation and planned every detail very carefully. My main tactics were usually sound because of careful management and personal leadership of the troops. I always insisted upon getting a clear picture of the enemy position from all angles. I also usually had good relations with the people, which helped me very much. Ts'ai Ao, who was famous for his commanding tactics, taught me very much. The Yünnan Army then was new and modern and armed with German rifles, of course. I think that the other element important for both commander and men is an

understanding of the political situation so they have the morale to fight firmly for a principle. The rest is experience—the more you fight, the better you are able to grasp the situation.

“After leaving Liu Hsiang in Szechuan, I took a boat down the Yangtze River to search for the Communist Party in Shanghai. At this time China had gone back into a period of militarist feudalism, and the outlook was dark indeed, and I was very depressed. During my last year as commander in Szechuan, which was 1920, I had taken up the habit of smoking opium. When I returned to Yünnan, however, at the end of 1920, I bought some medicine to cure myself before making my escape from T'ang Chi-yao, and took this cure during my first ‘long march’ to Sikong in 1921, continuing the treatment on the river trip to Shanghai. I was nearly cured of the habit when I arrived, and after one week of intensive treatment in St. Marie's Hospital in Shanghai I was permanently cured.

“When I left Szechuan in 1922 in search of the Chinese Communist Party, I had no idea of how to get into contact with it, but I had determined to make a connection somehow. In fact, the Party had only been organized a few months previously, I learned later. My interest in Communism and Bolshevism developed out of my own reading on the Russian Revolution. My only other influence was a few talks with returned students from France. While I was stationed in Szechuan, I studied everything I could find about the World War and the Russian Revolution. Until this time I had given all my energies to fighting for the Republic and the realization of Sun Yat-sen democracy in China. But the failure of the 1911 Revolution and the reaction into wasteful militarist war into which the country was plunged after-

ward discouraged me greatly. I realized that the China Revolution must go deeper and be as fundamental as that in Russia, the continuing success of which gave me hope.

"I could not find any trace of the Communist Party in Shanghai, so I went to Peking to continue my search. Sun Ping-wen, the editor of Sun Yat-sen's organ *The People's Press*, went with me also in search of the communist Party. In Peking, however, I had no better luck in finding the Communists, so returned to Shanghai. Thus, this year, 1922, I wandered about from south to north and back again like a horse without a bridle. My main impression of Peking was of the corruptness and farcical nature of Parliament. However, on the other hand I met many students, with some of whom I travelled, and their activities made a good impression on me.

"On my return to Shanghai I met Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min and other Kuomintang leaders. Sun impressed me as being a very sincere, determined and intelligent leader. He wanted me to go to Szechuan to fight against Chen Chung-ming, but I refused. Sun then wanted me to go to America, but I was interested in going to Germany to study military science and to see the effects of the great World War for myself. In September I took a boat to Europe, passing through Singapore and Marseilles and then to Paris, where I proudly had my picture taken surveying that city from the Eiffel Tower.

### *The Chinese Communists in Berlin*

"In Berlin, I met Chou En-lai (now Vice-Chairman of the Military Council of the Red Army) and other comrades. I had found the Chinese Communist Party at last—in Berlin!

I arrived in Berlin in October 1922, being then about thirty-six years of age. I joined the Party as soon as I found it then and there; this was in October 1922.

"I stayed in Berlin one year studying German, then went to Göttingen, where I entered a college and took lectures in social science for two semesters—partly as a protection to permit me to continue my stay in Germany. I carried on Party work steadily while I was in Germany. In Berlin we organized a branch of the Kuomintang in 1924. 'The Chinese Youth Party was the Nationalist party, and the students were then split into two camps. At the same time I edited a weekly political paper in mimeograph. Teng Yen-ta, who later founded the Third Party in China, was also there. I attended the World Student Congress, and in 1925 was arrested by the German police for activities in connection with the Chankoff case. Chankoff was a Bulgarian reactionary whom somebody tried to bomb in a cathedral, causing many arrests to be made. There were thirty arrested, and these included three or four Chinese. This was the first time I was ever arrested, and it was only for twenty-eight hours. My second and last arrest was made in Berlin 1925 for activities in support of the May Thirtieth Movement during a conference called by the Communist Party. This second arrest resulted in only thirty hours' detention. Therefore, my revolutionary prison record is not very impressive, I fear—only fifty-eight hours in all. At that time I worked with many Indians in Germany. In the Student Congress there were many nationalities among whom I made friends. I was finally driven out of Germany for these activities, so I travelled around Europe and to the U.S.S.R. until my return to China in 1926.

"Home again, I went from Shanghai to Hankow and then

to Wanhsien in Szechuan. I had been ordered by the Party to conduct a military movement in Szechuan and to do agitation work among Yang Sen's troops, being a good friend of General Yang. These were troops which had been under Wu Pei-fu, Yang being Wu's appointee, and had opposed the Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang. I succeeded, however, in helping to reorganize them as the 20th Army of the National Revolutionary troops. I was Chairman of the Political Department of this 20th Army and was concurrently the Kuomintang Party delegate, or commissar, but held no military position. In 1927, because Yang Sen still wavered in his attitude and his troops, though ostensibly reorganized under the National Revolutionary Army, still kept their connections with the enemy North, T'ang Sheng-chih of Hunan was sent with Kuomintang troops to fight Yang Sen. At this time I left Wanhsien and went to Kiangsi.

### *The Nanchang Uprising*

"In January 1927 I joined Chu Pei-teh's army in Nanchang and was made principal of the Military Training School in Nanchang as well as Chief of Police of the Nanchang Bureau of Public Safety, which positions I held up to the Nanchang Uprising of August 1. I helped organize this Uprising, which was planned under my protection as Chief of Police! After the Uprising I was made vice-commander of the new Ninth Army, created during the revolt, which consisted of about three thousand men. The 11th, 4th and 20th Kuomintang armies also participated in the Uprising.

"At this time I worked with Chou En-lai, Ho Lung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Pei-ch'eng, Lin Pai-ch'u, Lin Piao, Hsü Teh-lieh, Yeh T'ing and other revolutionary comrades.

Mao Tsê-tung was not in Nanchang, and I did not meet him until later.

"I then led my troops to Tungkiang, the East River district near Hailofeng, Kwangtung, as commander of the right wing of our revolutionary troops. I attacked San-ho-pa in Mei hsien, while Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung attacked Ch'ao-shan and Swatow. After our mutual failures in these areas, I retreated to Fukien, then to Kiangsi and Hunan. By that time most of my men in the Ninth Army had been sacrificed. I had altogether only twelve hundred troops, which included also many retreaters from Ho Lung's and Yeh T'ing's forces who scattered after their defeat.

### *The Red Army*

"I then helped organize the South Hunan Revolt in January 1928. We changed our name to the '1st Division of the Peasants' and Workers' Revolutionary Army,' and carried the red banner, the hammer-and-sickle and the red star. We used the red star for the first time on our flag during the South Hunan Revolt. Six months later, in May 1928, I went to Chingkanshan in Kiangsi with troops increased to ten thousand men. Here, at the foot of the mountain, Chingkanshan, where we were to establish our first base, I met Mao Tsê-tung for the first time. It was a very exciting and happy occasion.

"Before the South Hunan Revolt Mao Tsê-tung's troops had left for Chingkanshan in the winter of 1927. My only connection with him previous to 1928 was when his brother, Mao Tsê-tan, was sent to make connections with me after my retreat from the East River district in Kwangtung. At Chingkanshan in 1928 Mao and I combined our forces into the new 'Fourth Army,' using this name in order to keep the

famous name of the Kuomintang Fourth Army, the 'Iron-sides,' which had been our revolutionary stronghold during the Great Revolution. I was made commander of the Fourth Army, while Mao was political commissar. We stayed on the mountain Chingkanshan for six months and defeated three campaigns to annihilate us. At this time P'eng Teh-huai, after his uprising in the P'ingkiang region, arrived in Chingkanshan. We left him to garrison Chingkanshan while Mao and I led our forces to South Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwang-tung and Human, in 1929, to carry on our long struggle for the Soviets. After this my life is merely a part of the Red Army's history.

"To answer questions about my personal life: I was married twice before joining the Communist struggle. My first wife died, but the second is still alive. I had one son by this first wife, but I have no idea where he is now. During the Long March in 1935 I read in the press that my son, then eighteen, had escaped from his mother's native town in Na Ch'i, near Suifu, where he was living, in order to save his life. This first wife was a normal-school teacher, with natural feet and progressive ideas in support of the revolution. I married her when I was twenty-five and she eighteen. My third wife, with whom I lived during the South Hunan Revolt in 1928, was named Wu Yu-lan. She was then captured by Ho Ch'ien, governor of Hunan, and beheaded. My present wife is K'ang K'e-ching, whom I married in 1928.

"And no, the legend about my millions of dollars is not true. I had some property in Yünnan but not much, and my wife had a little. However, my property was all confiscated by T'ang Chi-yao when I was forced to run away in 1921."

I then asked Chu Teh whom he considered the best military men. His reply was:

"I admire the Germans very much—Hindenburg and Mackensen, a German military expert in maneuvering warfare. Marshal Foch was brilliant in his defense of France. And, of course, the Red Army commanders in the U.S.S.R. are now experienced and first-rate, such as Galen [Bluecher].

"Napoleon was not so bad in the old style. When I was a boy I liked him very much, and also George Washington. The story of the success of the volunteer farmers of the American Revolution used to excite me very much, and I knew that someday the Chinese farmers would fight for freedom and independence in the same way.

"In China I always admired Ts'ai Ao of Yünnan, who was the best early expert in modern military science. And I used to have great respect for Sun Yat-sen on the political side."

When I inquired what he thought of the Chinese soldier man for man as compared with the soldiers of other nations, Chu Teh replied emphatically:

"It is the officers and not the soldiers of China who are incompetent and bad. The men only need political training. If the Chinese soldiers could be properly trained they would be the finest fighters in the world, because they can endure any kind of hardship and keep up their morale under conditions which would shatter the fighting power of any other race, both spiritually and physically—just as the coolies of China have no equal for hard work and endurance."

### III' LO P'ING-HUI, HEAD OF THE "HUMAN CAVALRY"

LO P'ING-HUI LOOKS LIKE A "Chinese General." In the best Feng Yu-hsiang tradition. No wonder he was called the "Model Soldier" of Yünnanfu at eighteen. He is the biggest



Chinese I have ever seen. Tall and with a Gargantuan girth. But every ounce is iron muscle. It was natural enough that he should carry himself like a victorious wrestler who has just left a victim groaning on the mat.

When Feng Yu-hsiang went Christian, he baptized his troops wholesale with a fire hose. When Lo P'ing-hui went Communist, he took all the anti-Red *min tuan* of Kian with him—except ten. And the landlords' *min tuan* are the Reds' bitterest foes. In Red annals this is a feat paralleled only by Liu Tzu-tan in North Shensi.

My enjoyment in talking with jolly old Lo P'ing-hui was as enormous as he was. His open moonface reminded me of the Laughing Buddha—or rather, specifically, of the Jade Buddha from Indo-China in the Round City in Peking, which has the same fascinating Indo-Chinese eyes not curved but level on the top. And in fact Lo P'ing-hui was born in Yünnan, which borders Indo-China, and which is the most beautiful province in China, with high wooded mountains for which Commander Lo was a little homesick after his stay among the bare desert loesslands of the Northwest. When he talked about the flowers and crystal streams of Yünnan, he looked a bit wistful and said, after the manner of Feng Yu-hsiang's favorite verse about Manchuria, "Give me back my mountains and rivers."

Lo P'ing-hui enjoyed soldiering, enjoyed talking about his battles, about himself, and about anything which came up for conversation. In thirty-eight years he has lived a lifetime, and fought the length and breadth of China. He is a real Chinese, who would be dear to the hearts of the Chinese in any period of their history. The Kuan-ti kind that the Chinese love for folk heroes. "A strong man and a

clever one." Always outwitting the enemy, and not afraid to thump on his chest afterward. The stories he tells of tricking enemy troops might be taken right out of the *San Kuo*—and will make heroic folk tales in themselves one day. (He even carried a book of poetry under his arm when he came to see me—in the approved Chinese tradition.)

Like Chu Teh and Ho Lung—and old Feng Yu-hsiang who affects the simple garb and the simple life—Lo P'ing-hui is the product of some underlying wholesome democratic tradition in China, and proud of remaining a son of the people. He despises luxury and money and enjoys living a hard, dangerous life, enjoys eating the same food and going half barefooted with his men. The fact that he thrives on it proves to him his natural right to leadership among them.

The man-mountain had been in more battles than other Red commanders, he said, "because it was my business to go out and pick a quarrel in order to divert the enemy troops from our main columns. And during three years of battling, the enemy was always ten to twenty times bigger than my force—my troops being always a small mobile unit." Lo was always right in the front lines—I am sure he enjoyed being the biggest target on the terrain. When I asked how many times he had been wounded, he had to stop and think awhile.

"Let me see," he wrinkled his smooth bland brow. "I never stopped to count my wounds before. I think I have had six small wounds and one serious one. My clothes have been shot through several times, though, as I am often only twenty meters from the enemy lines. Once, when I had just walked away from a trench, a bomb dropped in the spot I had just left. And once I was hiding in a rock cleft when an air bomb dropped in the cleft but did not explode. Many

times I have been covered with dirt and mud from bombs, but never been wounded by them."

"What was the worst enemy threat to the Red Army?" I asked.

"Nothing the enemy did bothered us much," was the reply. "Air bombing is bad for the psychology of the troops, but we just move into action with the enemy quickly, and they dare not bomb their own troops. For instance, in Ch'ang-hsien,\* South Kansu, only last year, the airplanes bombed and the enemy retreated. The Red Army chased them, and the planes bombed their own troops instead."

Lo P'ing-hui was fun to talk with, because the Red Army was new to him and he took nothing for granted in a bureaucratic way, but still had a great interest in the phenomenon and a long perspective from previous experience. I could hardly keep him from drawing maps all over the furniture, and one day he nearly put me through a course in maneuvering warfare before I could stop him. As he talked, he usually pursued the enemy with his finger, then took a prodigious leap to the opposite side of the table to chase them back again, finally slapping the table a resounding smack and wiping his brow when the victory was won. He was very valuable, full of details, and got excited easily, looking at me in a childlike earnest way, as he talked in his husky voice. If I asked him a political question, he usually replied, with a grin, "My head is a little stupid. I don't know." He was attending classes at the Military and Political Academy in Yen-an when I met him.

"Why is the Red Army superior to the Kuomintang armies?" I asked Lo. "You have had much experience in both and should know."

"First, I think it is because the Red Army is under the strict leadership of the Communist Party; second, the soldiers are class conscious; third, the political work and education is good; fourth, the Communist cadres are model soldiers to follow, and there is perfect democracy in the army—the officers live exactly like the men; and fifth, our tactics are better because they have been created out of complex situations and hard necessity."

"You are the happiest-looking person I have ever seen. Don't you ever wear yourself out?" I inquired.

"Everybody in the Red Army is always happy and full of spirit and energy," was the pat answer. "This is because we have a determined aim and everyone knows the ultimate victory belongs to us. We are ragged, and sometimes we have to eat food that even a horse or pig wouldn't touch—and we may have only grass sandals—but we are never discouraged, year after year."

Lo likes children, and the picture he gave me showed him as an island entirely surrounded by *hsiao kuei*. One good-looking boy was a Miao-tzu. All his *hsiao kuei* wore good shoes, but Lo proudly displayed a huge pair of grass sandals.

"Where are these *hsiao kuei* now?" I asked, looking at the picture.

"I brought five with me to Yen-an," he replied, and pointed to a pocket-size figure. "That's my bodyguard, T'ang Tse-p'ei—a very intelligent Kiangsi boy only eighteen, who has been with me five years. I had two or three hundred *hsiao kuei* with me on the Long March, right through all my maneuvers. Many were with me during the fighting at Wu-kiang even. Most of them kept up with the troops somehow, but some lagged behind and were lost. They never desert

the Army. Many fight in battle, and they are all brave and determined. I had one battalion commander who had been a *hsiao kuei* who was killed at eighteen—he was a very brave boy.

“I have three children of my own in Kiangsi,” Lo added wistfully, “but I don’t know what has become of them now—and one boy in Yünnan. . . .”

Lo P’ing-hui had all of the old-world courtesy for women. (I never could find out how many wives he had had—he had been an independent married householder at twelve.) He always bowed with cavalier courtliness. And he brought me a very nice gift on parting. It was a round piece of agate—a Lama bead from Tibet, to be worn for good luck. The bead was divided exactly by a white line, like the ring on Saturn.

“Have many other Kuomintang commanders deserted to the Red Army?” I asked. Lo P’ing-hui had been one of Chu Pei-teh’s best commanders in the Kuomintang army before he led the Kian Uprising and joined the Red Army in 1929.

“Yes, many lower Kuomintang commanders especially have deserted and brought their guns over with them. The Ningtu Uprising was the biggest. This was led by Teng Chen-t’ang and Chao Pao-shen, and they brought twenty thousand men and ten thousand rifles with them after the uprising. Another was Ch’eng Tzu-hua, now Hsü Hai-tung’s political commissar. He was a platoon commander in the Ouyüwan district, and led an uprising of his own and several other platoons to join the Red Army. After 1932, however, hardly any officers deserted from the Kuomintang, because the new Fascist movement influenced them against us.”

Lo P’ing-hui has been for several years one of the ten best-

known Red commanders. (When I asked him whom he considered the ablest Red commanders, he replied: "P'eng Teh-huai and Huang Kung-liu who was killed in 1932 at Tungku, Kiangsi.") He and his "Human Cavalry" have become one of the most famous of all Red Army units. How the outsize commander could stay at the head of such a fast-moving professionally mobile column is a mystery. But obviously his legs are as animated as his personality. It took me several days to make out exactly which main front army he belonged to, he seemed to cover so much territory, and they all claimed him. The fact uncovered itself, eventually, that he had been attached to every one of them. He had left with the First Front Army on the Long March from Kiangsi, during which he commanded the dangerous rear-guard position. On their arrival in Szechuan, he had joined the Fourth Front Red Army as rear guard and spent the winter in Tibet with Chu Teh and Hsiang-ch'ien. Then later on he had travelled through the Grasslands with Ho Lung's Second Front Red Army. At the time I met him he was in command of the 32d Red Army.

Lo P'ing-hui's personal history is a fascinating study of the revolutionary changes in the life of a soldier from the ranks. He was born in Yunnan in 1899 of a middle-class peasant family. At twelve he ran away to join the army, but was brought back by his family. At sixteen he ran away again and joined the artillery in the garrison troops of Yunnanfu in 1916. He wanted to join the army, he said, "mostly in order to have freedom to revenge myself upon the landlords. I got this idea from seeing two soldiers, who returned to my *hsien*, beating up a landlord with impunity."

He was promoted from the ranks and studied military

science through lecture courses at the garrison. In 1920 he was made a member of General T'ang Chi-yao's staff, and went with him to Hongkong as "purchasing agent." This is the general who lost ten million dollars when the Sino-French bank went bankrupt. Lo P'ing-hui was honest, however. "My life with T'ang was luxurious, but I didn't like it," he explained. "Psychologically, I was revolted by an easy life and always enjoyed hard soldiering."

Lo became interested in Sun Yat-senism and in 1922 joined Chu Pei-teh's revolutionary army in Kwangsi, participating in the war against Ch'en Chiung-ming, as battalion commander. He was captured and imprisoned in Kanchow, Kiangsi, for nine months, narrowly avoiding execution, but finally escaped disguised as a peasant and rejoined Chu Pei-teh in Canton. He fought throughout the Northern Expedition, and his battalion was disarmed in Nanchang during the Communist uprising there on August 1, 1927. After this Lo fought against Chu Teh's Red Army two years.

When Lo P'ing-hui was commander of the Peace Preservation Corps engaged in an anti-Red campaign at Kian, Kiangsi, the second largest provincial city, he was visited by a young Communist student from Peking National University named Chao Hsin-wu. Lo admired the audacity with which this student risked his head to influence him toward revolution, and fell victim to his arguments. Soon Lo was carrying on dialectical arguments with the local gentry: "In Kian *hsien* there are 300,000 peasants and only 20,000 of you gentry. You say all but you are bandits. If I kill all of these 300,000, how will you be able to live on their labor as you do? These Reds are just peasants trying to solve the problem of living."

Secretly under Commander Lo's protection, the Commu-

nist in Kian had a thriving underground colony multiplying. In July 1929 he became a Party member himself, and shortly afterward led the famous Kian Uprising of *min tuan*. He described this occasion to me as follows:

"One afternoon a brigade commander stationed in Kian called a conference with the *hsien* magistrate. This was secret, with locked doors. I was one of those present. In the conference this commander said, 'The Communists in Kian are very active, and we must clear them all out.' He then disclosed the plan to investigate every single room in the city, including all the Peace Preservation Corps quarters. We were all sworn not to reveal anything of what had been said.

"The conference finished at eight o'clock, and two *tuan* (two or three thousand men) were already moving out to guard every house during the search. I was extremely worried, and could not find the Party secretary until ten o'clock. The 'clearing out' was to begin at twelve midnight, so the comrade rushed away to prepare for the search.

"During the conference, the brigade commander had said, 'We should arrest ten innocent people, rather than let a single Communist escape.' That night a thousand people were arrested and put in the local temple for detention. Then the order was given that those guaranteed by the gentry not to be Communist members could be released.

"A comrade came to me and said, 'Only two of our comrades have been caught, but they know you, and if they make confessions it will be very dangerous.'

"I managed to get their release."

"Of the thousand arrested only a hundred got guarantees, so the others were imprisoned a long time. Many must have been killed later after my uprising. I don't know what hap-



pened to them. No guarantee was acceptable except one from the gentry—naturally the poor people could not easily get this.

"It was possible at that time to concentrate all the important gentry in one big meeting and clean them up with one stroke, and to disarm all other troops, concentrate the Red troops near by, and capture the city of Kian without much trouble. This was my plan, but the Party disagreed with it and called it a 'military plot,' so I gave it up.

"Then . . . my connection with the Communist Party was discovered by my wife. I had a fight with her and sent her back to her own family without trouble, however. But once again a local Party organ was discovered and my connection became more and more apparent. So it was necessary to act.

"I led my *min tuan* to a place outside the city called Chih-hsia to stay, as I feared a *coup* against me and that I would be bottled up in the city walls. The brigade commander and the gentry wrote to me saying, 'You must come inside the city. We guarantee to give you so many new machine guns, to raise your salary, and to organize a new company for you,' etc. But I knew this was all a trick because I received, not one, but several different letters, all unnecessarily urgent.

"I was in control of the main road and of the post office and mails. I ordered an investigation of all mail, and military punishment for smuggling. One night we found a letter from a landlord to one of my lower officers, saying I already had the Communist 'idea,' and that if necessary the officers should at any opportunity try to 'fix' me—that is, arrest and disarm me.

"So I made my plan. Most of the soldiers and officers were under my personal influence. That same night the officer to

whom the landlord's letter had been addressed disappeared before I could get him, so I estimated that within three hours the Kuomintang troops would arrive to disarm my forces. Early in the morning I gave the order to concentrate without arms, because one of my detachments was not reliable but under the influence of the gentry. At this meeting I told my men :

“ ‘We have been fighting the Reds a long time. We lead a bitter life with no salary, and now the local gentry accuse us of being Communists ! To clear up this suspicion and to get our pay, I want to take you back to Kian.’ ”

“ ‘Just as I thought, the soldiers began arguing among themselves, and many said they wanted to join with the Reds and not to go back to the city. We put it to vote then, and those who wanted to join with the Reds were separated and armed, and those who did not, received no arms. At that meeting four hundred joined the Red uprising, and only ten chose to continue with the Kuomintang ! (Later on about twenty men deserted with their arms. Altogether only thirty or so rejoined the Kuomintang. None of the remaining original participants in the uprising deserted me afterward, however.’ ) ”

“ ‘We left camp and began marching to meet with the Red troops. Soon a new agitation began among my *min tuan*, and some began to waver. They sent spies back, however, and found that the Kuomintang troops had already arrived at our camp to disarm us. Then others said, ‘We dare not try to join with the Communists because we have fought the Reds so long they will surely take revenge and kill us.’ I said to them that I had fought the Reds longer than anyone else, yet I knew the communists were sincere and did not

hate the White troops personally, but only the gentry and the Kuomintang, and I declared that I had complete trust in them. We sent a messenger with a letter to the Red Army.

"This region was all White and far away from the Reds, but I took the men to a place where the Party had a strong secret organization. When we arrived, we gathered together, and the Party delegate and I made speeches. The men all tore off their Kuomintang insignia and said, 'Let these things go to the devil! We will wear the red star!' Everyone was jubilant and enthusiastic.

"Three days later, we marched back to our original camp at Chih-hsia carrying high the Red Flag!

"Kian was in chaos. The city gates were closed, and everybody suspected everybody else of planning an uprising. They said, 'If even the commander of the Peace Preservation Corps is a Communist, how many others must there be?' The whole *min t'uan* of the region was reorganized directly under the control of the gentry. The Kuomintang troops had fled inside the city walls already.

"We called a big meeting under the direction of the Party delegate, and three thousand peasants came. The delegate made a speech, then I made mine. I said to the people, 'Three days ago I was commander of the anti-Red Peace Preservation Corps. Now I come back with the red flag. I regret with all my heart that in the past I was utilized by the Kuomintang to fight against you poor people. I am glad to declare that now I have turned to your side to fight for you instead.'

"The peasants who were listening were very happy and shouted, 'Now you are the Red Army! Now you are our own troops! Let us forget the past!'

"When I heard this, I began to cry and could not speak.

I felt that I owed the people my life to pay for my past misdeeds.

"Later on two or three hundred other *min t'uan* and regular soldiers deserted the Kuomintang and joined with me. The *min t'uan* are poor mercenaries paid by the landlords, but the Red Army in general doesn't want *min t'uan* because they have lost their class consciousness in the service of the landlords, and not many of them want to join the Reds, either. If you become a *min t'uan*, a great number of people are held responsible for your actions. Not only your own family and relatives but three other families must guarantee for you, and the landlords usually have a perfect system of investigating their *min t'uan*.

"Now only a few of my *min t'uan* of the Kian Uprising are still alive. Later on over twenty became regimental, company or battalion commanders in the Red Army, and all fought very bravely on the front during the most violent engagements.

"After this we fought partisan warfare for a while, and my troops soon enlarged to over a thousand. We had no connection with the regular Red Army then, as they were far away, but we carried the Red Star and the Hammer-and-Sickle Red Flag. Some of the *min t'uan* wavered for a while, and a rumor started that there were counter-revolutionary elements among us and that I received money from the Reds and from Moscow! I made the men search my room, and finally they were all convinced that I hadn't a copper and was as poor as they, so their confidence was not shaken.

"The Kuomintang had two battalions near by, but they dared not come anywhere near our region because of fear of us. At this time we confiscated and arrested the landlords,

but few were killed, and those only on demand of the local people by formal vote in a mass meeting.

"After several months of independent partisan fighting, in January 1930, P'eng Teh-huai and Huang Kung-liu came to meet me. One month later Chu Teh's troops also came to the Tai-ho region in Kian to unite forces. My command was enlarged to 2,000 men then."

In 1930 Lo P'ing-hui was made commander of the 12th Red Army, which the Reds called the "Biped Cavalry," a special mobile maneuvering force trained to attack and divert enemy force away from the main column. He was later made commander of the Ninth Red Army Corps and fought in nearly every important battle during the Five Campaigns in the South, then commanded the gallant rear guard during the Long March. The story of his maneuvers during the Long March matches the tales of the *San Kuo*. In Tung-chuan-fu, Yünnan, for instance, he confiscated the magistrate's official seal and the Kuomintang uniforms of the local soldiers, and ordered his Kuomintang-clad troops ferried across the River of Golden Sand in full official style.

From October 1935 to August 1936 Lo P'ing remained on the Sikong-Szechuan border. As he tells the story: "When the main Red Army left Szechuan on the march to the Northwest, my troops were five or six days behind them. I was also four or five days' march distant from the Fourth Front Red Army. I was surrounded by the Man-tzu tribesmen and had severe fighting with them. We defeated the Man-tzus by climbing a mountain and going around to their rear. Being so far behind by that time, I joined the Fourth Front Army under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien as his rear guard."

In Szechuan Lo P'ing-hui was given command of the 32d

Red Army. What happened to the gallant "Human Cavalry," I couldn't find out—but I fear that not many survived to tell the epic tale of their adventures.

The Red soldiers always say of Lo P'ing-hui: "He is a one-man battle. He gets so engrossed in fighting that he is always in the front lines directing only one squad or company and forgets to command the rest of the troops."

#### IV. HSÜ HSIANG—CH'IENT, WHAMPOA VETERAN OF FOUR SOVIETS

HAD I LEFT Yen-an in June, as originally planned, I should have missed Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien. This elusive commander was stationed far away in Kansu, but fortunately for me made a trip to the Red capital while I was there, so I was able to get the unknown stories of three isolated Soviets from the only person who was able to tell these. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien had always been separated from the Central Soviets, so the Communist leaders themselves had hardly even been introduced to him. I had asked nearly everyone in Yen-an to give me some notes for his biography, but nobody knew anything about his personal background except that he was a graduate of the First Class of Whampoa Cadets.

The mere name Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien is a flaming brand of Red Terror to the corrupt war lords and landlords of Szechuan. I remember very well when I first heard this name discussed. An old Szechuan landlord who was in Tientsin as a refugee from the Red Army had said:

"I understand that the Central Red armies are quite reasonable. But Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien is too fierce. There was too much killing in Szechuan. Otherwise, even the landlords

might have welcomed the Reds, because we were so sick of tax extortion and the corrupt warlord regime there."

I had expected dashing military figure, to say the least. But Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien did not look at all like an officer, much less a firebrand. He was an intellectual type, with fine sensitive hands and face. I noticed that he wore the only pair of foreign-leather shoes I had seen on a Red commander—and he knew a little English. He seemed moody, introspective, reserved, not inclined to talk much, and had a surprisingly modest manner with an occasional shy boyish smile. He was thin, pale and nervous, with a nervous tic in his throat. Now only thirty-five years old, he had been wounded three times in his long years of battle and had not escaped the psychological ravages of revolutionary life, as the other Red commanders seem to have done. He told me, however, that he had always been in good health during his campaigning, and others said he was famous for being unusually daring and brave as he led his troops in battle. When I met him, he was ill.

The doctor had given Hsü Hsiang-Ch'ien orders to rest, and he was permitted to spend only an hour or so a day talking to me. It was a great effort for him to take time and energy to give me an account of his experiences, especially inasmuch as he had not previously collected this material together and had no notes as he talked. He had difficulty remembering dates and details.

I always had trouble getting details about the personal lives of the Red Army people, but with Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien I could get nowhere at all. He seemed profoundly disinterested in himself as a personality, and five paragraphs were all I could inveigle out of him, to my great disappointment. Being

more the sensitive, intellectual type—he had once even been a school teacher—and therefore more conscious of the meaning of his personal experiences, I think his impressions and reactions in so many different revolutionary situations would have been intensely interesting to know. But he was stubbornly reserved and matter-of-fact. It is a tribute to his intellectual initiative that he rose out of the backward conditions of the isolated province of Shansi; he is the only Shansi man among the first-rank Communist leaders.

Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien represents the Whampoa tradition in the Red Army, a fact of which he is conscious. In his comments at the end of our interview, he added as one of the reasons for the superiority of the Red Army the fact that it "has carried on the traditional spirit of the true Chinese Revolution and maintains the revolutionary spirit of the Whampoa Academy of the period of the Great Revolution." Commander Hsü is one of the few surviving veterans of those idealistic revolutionary, and usually petty-bourgeois, youths educated at Whampoa in Canton, who were the life and spirit of the Kuomintang Revolution of 1925-27. A great percentage of the Whampoa graduates joined with the Communists either before or after the Split in 1927, and they were the first to be sacrificed when the Red Army movement began. Hundreds were killed in the ill-fated Canton Commune and Hailofeng Soviet, the backbone of which was the Chao Tao Tuan, the regiment made up entirely of Whampoa Cadets from Canton and from the Whampoa branch at Wuhan called the "Military and Political Academy." Dozens of other Whampoa men were killed with the Red Army later. Others left the Soviets and joined with the Third Party, so that today only a few remain with the Reds, such as Hsü



Hsiang-ch'ien, Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-ying, Cheng Ken, Nieh Ho-t'ing, Ch'en Po-chün, Tso Ch'uan, Hsiao Ching-kuang and others not so well known. Chou En-lai had been political director of Whampoa—not a cadet—and his background in revolution had an earlier beginning in Europe. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien was a classmate of some of Chiang Kai-shek's best generals, such as Hu Chung-nan, and ranks with them in military ability. These Whampoa graduates have great respect for Hsü and usually rank his name along with Chu Teh when they mention the Red commanders in newspaper articles. It is said that once during a battle near the Sungpan, Hu Chung-nan sent a messenger to Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien with greetings from one Whampoa charter member to another.

Since the beginning of the Kuomintang revolution in 1924, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien has fought throughout the length and breadth of China in nearly every province. He began as a political director, before engaging in pure military work. I think that perhaps he had the most varied experience of anyone during the Soviet movement, for he is a veteran leader of four different Soviet movements.

The outline of his experience tells the story of the bourgeois-democratic-nationalist revolution of China from its beginning under the Kuomintang to its transformation into a struggle for Soviets under the Communists, and up to the giving up of the youngest of the Soviets in Szechuan in 1936.

There were five main Soviet districts: The Central Soviets in Kiangsi, the Ouyüwan Soviet near Wuhan and the Yangtze River, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kweichow Soviet, the Szechuan-Shensi Soviet, and the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Soviet. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien was a leader in two of these, as well as in the two earliest attempts which failed disastrously at Canton and

Hailofeng in 1927. The history of the Ouyüwan and Szechuan Soviets has been very obscure, and indeed Hsü is the only individual who has all this material at his command. I consider myself very lucky to get this story in so complete a form, as well as the almost forgotten story of Hailofeng, of which few participants are now alive.

At the end of his narrative, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien volunteered to express his opinion on the reasons for the success of the Red Army and to analyze the process of the development of strategy during the struggle of his Fourth Front Red Army, which at one time had nearly a hundred thousand troops, although it suffered disastrous losses in the Northwest fighting against the Mohammedans in 1936 and 1937. Here are the five paragraphs of Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien's personal story:

"My home is at Wutaishan\* in Shansi, where the Governor, Yen Hsi-shan, was also born. My father was a *shsiu-ts'ai* scholar and taught school. He was also a small landlord, owning thirty or forty *mou* of land. In my family were one younger and two elder sisters, one elder brother and his wife and my parents.

"I was born in 1902. As a child I studied in school at home for three years, then went to the Higher Primary School three years. After this I worked as clerk in a bookshop for a while before entering the Taiyuan Normal School. Upon my graduation I taught in the primary school attached to the Ch'uan Tze Middle School in Wutaishan—this school having been founded by Yen Hsi-shan. In 1924 I went to Canton to enter the Whampoa Military Academy of the Kuomintang.

\* Wutaishan is one of the famous sacred mountains of China, and is now the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the center of its new "Shansi-Hopei-Chahar" special area.

"Shansi Province was very backward, both socially and politically. It was difficult to get the new progressive books to read. However, I was already interested in revolution. Even in 1915, when the Japanese took occasion during the World War to present the Twenty-one Demands to China, I was the leader of a student demonstration against this, and talked to the people on the street. The establishment of the Kuomintang had a great influence on me later, and I wanted to go to Canton because it was then the revolutionary center. I joined the Kuomintang as soon as I arrived in Canton in 1924, being then twenty-two years old.

"My father being very conservative and opposed to my ideas. I ran away to Canton without his knowledge. Only my brother knew my intention of becoming a military man at Whampoa. I had already been married and had a daughter. My wife died when I went to Whampoa, and I have no idea what became of the child.

"I was a graduate of the First Class of Whampoa Cadets in 1924. There were six detachments—about seven hundred graduates. We had received six months' training. Whampoa then had two Soviet Russian instructors, Borodin and Korloff, who made speeches to the cadets and had considerable influence on us. However, at that time I was in the middle, between the Society of Sun Yat-senism on the Right and the Communist Party which many joined on the Left."

After graduating from Whampoa, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien fought in the North against the war lords Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Tso-lin, in the first phase of the Kuomintang revolution. He was active in forming the Special Training groups which were the revolutionary cadres of the army. During the period of the Wuhan Government in 1926, he was instructor

in the Wuchang Military and Political Academy, a branch of Whampoa, and joined the Communist Party in 1926. After the Split with the Kuomintang in 1927 he did secret Party work as a member of Chang Fa-kuei's staff in the famous "Iron-sides" army. Then he trained and led a detachment of factory workmen in the Canton Commune on December 11, 1927. After this failed, he went with the ill-starred Chao Tao Tuan to defend the Hailofeng Soviet, the first in China, which was destroyed within a few weeks, after terrific fighting. He escaped to Shanghai, and went to the nascent Ouyüwan Soviet near Wuhan in June 1929. This doughty little Soviet was perhaps the scene of the bitterest class struggle of the Soviet period, and had a population of two millions.

When Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien arrived in the Ouyüwan area, he found only two hundred armed Hupeh partisans dignifiedly calling themselves the 31st Division of the Peasants' and Workers' Red Army. They held only two *hsien* in Hupeh—Huang-an and Ma-tsen. An uprising was held in San-tsen and Kwang-shan *hsien* in Honan in 1929, from which a new 32d Division was formed, and in the latter part of 1929 the "Hupeh-Honan Soviet" was formally inaugurated. In 1930 the Reds occupied four *hsien* in Anhui, and enlarged the Soviet, which was then called the "Ouyüwan Soviet," after the three ancient names of these provinces used by the local people—Hupeh being called "Ou" by the people, Honan, "Yü," (the ancient Confusian state), and Anhui, "Wan."

Upon arrival in this district Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien was made vice-commander of the 31st Division and later commander. For months the 31st and 32d divisions fought a running battle back and forth across the terrain—against the local Red Spears in the pay of the landlords and against a Kuomintang brigade

stationed there. Then the First "Extermination" Campaign began, led by General Hsia To-yin, notorious like Ho Ch'ien, for his brutal atrocities. The rebel peasants had to run away to the mountains, and the White troops occupied all the Soviet areas except the tops of the mountains, burning houses and massacring the population. This brutality had the usual dialectical effect, and soon great masses of the people joined the Soviet movement, even though until 1930 no land redistribution had been effected.

In 1930 the movement developed rapidly, and for the first time the Reds captured machine guns and artillery, which helped them immensely, and uniformed themselves in proper style. They captured telephones and radio but had no operators and had to destroy them. They also captured one airplane, and forced the pilot to carry out a bombing expedition for them once. (Speaking of airplanes, Hsü told me, "In a later period when I was in command of the 4th Red Army, we destroyed ten airplanes—all were brought down by rifle shots.") By December 1930 the Red divisions numbered six thousand men, and had partially Sovietized ten *hsien*, numbering a population of about one million. The three Red divisions were in that month reorganized into the 4th Red Army, of which Kuang Chi-hsun was made commander and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien chief-of-staff.

The Second and Third campaigns in 1931 resulted in big victories for the Red Army. On November 7, 1931, the troops were again reorganized into the Fourth Front Red Army, including the previous 4th Red Army and the 73d Division of the 25th Red Army, and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien was made commander-in-chief. According to Hsü, "The Ouyüwan Soviet was at its highest period just after this defeat of the Third

Campaign in 1931. There was a population of about two millions under our control at that time."

After the Fourth Campaign in 1932, in which the Reds did not fare so well, Hsü says, "It was decided that this army [the Fourth Front Red Army] should go to Szechuan and organize a new Soviet, because this province was a good area for us, being richer and more heavily populated. We left the Ouyüwan Soviet guarded by the other troops (the 25th Red Army under Hsü Hai-tung), and marched through Hupeh, Honan and Shensi into Szechuan, arriving in December 1932. We first occupied T'ung-chiang, Nanchiang and Pa-chou in north Szechuan. Before the Red Army arrived in Szechuan, the oppression of the ruling class had been very great, so when we came the people were very excited and immediately began to struggle against their oppressors. Many were anxious to join the army, and we added a great number of new recruits."

On May 11, 1933, according to Hsü, the Reds annihilated about twenty regiments of T'ien Tsung-yao's opium-ridden Szechuan troops, many others deserting to the Red Army, and one week later organized the "Tung-nan-pa Soviet" from the three above-named *hsien*. Speaking of this occasion, Hsü told me, "At Pa-chou we held our Soviet Delegates Congress, attended by 3,000 delegates who represented nearly a million population. Pa-chou had 500,000 people, T'ung-chiang about 200,000 and Nanchiang about 200,000. After the Delegates Congress the Fourth Front Red Army increased tremendously." The original Red divisions were expanded into whole armies, including then the 4th Army, the 9th Army and the 30th and 31st armies.

After defeating Generals Yang Sen and Liu Ch'eng-hou, the Reds had partially Sovietized fourteen *hsien*. These

fourteen *hsien* were then incorporated into the "Szechuan-Shensi Soviet," of which Chang Kuo-t'ao was the political head and Chairman of the Military Committee, while Hsü commanded the Fourth Front Red Army and Fu Chung was his Political Commissar.

A new 33d Army was created, and the entire Red forces then numbered 38 regiments, or 60,000 men, against which the Szechuan militarists mobilized 170 regiments. The six Szechuan war lords co-operated in a campaign, and according to Hsü, "We fought against this six-route campaign for ten months and defeated them all. During these ten months we killed and wounded at least 100,000 white soldiers. We ourselves had only 10,000 wounded in the hospitals, and I have no estimate for the number killed."

Hsü was very proud of his strategy and tactics during this battle and told me about it at length. He had held a line of defense over a thousand *li* in length. In conclusion, he added: "In order to supplement our numbers, we surrounded one regiment of Hu Chung-nan's army. Then we went forward to Hanchung and expanded our troops very much there. When we started the Long March in 1935.....we had so many new recruits for the Red Army that within one month our forces had increased about two fifths. At that time the Fourth Front Red Army had more than eighty thousand troops."

The First Front Red Army under Chu Teh from the Central Soviets in the South arrived and met the Fourth Front Red Army at T'a-wei in Mo-kung *hsien*, Szechuan, in June 1935. Most of the First Front Army units marched on to the Northwest under P'eng Teh-huai and Mao Tsê-tung, while Chu Teh with two armies remained in Szechuan with the Fourth Front Red Army.

"In February 1936 we concentrated our forces in Sikong (Tibet) at such places as Tao-fu, Lu-huo, Kan-chi, Ya-chang, K'ang-ting and several other *hsien*, and formed the 'Special Independent Government of the Minorities,'" Hsü concluded. "At that time the Second Front Red Army had begun its Long March from Hunan and crossed over the River of Golden Sand in Yünnan province. They passed through Pat'ang, and at the end of June these troops arrived in Kan-chi and met together with our Fourth Front Red Army. In the beginning of July we all together began the March forward to the North and passed through the Great Grasslands for a month. In the first part of August we arrived in southern Kansu and.....in the beginning of October 1936 we met together with the First Front Red Army in the Hui-ning district in Kansu."

## V. THE CHINESE CHARACTER CHANGES

IT WAS A DRAMATIC THING TO SEE: the ideograph in revolt. The Chinese language liberating itself from its ancient tomb.

I found the Chinese Communists engaged in an intensive mass education program through the use of Latinized Chinese, or *hsinwenz* (new characters), as they called it. This is a revolution in China of great significance. Such a step was basic in the Renaissance of Europe, and is a great stride forward in the cultural renaissance of China. It means more than the emancipation of thought and the quickening of new intellectual life among the illiterate masses of China. It means laying the foundation for a new cultural and political democracy.

At present the Chinese intellectuals find themselves unable even to communicate with the mass of their own people, except through lectures, the theatre and the graphic arts. Much less have the illiterate 80 or 90 per cent a means of Com-



munication with each other. Although the dead *wen yen* classical style of the Confucian scholars was overthrown in the literary world by the "Literary Revolution" of 1917, led by Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the new *pai hua*, or "plain speech" written language, simply became a new cult of the literati among a circle of modern-educated students. Although it created a medium for writing the spoken language, it still retained the ancient ideograph, which takes years of eyestrain and hard study to master. And advanced students of the modern sciences and mathematics had to learn foreign languages in order to have a sound scientific terminology for their work, as well. The *pai hua* movement advanced the spread of a *kuo yü* or "national language," based upon the "Mandarin" or official Peking dialect, but so long as the ideograph was retained, it was impossible to write in the true vernacular of the various local dialects. The literature of the country people still remained in the Homeric stage of itinerant storytellers, and their newspaper was the irresponsible rumor-monger for the most part. The people themselves did not share in the new cultural movement.

With a Latinized alphabet instead of the hieroglyphic, anyone who can speak Chinese can learn to write it within a few weeks. It is elastic and simple. The local dialects can be written easily and village education in the "reading and writing and 'rithmetic" stage made immediately universal. Spelling is very simple in Chinese and presents no such complicated problem as has developed in English, for instance. China, of course, is a linguistically divided continent almost like Europe. However, a single letter of the new Latinized alphabet has a common written form, but various pronunciations, just as in Spanish, English, Scotch, French and Italian.

Latinization makes it phonetically possible to spell every conceivable word, with tones indicated by diacritical marks, somewhat as in French and is readily pronounceable by all who speak a common branch of the language.

This is so logically the answer to the vast problem of enlightening the "dark masses" of China that it is astonishing it has not been nationally instituted before. On the contrary, however, the Nanking Government has for several years prohibited the teaching of *hsinwenz*, and banned all magazines using it as "Communist." In 1935 there was even a tendency to restore the old *wen yen* in the schools. Too many people knew too much already, they decided, after the peasant revolts and general popular criticism leveled against the corruption of the ruling class. "We must preserve our national heritage," they said. "We must never put the ancient writing of our ancestors in the museums, with the rest of our old culture."

Actually, the fear that Latinization will drive out the ideograph is unimportant. It will create a vast new educated people, but those who have time and money to spend in higher education can still learn the old characters, just as in the West we still produce our scholars of Latin and Greek. Actually, giving the mass of the people a means of becoming literate will tremendously increase the knowledge of the old literature and culture, by giving them the rudimentary ability to read and write which is the first step toward higher education of any kind. In the same spirit it will increase the spread of a *kuo yü* standard dialect rather than prevent it, by stimulating the tempo of education and increasing intercourse throughout the *hsien* and provinces of the interior generally. It is a positive contribution in every sense.

The Chinese character is a curious phenomenon. Consciously or unconsciously it has been so elaborately specialized by the canny old scholars as to become an instrument of political power for keeping a monopoly over the national culture and a dictatorship over the people. For the ignorant masses the character was almost magic, and they worshiped those who were able to read and write like priests. It was actually a branch of art, not a form of communication. The villagers even thought a few characters by Tu Fu would cure malaria!

Not only has the ideograph prevented the spread of education among the people, but it has imprisoned the minds of the intellectuals of China. Just how much it has been responsible for the conservative and reactionary nature of the educated class of China in the past could probably be determined by mathematical ratio. In the past a man spent a lifetime merely learning to read and write and was considered a scholar if only he were able to read the *wen-li* classics and write a *pa-ku* essay at examination time.

It is undoubtedly true that if only a democratic system of education were introduced into China, the Chinese would take vast strides toward the leadership of the whole of human culture just as in early times. It has been only the stalemate whereby the educated class held tight to its monopoly of learning, preventing mass education, at the same time that its own intellectual initiative was destroyed by being bounded by an ideographic frame of mind, that has prevented a tremendous development. The Chinese have achieved prodigious memories, but the avenues of creative thinking have been crowded out by so much mere storage lumber.

This potentiality was shown in the Soviet districts. Being

able to read and write seemed to raise the Red soldiers to a different plane of thinking. The people of China are all pathetically eager to grasp at any straw of education. To send his son to school, a farmer will make almost any sacrifice. This is one reason for the popularity of the Communists. Though they had little personnel to spare for school teaching and little time between battles, the first thing they did in every district was to start primary schools for adults and children, trying to educate enough teachers quickly to disseminate all available knowledge as widely as possible.

In Yen-an there were night schools everywhere. Bricklayers and apprentices, merchants' sons and poor farmers sat at their desks eagerly learning to read and write after their day of hard exhausting labor. Both the old Chinese characters and the *hsinwenz* were available. The people usually preferred that their sons learn the old characters, looking upon *hsinwenz* as a kind of fake short cut. It was so easy they could not believe it was actually a proper way of writing. But many of them had no time for the luxury of learning the "proper" characters, and for these the Latinized alphabet was like a dispensation from heaven.

Old Hsü Teh-lieh was the commissioner of Education of the Soviet Government. A charming old man over sixty with wonderful humorous eyes, rosy bronze cheeks, unruly boyish hair, a wispy mustache and broad shoulders a little bent with age, Hsü Teh-lieh was himself a living record of the progress of education in China from *wen yen* to *hsinwenz*. One of the Fighting Hunanese, he had begun teaching the classics at the age of sixteen. After studying in Shanghai and Japan, he returned to Changsha as principal of a girls' normal school for eight years, then went to Paris at the age of forty-three

to work his way through three years' study at Paris University and one at Lyons. In 1928 he went to Moscow to study two years more at Sun Yat-sen University, then entered the Central Soviets in Kiangsi.

He was valiantly struggling to establish universal education in the barren isolated villages of the Northwest, and was an ardent enthusiast for Latinizing the language.

"Do you think mass education is possible in China through the continued use of the old character?" I asked him.

"I think it would be impossible under our present economic conditions. The peasants and workers cannot attend the classroom. They must learn individually and from each other. That is one reason why the Thousand Character method of Tingsien cannot easily be made a basis for popular education in the villages. Poor people in China must educate themselves. And they should be able to write everything they speak—so a thousand characters is not enough, anyway.

"In three months we can teach a person to read and write through the Latinized alphabet. In two years we can make him entirely literate so that he can read newspapers and the ordinary political and social lectures. To achieve this same result by the use of the old characters would take at least ten years of study in a classroom."

"How many are now able to use the *hsinwenz*?" I inquired.

"We have no statistics on this, but I should estimate that in the Party and among the Red Army officers alone at least twenty thousand can read and write *hsinwenz*. Comparatively more of those who were originally illiterate in the old characters know *hsinwenz* than those who were already literate before we began teaching *hsinwenz*, of course.

"We now have a plan to promote *hsinwenz* on a grand scale. We are publishing songs in it because it is so much easier to read, and this summer we have sent out a hundred travelling teachers, who will go to the villages and workshops to carry on classes in *hsinwenz*. Last winter we had a hundred night schools in *hsinwenz* for the peasants."

When did you start teaching Latinized Chinese? I asked.

"When Lin Pei-ch'u was teaching in Vladivostok in 1932 he made a special study of the methods of Latinization used in the Soviet Union. He returned to the Central Soviets in Kiangsi in 1933. At that time, however, we had more stable conditions and could carry on with our ordinary schools easily, so we did not stress *hsinwenz*. For instance, in our model *hsien* in Kiangsi, Hsingkuo, every person under forty-five could write the old characters, and today every soldier in the Red Army from Kiangsi writes the old characters well. All propaganda slogans are written by the common soldiers, not by the officers. Then during the Fifth Campaign in 1934 and the Long March our work was interrupted, so we are only now really mobilizing on the *hsinwenz* front."

The original impetus toward Latinizing the ideographic languages of the East came from Soviet Russia. According to Tass News Agency under date of May 21, 1936, "Since 1917 the new Latinized alphabet has been adopted by sixty-eight nationalities, mainly oriental, i.e., over twenty-five million people. Prior to the Revolution, many of these nationalities did not even possess a written language of their own, while in 1935 they had newspapers printed in fifty-three languages."

Chinese was first Latinized in Soviet Russia. About 1931 a professor named Dragunov in the Oriental Institute at

Leningrad worked out a twenty-eight-letter alphabet for Chinese. He first experimented with this along the thousands of Chinese miners near Vladivostok in Siberia. It was immediately successful. Soon a few Leftist Chinese students and writers in China began agitating for its adoption in China proper, and in 1935 a "Mass Language Movement" based on Latinized characters was begun, which was more or less suppressed by the Nanking Government.\*

The students, however, took it up immediately and wrote their letters in it during the revolutionary student movement in 1935 and 1936—to the mystification of the government censors.

This twenty-eight-letter alphabet adopted from Soviet Russia discards only three of the twenty-six letters of the English alphabet, namely, h, q and v, and adds five new combinations, namely, ch, ng, rh, sh and rh. Phrases are made into polysyllabic words. The great number of homonyms in Chinese creates a problem but in practice these serve much the same purpose as suffixes and prefixes in Greek, and become differentiated when combined into compound words in the same way. Actually, spoken Chinese is not monosyllabic at all, but cannot be understood except in word groups and phrases. In the old written form, however, each syllable had to be represented by a complex character, sometimes made up of fifteen strokes. A Chinese typewriter, suitable

\* After the war with Japan began, the Government changed its mind somewhat about Latinization, finding an urgent need to rouse the mass of the people to the anti-Japanese struggle and having no method to do so. In 1938 a "New Chinese Language Movement" began in Hankow, sponsoring the promotion of Latinization for emergency education during the war.

only for the most ordinary usage, has to have two keyboards of five thousand characters, for instance. According to one authority, "The Chinese written language is composed of 23,265 monosyllabic characters. . . . One has to commit each one of them to memory both with regard to its sound, meaning and the way it is written. . . . On the other hand, in the case of the Latinized language, there are only twenty-eight letters. An experiment made in refugee camps in Shanghai shows that an adult of normal mental capacity 'learns how to read and write it within three weeks. ' . . Now if the Chinese language is Latinized, a simpler type-writer can be manufactured. This will revolutionize the Chinese printing and newspaper industries. For, if a handy typewriter can be built, Chinese linotype will come as a matter of course."

Among the educated classes, the movement toward establishing the *kuo yü* national language has been a useful unifying influence. However, this has had no meaning whatever among the mass of the people themselves. They are still as isolated as before, and lack of education has continued to nurture provincialism and feudal suspicion of strange ways and ideas. Latinization would help to break down these provincial barriers. It would make it easy for persons from different provinces to learn each other's dialect phonetically, thereby hastening the process of rousing national consciousness and creating fellow understanding and the spirit of nationhood. This is especially true in the case of the national minorities of China and of all the various ideograph-using peoples with which China has contact—the tribesmen, the Tibetans, Moslems, Mongols, Koreans, Japanese, and others. With the aid of a Latinized alphabet they can learn Chinese easily, and the Chinese can learn their native languages. An



international alphabet would have a tremendous influence in establishing interracial and international understanding—not the least important of which would be the bridging of the linguistic chasm which now separates Europe from China.

While I was in Yen-an, the Chinese Communists were already successfully experimenting with the use of Latinization among the Lolos, Man-tzus, Miao-tzus, Mongols, Moslems and other national minorities attending the Communist Party school.

## VI. NEW PROPHETS FOR MONGOL, MOSLEM AND TRIBESMAN

IN THE DORMITORIES of the "National Minorities School" I found the fighting tribesmen of China living in perfect collective harmony with the sectarian Mohammedans and the individualistic Mongols—though the Moslems had the upper hand, I was told. There were four Man-tzus, one Tibetan, eight Lolos, ten Mongols and ten Moslems. Of these only one was a girl—a tubby little butter-fat Mongol.

These "unoppressed minorities" were all gay and happy in their little Red schoolhouse and studied their lessons as hard as anyone. The nomad Mongols, however, were insurgent against having to sit still too long at a time, Dean Ch'eng told me, and wandered about the campus wishing for a more peripatetic system of education in the good old Aristotelian manner. In fact, if they had been given real autonomy, they would have instituted Marxist classes on horseback, no doubt.

These representatives of the national minorities of China were being trained in revolutionary theory so they could go

back to their homes to work as missionaries of the new Marxist-Leninist faith. Central Asia is now doing a brisk trade in exchanging old prophets for new. With the dynamic Chinese Communists on the east and the vast Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia influence on the west, the priests and princes of the old order are between the hammer and the anvil. A regenerate nationhood is being pounded into shape, with the conflicts between China, Japan and the Soviet Union acting as a bellows for fanning the fires of national and racial independence. And at the same time a new internationalism is being created on a basis of national equality and self-determination—and Latinization of the various languages.

"At present, because their education is just beginning, these students study only four courses," Dean Ch'eng Fang-wu explained. "These are: Latinhua [Latinized characters], the Chinese language, elementary Marxist political science, and the natural sciences, such as zoology and botany, which last they enjoy very much. We use Latinhua to teach Chinese, and after they have learned Latinization it is not difficult for them to learn Chinese, as well as other languages. All of them have learned Latinhua easily except the Lolos, who find it hard because their own language has practically no written text at all."

The problem of national minorities has always been a very important one in Chinese political administration, but now it is greatly intensified. Sun Yat-sen had a liberal self-determination policy, which was not realized, however, when the Kuomintang came into power and put most of his principles on the shelf. In this, as in agrarian and other fields, the heirs to his progressive program were the Communists, who shifted it a little to the Left but actually carried out substan-

tially his basic concepts. Since the Chinese began suppressing and driving out these original inhabitants of China centuries ago, there has been only bitter hatred between the two contestants for the land. The tribes have been in continuous revolt against the harshness and cruelty of the invaders, and have gallant and patriotically defended their homes through a long bloody history of warfare. Many have already been destroyed.\* But others are holding their own in the mountain fastnesses of frontier regions. Indeed, the warlike Lolos have captured tens of thousands of Chinese and still use them as slaves in their little kingdom. Of the eleven million inhabitants of mountainous Yünnan Province, about two thirds are aborigines—Lolos, Lisus, Musus, Man-tzus, Miao-tzus, and others, including some fifteen or sixteen main tribes. Kweichow has six or seven tribes. and Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Szechuan not less than three or four. They also exist in Hunan, Honan and in various bordering districts, as well as on the island of Hainan. In western Szechuan there are said to be about forty tribes and sub-tribes, and on the Szechuan-Tibetan border and the Sungpan region they have well-organized states, particularly in the case of the Hsi-fan (Sifan) and Man-tzu tribes. According to J. Dyer Ball, in *Things Chinese*, "in the provinces of Hunan. Kweichow, Kwangsi, Yünnan, and Szechuan, the aboriginal tribes—Miao-tzu and others—occupy an area of country equal to that of France, and are some millions in number, representing numerous tribes and sub-tribes; as many as one hundred and eighty being mentioned, though perhaps not so many are in existence now."

\*Since the war with Japan has already forced over thirty million refugees into the crowded interior, the pressure on these minorities will become greater than ever in the near future.

These tribes still cling to their own culture, customs, language and dress. They are very clean, of fine physique, and possessed of the highest qualities of courage and racial solidarity.\*

The most interesting of the tribes are the Lolos (who call themselves I-chia). They are the largest of the tribes, and Independent Lololand occupies a territory of eleven thousand square miles on the Yünnan-Szechuan border. Lololand lies in a bend of the great Upper Yangtze River, and few Chinese had ever voluntarily penetrated its borders and come out alive before the Red Army ventured to do so.

The Chinese Soviets originally had much the same broad general policy toward the national minorities of China as the U.S.S.R. of Russia. In this all the various tribes in southern and western China would have their autonomous republics, as well as the Mohammedans, Manchus, Mongols and others. Through the class struggle they hoped to see the old feudal or slave societies changed to more progressive forms. On the principle of democracy, religious freedom and national independence were guaranteed, and the cultural heritage of the various races was not to be destroyed but revitalized and transformed into a new historical era.

While remaining in the South, the Soviets had little occasion to worry about the minorities question, but during the Long March and when they arrived in the Mahommedan-dominated Northwest, it became very important indeed. One of the most dramatic things about the Red Army's Long

\*Mr. Ball also states: "It has been suggested that the Japanese are descendants of the Man or Miao tribes, who crossed over from the south of China to their future island home. At the time of their emigration they were the only inhabitants of the South of China."

March across a continent was that its route audaciously passed through the closed tribal territories of interior China and halted in the fiercely anti-Chinese Mohammedan regions of the Northwest. Negotiating a thoroughfare required the most skillful diplomacy as well as the highest test of fighting power. The tribesmen and the Moslems have been traditionally considered better warriors than the Chinese, and when their territory is invaded they fight a desperate holy war. The Communists tried every possible measure to win the confidence of the tribespeople and other minorities, but in spite of their efforts, their worst losses occurred in the Mantzu region and in Mohammedan Kansu. On the whole their success was amazing, however. Hundreds of tribesmen who had never before co-operated with any Chinese army gladly joined the Red March, including the elusive Lolos, while others assisted the army on its way. Even earlier in their Soviet history, however, the Second Front Red Army under Ho Lung established friendly relations with the Miao-tzu tribesmen in Kweichow. Wang Chêng, Hsiao K'eh's Political Commissar, had been the Red Army delegate in these early negotiations, and when I talked with him proudly gave me a photograph of himself surrounded by his Miao-tzu friends.

In passing through Kwangsi, Kweichow and Yünnan on the Long March the Red Army had little trouble with the tribesmen, but when they reached Independent Lololand they had to take time off for a little first-class diplomacy and disarm the warlike Lolos of their traditional hatred and distrust of all Chinese. (They couldn't aspire to disarming them of their guns even if they had wanted to, but on the contrary had a taste for their own medicine, the Lolos looking upon them as a caravan of "ammunition carriers," just

as the Reds had previously looked upon their Kuomintang enemy.) The Red Army leaders had to do a great deal of plain and fancy talking about their theories of "national autonomy" and enter into a formal alliance with the Lolo chieftains, giving them arms and ammunition as the condition of their common front against the "White" Chinese. Commander Liu Pei-ch'eng, a native of Szechuan familiar with Lolo ways, became a blood brother by going through the ceremony of drinking the blood of a chicken. Thus was the first Lolo-Chinese peace treaty signed and sealed. Lo P'ing-hui, who was in command of the rear guard at this time, remarked to me in discussing this occasion:

"Five or six thousand Lolos were concentrated, meaning to fight, and they had already captured about six or seven hundred rifles from the Red Army. . . . However, the Lolos hated the Central Government troops, and after making an arrangement with them we gave them rifles and they protected us on the March. The Lolos captured many rifles from the White troops, just as they had from us, and fought the Whites along the way. The Miao-tzus and Man-tzus also attacked the white outposts."

All the Red commanders I talked with agreed that the best warriors they encountered on the whole Long March were the Man-tzu tribesmen in western Szechuan—and they had fought against ten different provincial armies and the best Central Government troops on the way. The Man-tzus used the same tactics in defending their homes as the Reds had used so successfully in defense of their Soviet. They were experts in ambush and guerilla warfare, and in addition had a few tricks of their own. They moved the whole population and all food supplies out of reach of the marching

Red column, then settled down to individual sniping from behind rocks and trees. The Reds could not even see their invisible enemy, but he was all around them. At first they could not capture anybody, and negotiations were impossible. The effect was very demoralizing. The Man-tzus sat back and annihilated the vanguard units as they came along. Their favorite method was to ensconce themselves beside some narrow defile through which the Reds had to pass in single file. They were infallible sharpshooters and never wasted a bullet. Their way of using firearms was curious. They trained their guns on a certain spot, then shot every victim right in the center of the forehead as he passed by. Or at other times, when the exhausted and harassed Red soldiers lay down to rest, the Man-tzus stole up silently and cut their heads off, making away with their guns before the nervous patrols could come around five minutes later. They also made swift cavalry forays. We may quote Lo P'ing-hui, the veteran fighter, again :

"In the Grasslands we were constantly attacked by the Man-tzu cavalry. They can shoot on horseback and are crack marksmen. The Man-tzus are very *li hai*\* and hard to fight. They fight better than the Kuomintang troops because they are expert at ambush and mountain warfare, and their morale is invincible."

A part of the First Front Red Army under Chu Teh and Lo P'ing-hui remained in the Man-tzu regions in Sikong (Inner Tibet) during the winter of 1935, together with the whole Fourth Front Army under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien and Chang Kuo-t'ao. There they organized the first Soviet "Special Independent Government of the Minorities," which included a population

\**Li hai*, in Chinese, means full of fighting spirit.

of two hundred thousand local inhabitants. The Reds had fought a severe battle at Tei-ke (Day-Geh) and captured the local Tibetan chieftain named Hsia-k'e-to-teh, and also one very important lama. This chieftain had been wounded, and during his convalescence the Red leaders made friends with him and converted him to their "national minorities" program, after which he agreed to serve on the Executive Committee of the Government. Their capital in Sikong was at K'ang-ting. This government existed for four months until the Second Front Army arrived and all the Red forces moved on to Kansu.

Upon arrival in the Northwest, the Communists were confronted with a tremendous Mohammedan problem. The First Front Army under Mao Tsê-tung and P'eng Teh-huai, which arrived in late 1935, had been busy doing political work among the Moslems before the rest of the Red troops arrived a year later. They had had considerable success in forming Soviets in Moslem villages and calling delegates' congresses. A provisional Moslem Soviet Government Committee had been formed in 1936, and the Reds had even recruited whole regiments of Mohammedans in their army. However, their success had galvanized the reactionary Moslem militarists into fierce antagonism, and when the immense new body of Red troops arrived in the Northwest in 1936, these generals became thoroughly frightened and mobilized a terrific campaign against the Reds, whom they expected to occupy Kansu and Ninghsia and all roads between Northwest China and Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. A great battle was fought in Kansu between the Fourth Front Red Army and several other Red Army units and the Mohammedans. This battle occurred after the Sian Incident of December 12, 1936. In January the Mohammedan generals Ma Pu-ch'ing and Ma Pu-fang attacked the Fourth



Front Red Army, assisted by Central Government bombing planes, though no Central troops were involved. By February the Reds had suffered tremendous losses at the hands of the fierce Arab-blooded Moslems and had to admit defeat. This battle is said to have caused the greatest single loss the Red Army had ever had, and the catastrophe was blamed largely upon Chang Kuo-t'ao, political head of the Fourth Front Army, who was later expelled from the Communist Party. The famous Fifth Red Army Corps (originally part of Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchün which had suppressed the Moslems in 1926-28) was nearly destroyed and its commander Teng Chen-t'ang, who had led the Ningtu Uprising, killed.

The Mohammedans first came to China overland in the seventh century and have been rebelling against Chinese administration for generations. It is estimated that Moslem religious adherents now number from fifteen to twenty millions, most being of mixed Turkish, Arabic and Chinese blood, and mosques may be found in half the provinces of China.

The great Panthay Rebellion in Yünnan province lasted from 1855 to 1873, and the Mohammedans had a Sultanate with its capital at Talifu until 1873, when an incredible massacre followed their surrender. From 1861 to 1877 the Mohammedan Rebellion in the Northwest occurred, which was also suppressed. Again in 1889 and in 1905 two smaller revolts broke out in Kansu. The last rebellion occurred in 1926-28, when Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchün entered Kansu Province. Now the tension developing in the North-west as a result of the general Far Eastern conflict seems to portend a new uprising. It is estimated that about ten million Mohammedans live in China's Northwest, and Chinese and Japanese are making competitive bids for their passive or active support.

From the above it may be concluded that the Chinese Red Army has been involved in practically every complicated problem in China, and set foot on all its forbidden territories. One can but admire their audacity in rushing in where lesser angels have long feared to tread. Under their "Soviet" thesis, the Chinese Communists had placed much stress on the class struggle, encouraging organic progressive changes within the body of the national minorities. When the "United Front" thesis came into operation after the Long March, however, they concentrated all attention upon forming an anti-Japanese common front and abolished all Soviets just as in Chinese areas. A part of this program was the realization of political and economic reforms—abolishing of sur-taxes, lightening of land taxes, and general democratization of the form of government.

There is no doubt that, delegated authority from the Chinese Government to deal with the Mohammedans and Mongols in the Northwest on a liberal basis, the Communists are competent enough to realize a program of co-operation and thereby defeat the Japanese "autonomy" puppet schemes. But whether the Kuomintang itself can be trusted to carry out such delicate diplomacy and with the confidence of these elements is very doubtful in view of their past history in such dealings. The one who first guarantees—not promises—national independence and self-determination will be the winner of Mongol and Mohammedan affections.

Most of the thirty-three representatives of the national majorities attending the Party School had joined the Red Army during the Long March, though the Mongols came from Inner Mongolia near the Great Wall. These thirty-three had been chosen for special training out of others in the Red Army. All

were young and intelligent-looking, and as friendly to the visiting American as the Chinese. When I suggested taking photographs, they saluted courteously and stood at attention to await the ordeal.

One by one we invited the different groups in for interviewing. It was hard work for several interpreters, but they were all full of ideas and clearly in the proselytizing mood, regarding themselves as future leaders of the nascent youth of their various nations.

The blue-eyed Lolos fascinated me. And I them. They stared at me so intently that I felt uneasy, and whenever I looked up they burst into unembarrassed friendly and delighted grins. It didn't occur to me that they considered me a sort of fellow tribesman until they asked if all Americans had blue eyes like mine. These Lolos came direct from Independent Lololand. The Lolos are a fair-skinned race and many have blue eyes. This fact has given rise to the theory that they are a "lost white tribe" probably surviving from some forgotten Aryan march across Central Asia.

One of these student Lolos appeared to be a pure aborigine Lolo type. He was about six feet tall, raw-boned and very fair, having clear blue eyes and a long face with sharp features. Most of the others had hazel-gray eyes and were mixed descendants of Chinese slaves captured by the Lolos, or what the Lolos call "White-bones," but all had distinctive un-Chinese features. Two handsome young Beau Brummels were very neatly uniformed, with watch fobs and chains dangling from their pockets (I didn't investigate whether a watch was attached to these trimmings, but I think not), a neat row of paper clips around their limp collars to keep them standing upright, and *mo teng* basketball shoes on their feet. They had all joined

the army at the Ta-t'u River on the Yünnan-Szechuan border during the Long March.

Big-bones, the all-"Aryan," was very intelligent and seemed to be the squad commander and spokesman.

"Why did you join the Red Army?" I asked him.

"I joined the First Army Corps at the Ta-t'u River," he replied. "Many hundred Lolos joined the Red Army then. We joined because we were oppressed by the Black-bone landlords and war lords and heard that the Red Army saves poor people."

"Who are the Black-bones?" I inquired.

"In Lololand," he explained, "there are two classes—Black-bones and White-bones. The Black-bones are the ruling class and slave-owners, and the White-bones are slaves. Every Black-bone has about fifty and can beat them or hang them as he likes. The slaves are very oppressed and unhappy, so many White-bones took the chance to escape when the Red Army came. No Black-bones joined the Red Army. Most of those who joined the Red Army are descendants of Lolo slave mothers and Chinese slave fathers, so they are slaves at birth. The Chinese were originally captured by the Black-bones to use as slaves. But they intermarry with the Lolo women slaves."

"Aren't you afraid you will be hung by the Black-bones if you go back to Lololand talking revolution?" I asked.

"No, we're not afraid, because the Black-bones themselves are very afraid of the Red Army and will treat us respectfully because we belong to it. And also they like the Red Army because they know the Reds are the enemies of Liu Hsiang, whom our Lolo war lords hate very much. That is

why the chiefs and slaves alike welcomed the Red Army when it came."

"Do you believe in your old religion?" I asked.

"No, we believe in Marxism," they all agreed.

The Lolo tribe has its own distinctive dress (usually a long gray felt cloak), cultural and religion. Their language is said to be unlike any other tribal Chinese dialect. They live near the haunt of the giant panda and are just as seclusive.

The four sons of the indomitable Man-tzu from the Tibetan border were all good-looking young boys of the most engaging personalities. They had rather light skins and light brown eyes. These had lived in the Great—Grasslands on the Tibetan-Szechuan border. When they joined the Red Army in July 1935, about a thousand Man-tzus and Tibetans from Sikong joined with them, including thirty Man-tzu cavalymen and their ponies.

"Why did you join the Red Army?" I inquired of them.

"Because we were oppressed by the Szechuan war lords, and by our own landlords and war lords, too," was the reply. "We were all poor peasants before. No rich people joined the Red Army."

"And because the priests are not revolutionary," an impish little *hsiao kuei*, who had entered the room with the Man-tzus, piped in.

I turned to look at this interlocutor. A dimpled grin appeared on his little moonface fringed round with straggling fleece of hair. The sleeves of his uniform were about a foot too long for his arms, but otherwise he was very trim with his leather belt, foreign-style white-pearl buttons, and a fountain pen in his pocket—they all had fountain pens and pencils prominently displayed.

"Come here," I—or rather we—said to this appealing little figure. He came over and remained unabashed when I put my arms around him. "How old are you?"

"Fifteen."

"How do you like life with the Red Army?"

"It is good," he announced emphatically. "Nobody oppresses us, and we have good food and clothes and can sing songs all day."

"This boy is not a Man-tzu but a pure Tibetan little-lama from Sikong," I was then informed. "He can write Tibetan-Sanskrit, and is very bright and advanced in political thought."

"Are you still a Lamaist?" I asked him.

"No," the boy replied. "I was only a little-monk training to become a lama, anyway. I entered the lamasery to study when I was seven, but now I don't believe in any religion. Religion is feudalism, and it is the opium of the Tibetan people."

"Did many lamas join the Red Army?" I inquired.

"No, but many young monks joined the Red Army when it came."

"How do you like the British?" was my next question.

"British imperialism is very bad in Tibet," was the answer. "And the lamas work with the British instead of standing for Tibetan independence."

The Communists gave their minorities students full freedom of religion, but nobody took advantage of this except the Mohammedans, I was told. Although the Mohammedans of China are much less fanatical than those in Islam proper, these believers in Allah were still loyal even after inoculation with the virus of Marxism. When I questioned the Party School Moslems on this question, they replied:

"Yes, we all still believe in our religion, but we did not bring any of the holy books here with us. At home we read the Koran every day."

"Do all young Moslems still believe in the old religion?" I asked.

They took several minutes to consult together on this question, then answered:

"All the old people still believe, but maybe about, 1 per cent of the young men no longer accept the religion of Mohammed."

The Moslem students were very proud and more aloof than the others in the school. They looked quite Arabian, with heavy eyebrows and reddish beards and mustaches. They were very clean, and I was told that the number of baths they took was a source of constant amazement to the Mongols—for whom water was only a substitute for mare's milk and strictly for drinking purposes.

The hundreds of Moslems who joined the Red Army came mostly from Kansu and Ch'inghai (Kokonor). Two of those whom I interviewed separately were from P'ing-liang, Kansu. Their families were sympathetic, but all the others had run away without their parents' consent. Two others were from Ho-tso-hsien, Ch'ing-hai, and had joined the Red Army together with a hundred other young Moslems from the same *hsien*. None had been married. All came from poor families of four, five or six members. One, who had joined in April 1936, had been a bricklayer and liked the Reds because he heard they "helped the workmen specially." Twenty-seven other Moslem workmen had joined on the same day, he told me.

Two tall competent-looking students had been officers of Ma Hung-ping in Kansu, they told me, and added:

"We were both captured by the Red Army during a battle in March 1936, in which three thousand other Moslem soldiers were made captives, but after talking with the Red Army people we decided to become Communists, so we voluntarily enlisted in the First Army Corps."

"Why?" I asked.

"To begin with, we were conscripted and forced into the White army," they answered. "Ma Hung-ping and Ma Pufang force every family to send one or two sons to their armies. The poor Moslem masses all hate the four Ma generals, because they conscript their sons and because taxes are very high and they have no power to oppose them. We say, 'when one Ma goes, another Ma comes; and the oppression of the people never stops.'"

"Is the revolutionary idea now spreading among the Moslems?" I inquired.

"Yes," they answered. "Both against the landlords and against Japanese imperialism. The poor people consider it a religious duty to purify corruption and restore the early teachings of Mohammed. In ancient times Mohammed himself fought against the landlords. In our district there are only a few big capitalists and landlords, but they treat the people very cruelly, so all the poor hate them very much."

"What do the Moslems think of the *San Min Chu I*?" was my next question. Nobody volunteered to reply for a while, then one of them said:

"All of the Moslems hate the Kuomintang very much except a few leaders who intrigue with them. But the Kuomintang never realized the real *San Min Chu I*. Sun Yat-sen's original *San Min Chu I* was revolutionary, and now if the Kuomintang fights Japan it must restore these three principles,





THE AUTHOR WITH THREE DIRECTORS OF THE "MILITARY AND  
POLITICAL ACADEMY" IN YEN-AN

These Three Were Veteran Commanders in the Red Army, Each Having Fought in More Than Two Hundred Battles. *Left to right:* Pien Chang-wu, Nieh Ho-ting, the Author, and Ho Ch'ang-kung.

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and especially the principle of autonomy for minorities. Marxism is much better than the *San Min Chu I*, anyway."

"Will you go with the Red Army to fight the Japanese?"

"Yes," they all declared, emphatically.

"Is the race struggle between the Moslems and Chinese better now?"

"Yes, in some ways, because both the poor Hans and the poor Moslems are beginning to see that they are oppressed by the same kind of war lords and that they must have a common struggle against feudalism."

"I suppose you have a new slogan now, that 'There is no God but Allah, but both Mohammed and Marx are his prophets,' haven't you?" I suggested.

But not one of them would commit himself on such a ticklish question. They were prepared to march under the Red Star and the Crescent, but had not yet embroidered the name "Karl Marx" on their prayer rugs. I noticed that they had his picture all over their dormitories, however. I shouldn't be surprised to find that the race-proud Mohammedans secretly think Karl Marx was one of them—otherwise how could he produce such a superlative luxuriant beard? And "Ma," which is his Moslem name, is the most ancient and respectable Mohammedan name of all. After all, Marx was an Oriental—a Jew—a fact which Asiatics often point out to those who accuse them of "importing European prophets." Jews are Semitic; so are Arabs; and the Moslems are of Arabic origin. And also Lenin has the kind of Russo-Oriental face which appeals very much to all Orientals—no doubt a scratch at his genealogy would produce a Tartar. I think that the not un-Oriental faces of the prophets of Marxism, Marx, Lenin and Stalin—a Jew, a Russian and a Georgian—

have had not a little to do with making them beloved among the peoples of the East. They do not think of them as racial foreigners and aliens, but as stepsons of their own. And for the same reason semi-Asiatic Soviet Russia is looked upon as the natural leader in the regeneration of Asia and as an authentic teacher not only of internationalism but of interracialism. All that remains now is for Russia to practise Latinizing its own alphabet as it is preaching to all other hieroglyphic-users to do!

Now as to the Mongols: The Chinese Communists had not had time to do very much work among the Mongols, except at Tingpien and places bordering the Great Wall, and the Japanese seem to have stolen a march on them. Nevertheless here were ten training to become Marxist teachers, who told me that "some Mongols have already joined the Red Army, but not many."

Inner Mongolia is made up of the provinces of Ninghsia, Suiyuan and Kansu. There are few Mongols left to enjoy their patriarchal domains in Ninghsia and Kansu, these areas being largely populated by Moslems, and altogether Inner Mongolia (including the Mongols in Jehol and Chahar, now part of Manchukuo) probably numbers a population of no more than two million Mongols. The fall of the Manchu empire did not liberate the Mongol race, but on the contrary was the signal for the Chinese to move in as fast as possible, just as they migrated by hundreds of thousands into the previously closed doors of the Manchu homeland, Manchuria. "Squeezed" by Chinese merchants and officials, and "squeezed out by Chinese and Moslem farmers, the Mongols resent their shameful treatment at the hands of the so-called "Chinese Republic," and the fake Japanese promise

of "autonomy" is sweet music to their ears. Much sweeter, however, would be a guarantee of real autonomy from the Chinese side, if the Chinese Government could accept the Communists slogan of self-determination" and revolutionize its diplomacy to meet the situation, in spite of its domination by the landlord-merchant interest who have thrived on Mongol helplessness.

"What do you think about Teh Wang and his Mongol 'independence movement' which is now working with Japan?" I asked these young Mongols of the Party School.

"Every Mongol wants national independence," they agreed, "but Teh Wang's new government is wrong because it cannot secure real independence by working with the Japanese. If it were really independent—of the Japanese, too—it would be good. There are five races of China, but the Han is the strongest, so we Mongols must unite with the Han to fight Japan, which threatens to destroy all the races of China."

"Which form of government do you think is best for the Mongols—that in Outer or Inner Mongolia?" was my next question.

Outer Mongolia is best," they declared enthusiastically, "because they have a revolution there. They still have *wangs* [Mongol princes] but also a Communist Party, and the Communist Party controls the Government. In Inner Mongolia there are also some Soviet districts, though."

One of the ten Mongols was the son of a rich Mongol family near Tingpien, and had joined the Communists only six months before.

"Why did you join the Communists?" I asked him.

"My family owns many cattle, but they did not oppose having me join with the Chinese Communists," he replied.

"We don't want to be slaves of Japan, and we think that only the Communist Party can lead the fight against the Japanese. I want to fight in the army against the Japanese. Besides this all the Mongols who know about the racial-minorities policy of the Communist Party like it very much."

"But do you believe in Communism in practice?" I inquired.

"In Mongol districts all land is public, only the *yurts* are private. This is much like Communism in the U.S.S.R.," was the answer.

Another, older than the rest and with a rather fanatical glint in his eye, was a Mongol lama.

"Do you still believe in Lamaism?" I asked him.

"Yes," he replied. "But the reason I entered the lamasery was only in order to learn to read and write and get a special position in society."

"Don't you think Marxism and Lamaism conflict with each other?"

"No, according to the Communist Party program religion is freed from all ties. Many lamas, both rich and poor, are joining the revolution now.

Several others of the group had been with the Communists for two years, but the tubby little Mongol girl of eighteen had joined only five months before.

"Why did you join the Party School," I asked her.

"Because I want to work for the Mongol revolution," she answered. "And because the Japanese are coming to take our lands away, so we must organize to fight them. My husband is a soldier in the Mongol army in Inner Mongolia, and he wanted me to come to the Communist school."

**THIRD BOOK:**  
**WAR WITH JAPAN**





## 1. THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY MARCHES

ALL DURING JULY after the Liukouchiao Incident the atmosphere in Yen-an had been heavy with suspense. Had the great War of National Liberation for which the Red Army had been preparing since August 1, 1935, actually arrived? Or would there be more compromise between Japan and China? The few radio stations were crowded every night with eager listeners for news, and the streets were humming with anxious speculations. Chiang Kai-shek's firm speech at the Kuling Conference on July 19 was greeted with tremendous acclaim. Then, when Peking and Tientsin were occupied by the Japanese during the first week in August and the Shanghai fighting began on August 13, it was clear that a real war had begun at last.

The Red Army is always mobilized and ready to march to any front on five minutes' notice. After July 7 they had been on their marks and anxious to start. Chiang Kai-shek invited Chu Teh to the Military Conference held in Nanking during the first week in August, and the Communists in Yen-an waited breathlessly for his report. On August 11, I asked Mao Tsê-tung for news. . . .

Although a misty rain was falling, I found Mao Chu-hsi, or Chairman Mao, as he was always called in Yen-an, sitting in his garden in a foreign-style canvas deck chair smoking cigarettes. It was nine o'clock at night. My interpreter and I had made our appointment through his secretary the previous day. Being able to see Mao Tsê-tung was a state occasion. He preferred not to see people at all, but to have

them send him a list of short, concise questions, consecutively numbered, on which he could scribble brief "yes" or "no" answers. Appointments, however, were always made at night, as Mao slept in the daytime. He had got into the habit of working at night when he was a journalist, and this habit had been confirmed by night marches when leading the Red Army. Apparently he found it easier to sleep through the air bombings and pandemonium of the day and to do his thinking and make decisions in the silence of martial law at night.

Because Mao carried on the affairs of state after dark, his personality was dramatically aloof in the half-light of mystery. In the gregarious elbow-to-elbow world of Yen-an, he was an Olympian figure indeed. When you went to call on him at night, the affair seemed as ceremonial as keeping a tryst with an oracle.

You usually walked through the black silence of the deserted streets in a drizzling rain. You came suddenly upon the street pailous gleaming ghostly white in the darkness like ancient temple archways. Flash of a bayonet and a sentry challenge confront you on every corner. Your bodyguard gives the password. You salute and march on. At the foot of the mountain a great gate opens on screaming wooden hinges, and you are ushered into the presence. Mao Tsê-tung greets you with a friendly handshake, then sits back in the darkness like the Delphian oracle in a cavern, a continuous incense-spiral of cigarette smoke rising in front of him. You sit in the candlelight, and he concentrates two bright intense eyes upon you from the outer darkness. Your interpreter fidgets nervously, anxious to create a favourable impression on the leader of all the Chinese Communists. Mao speaks in

quiet decisive syllables like someone reading from a familiar book. He never shakes the shaggy black mane away from his eyes. He never plays with a pen or pencil. His large shapely hands are as quiet as his voice.

Ho Tzu-ch'ün, his gentle little wife, brings in cocoa and cakes and sits unobtrusively on the k'ang, lined with dozens of books on philosophy and political science. . . .

"Is there any news?" I inquire.

"Just a day or so ago the Red Army received an order from Nanking to go to the front to fight the Japanese under the command of the Nanking Government. However, Chiang Kai-shek will not yet permit us to publish the political outline of the unification of the two parties, and this can be done only after the fighting with Japan has begun.

"Although the Communist Party has got a legal position and Chu Teh can join the National Defense meeting at Nanking, on the other hand the political prisoners are not yet ordered released by Nanking. And also the Communist Party cannot yet work publicly in the White districts. Some things in China are very strange, aren't they?" (with a twinkle in his eye).

"The Red Army has not yet been reorganized, because Chiang Kai-shek has delayed this question and has not yet appointed a commander-in-chief. We still use the old name of the 'Red Army.' Now all we can do is to send the Red Army to the front and change its number there. Also, we have not yet changed the name of the Soviet Government, because Nanking has delayed this question, too."

"What is the cause of this delay?" I inquired.

"I suppose it is because Nanking is afraid of Japanese imperialism. If the United Front manifesto is published, it

will raise a strong reaction on the part of the Japanese. So we want to publish the manifesto after the fighting breaks out. We ourselves wanted to publish the manifesto earlier, but Nanking refused."

"Are there any problems which have not been settled between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party?' is my next question.

"Yes, many questions are still not settled, such as the fact that Nanking wants to appoint the Red Army commander-in-chief and the head of the political department from Nanking, but we refuse this. Also we have suggested our ten-point political program\* to Nanking, but Nanking has not yet decided to accept this."

"What do you anticipate will be the development of the war with Japan?" I asked.

"The future of this war has two possibilities: (1) victory, or (2) failure. How shall victory be achieved? We must struggle, keep up our spirit and continue to struggle and keep up our morale. If China realizes these ten points, of course we can win a victory. If not, we shall fail."

"When does the Red Army expect to march to the front?" I then asked.

"This is not yet decided."

Shortly after this interview, however, the immediate questions were satisfactorily agreed upon. Chiang Kai-shek assigned the Red Army to the Shansi-Suiyuan front under Governor Yen Hsi-shan as the "Eighth Route Army" and on August 22 appointed Chu Teh its commander-in-chief and P'eng Teh-huai as his deputy field commander. The United

\*These ten points are listed in the chapter "The Celestial Red Star Passes."

Front manifesto was published openly a month later under date of September 22—which marks the date of the new era.

During August and September the Red Army began secretly moving into Shansi to take up its sector of defense, and had its first big encounter with the Japanese at Pinghsingkuan, which resulted in a smashing victory for the Eighth Route Army on September 24—the first big victory of the Sino-Japanese war. . . .

In the meantime Yen-an was astir with excitement. Everybody wanted to go to the front. Nobody wanted to remain in the rear. Miss Ting Ling promptly began organizing a "Front Service Group" to do propaganda along with the troops. This was composed of thirty-one members. Most were students of the Academy, and all had recently come to Yen-an from the White region. Originally seven girls volunteered for his dangerous work, but when I left Yen-an there were only four still enlisted, one of whom was Wu Kuang-wei, the "Bernhardt" of the local theater. This Front Service Group planned to do propaganda through dramatics, singing, lecturing, distributing leaflets and posters, and by sending out news from its war correspondents' department.

"Our work is to help the soldiers at the front and to keep up their spirit of sacrifice and belief in our race," Commander Ting Ling, the *tuan-chang*, told me. "We'll also work among the Japanese captives to teach them class consciousness. As we march with the troops, we shall organize a people's movement to help the anti-Japanese soldiers by forming volunteer transportation units and other civilian support."

At first the Nanking authorities objected to any propaganda units going to the front with the Red Army, and Ting

Ling's Front Service Group had to wait a long time for permission, but finally, in October, they reached their goal and were able to carry on their work in Shansi province.

I myself decided to go to the front as amateur war correspondent. . . .

My personal situation had become rather difficult during the past few weeks. I had originally meant to stay in Yen-an only during May. Then I learned that my husband was planning to bring several foreign writers to Yen-an some time in June, so I waited to return with them. This group, consisting of Owen Lattimore, T. A. Bisson and Mr and Mrs P. Jaffe of New York, duly arrived in Yen-an on June 22—my husband having decided not to come with them. They stayed in Yen-an only two days, as they had already been delayed in Sian a long time and the Jaffes had to catch the airplane to Shanghai. They had not come in a Red Army truck, however, but had been obliged to hire a small private car and driver in Sian. There was not an inch of room in this car for an extra person, so I did not insist upon leaving with them, though I had a premonition that it would have been a wise, if selfish, thing to do. I very much wanted some friends to escort me through the hostile police zone in Sian, but they had successfully eluded the police in Sian by pretending to be making a tourist trip to the famous mountain, Hua-shan, and if I returned with them my presence might have caused some embarrassment. However, I entrusted them with the custody of my films and notebooks, which were my main concern in passing through Sian.

Just as we were waving good-by to their car on June 24, a light rain began to fall—a rain which increased in quantity daily until August. This group luckily reached Lochuan be-

fore the downpour, and were held up there only two weeks. After this they arrived safely in Sian and passed through without the police having any suspicion that they had not gone to Hua-shan as planned—as I was told when I myself finally reached Sian in September. They just missed an adventure, however—for the week after they left the town, Lochuan was thoroughly looted by Yang Hu-cheng's troops as a farewell gesture on giving up their garrison there.

I had planned to take the next Red Army truck to Sian on June 28 and to call on Ho Lung on my way back. But this truck never departed. The downpour continued all during July and August, and the roads and bridges were washed out all along the line. As soon as repairs began, the floods destroyed them again. The oldest residents of North Shensi said it was "the first big rain for thirty years." Every week I expected to leave. Every week I was told to wait until the next. I did not waste any of my time, however, and wrote thirteen new notebooks full of interviews and discussions with everybody in Yen-an, in addition to the fourteen sent to Peking in June. Those rainy afternoons of my Soviet summer in Yen-an were extremely interesting and full of information if not of incident.

In the meantime the war clouds were gathering over my home in Peking, and they soon spread ominously in every direction. Events happened so fast that I felt the ground being cut away from me wherever I turned. Railways were cut and bombed and ports were closed with such finality that I felt myself thoroughly marooned in the interior. On August 14 over two thousand persons were killed by bombs in the International Settlement of Shanghai. On August 16 American women and children were ordered to be evacuated.

Radio news in Yen-an was sketchy and gave no instructions on how to get out for such persons lost in the woods as I. I thought the trains had all been commandeered for troop movements and that probably my only line of retreat was overland on the long route all across China from Sian to Hankow and thence by train to Canton. And still the rain came down unceasingly.

It is astonishing how cut off one can feel at such a time, isolated in the far Northwest on the border of Inner Mongolia. The war situation seemed gigantically exaggerated. I actually thought it not unlikely that I might be marooned in the interior for a year. I therefore consulted Mao Tsê-tung about going to the Shansi front as war correspondent. He looked at me doubtfully, but after some persuasion gave me permission. With an official credential from him for the Political Department, I began organizing my expedition.

The OGPU gave me a sturdy new bodyguard for service at the front, as little Demmy-erh was not strong enough for such strenuous work. During the summer he had developed tuberculosis and had to go to a sanitarium for rest—that was the reason for his rosebud Camille complexion, I was shocked to discover. Demmy-erh regretfully gave up his Mauser to the new guard and bade me farewell with tears in his eyes, then trudged off sadly to the sanitarium.

My new guard was enthusiastic about having a chance to go to the front; and promptly began getting everything in order. He decided that the Mauser was *Pu-hao* and that we must get a good one. We went to call on Hsiao Ching-kuang, the handsome Chief-of-Staff who had spent eight years studying in Moscow. Hsiao Ching-kuang was feeling kindly toward the world because his wife had just been released from



four years' imprisonment in Shanghai, and although guns were scarce and mules even scarcer, he contributed a beautiful new Mauser, two mules and a pony toward the cause. Thus equipped, Ko Sun-hua, the guard, and I waited for the order to proceed to the front. In the meantime the people in Yen-an amused themselves by telling me how a tenderfoot should act under fire.

"Under air bombing," they said, punctuating their remarks with gruesome details, "you act individually and not collectively. Never follow the crowd, fall flat on your face where you are, unless you have time to find a stone cave in a hill. Never hide in clumps of trees—wood splinters are worse than shrapnel. And remember that a moving object is a target for machine-gun fire," etc., etc.

It was all very instructive.

In China, however, ultimatums are always penultimatums, and there is always an anticlimax and a last way out, somehow. The Communists radio communication with Peking and Tientsin had been cut, but at eight o'clock on September 6 I received my first news from the outside world. My husband sent a radiogram from Tientsin saying, "You can still return via Tsingtao but urgent you leave immediately or cannot return this year."

This surprised me. Early in August the news had come that all Japanese nationals had been evacuated from Tsingtao, and I had assumed that they had blockaded that port first, as in Yen-an we expected them to take the Kiaotsi Railway there as the first maneuver. Tsingtao was still open, but might be closed any hour.

I decided to go to Sian and that if, when I arrived, Tsingtao was closed, I could still go from Sian to the Shansi front

for a while until I found a way out of the interior. I then feared that no foreigner would be permitted on the troop trains because they were being bombed daily.

Luckily the rain stopped that very day and a group of Red Army people who had been waiting for a clear day to leave for Sian were ready to start. Early next morning I set out with them.

## II. SEPTEMBER MORNINGS

THE EXPEDITION started off well. My horse threw me into the middle of the first river we tried to cross. As my body-guard and one of the mafoos rushed to help me to the opposite bank, the more intelligent of the two mules saw his chance, pulled away from the other mafoo, threw off his load and started jogging back to Yen-an. At that, both mafoos pooled their colorful vocabularies. My *t'e-wu-yuan* had to make his way back across the stream and hold the docile mule, while the mafoos set out in pursuit. By the time the mule had been coaxed into wearing his pack again, we were thoroughly late and had to travel alone.

We four did not catch up with the rear of the main caravan until the end of the day. However, as we rounded a curve several hours later, we came upon half a dozen Red soldiers waiting to escort us the rest of the way. While we meekly took a scolding from them for not keeping up with the rest of the caravan, two other Red soldiers came back. One was completely covered with about half an inch of mud, and the other was carrying his knapsack and helping his comrade along.

"*T'a-ma-ti!*" exclaimed the muddy one. "Not good going. I fell down up to my neck. We volunteer to escort the

mules across the mountain instead of taking this road."

That made the situation look interesting.

"You can either climb the mountain with the animals or try making your way through the mud along the road," the soldiers informed me. "It's three times as far one way and three times as deep the other."

I decided to brave the mud instead of the mountain, as the only interest I have ever had in climbing high places is to get on the other side. We rolled up the legs of our trousers, tied all loose effects around our shoulders and set out across the mud, while the mafoos took the two mules and my pony up the mountainside. The first few mudholes were not so bad. But no sooner would we get our shoes back on than we'd have to take them off and get in up to our knees again. Within a short time I found that my feet were getting cut and sore—which was a fine beginning for a two weeks' hiking expedition. Soon we were floundering in seas of the stickiest clay I have ever seen. The roadway was cut through high loess cliffs, and wherever it dipped into a little valley, this dip was full of mud soaked through after nearly two months of steady rain. In the worst places landslides had occurred on one side or another, and the mudhole might be three or six feet deep, or even deeper. We skirted the edges as best we could, holding hands in a long chain like Alpine climbers. The free edges of the road usually went off into endless chasms on one side while the slippery hill on the other was almost straight up and down.

"This is a Long March through the *tsao-ti*," Ko Sun-hua, my *t'e-wu-guan*, grinned, referring to the famous swampy Grasslands through which he had passed on the Long March from South, where hundreds were drowned in the quick sands.

After a while the *t'e-wu-yuan* became bored with such slow going and decided upon a radical maneuver. This was to run fast high up along the steep loess cliff and pass over before the sliding mud could give way under our feet. With three at a time in an Alpine chain, we succeeded very nicely, though I don't know what would have happened had we slid into one of the mud baths six feet deep below. We had already passed the carcase of an ill-fated horse who had been unable to extricate himself.

We never stopped for food, but devoured a few *man-t'ou* dough biscuits that I had brought along, as it was important to try to meet up with the main caravan as quickly as possible. After several hours we finally came upon several of them including one of the five Grand Old Men of the Chinese Soviets—Teng Pi-wu, who had been temporary chairman of the Northwest Soviet Government and was on his way to work in the Sian office. Still living the hard life of a Red soldier at fifty-one, he was not objecting to the *tsao-ti* in the least. Teng Pi-wu was a charming old man, amiable and friendly. He was a lifelong revolutionary of the oldest vintage, and had participated in the first revolutionary uprising at Wuchang on October 10, 1911, the date of the foundation of the Chinese Republic. At that time he had been one of the Council of Twenty of the Hupeh Tung Meng Hui which organized this first revolt against the Manchus. In 1913 he went to Japan to work with Sun Yat-sen and studied at Japan Law College until 1915, when he returned only to serve six months in prison. He did secret work for the Tung Meng Hui among enemy troops for a while, then organized the Wuhan Middle School in 1920 which was one of the first to teach *pai hua* instead of the classical *wen*.

yen. He had been one of the founders of the Hupeh branch of the Communist Party in September 1920, and was the Hupeh provincial delegate to the Kuomintang Congress in January 1926, where he was elected a member of the substitute C.E.C. of the Kuomintang. After the Split he escaped arrest by disguising himself as a sailor and fled to Japan. In 1928 he went to Moscow to study, remaining until 1932, when he entered the Central Soviets in Kiangsi and organized the Communist Party School, of which he was principal until 1937. During the Long March this hale and hearty veteran had been Commissioner of Health.

Teng Pi-wu's travelling companion was also an interesting individual. He was Teng Feng, the vice-chairman of the Kiangsi-Hupeh-Hunan Soviet, which remained in the South after the other Soviets were given up. He had come to Yen-an as delegate from there only a few weeks before. This Soviet still had ten thousand population, Teng Feng told me and its armed force was under Han Ying, the famous proletarian leader. This Soviet included the historic revolutionary Liuyang *hsien* in Hunan. Teng Feng told me the heroic story of this battle area, which held out against the Kuomintang troops for two years after the main army had retreated. He himself had once saved his life only by lying under water in a paddy field and breathing through a reed for a whole day.

When finally we reached our caravanserai for the night in the tiny hamlet of Lao-san, I was so tired I could hardly propel myself forward and had to be pulled along by the bodyguard. I had a terrific muscular pain in my back from the unaccustomed movement of pulling myself out of the mud, and as I collapsed on a mud *k'ang* decided I would have

to recuperate at least a week before attempting to go on. I was not the only one who was exhausted. Our ponies and mules did not arrive until after dark, and were all covered with mud in spite of having taken the high road while we took the low road.

The local chairman of the Lao-san Soviet gave me one of his rooms for the night. My *t'e-wu-yuan*, much concerned about keeping me alive until morning, rushed about making tea and trying to find food. Nearly everything available in the village had already been bought by others, but he found a huge squash for fifteen cents, cut it into large crescents and dumped them into an iron kettle to boil. We ate the squash with some of the dirt-colored Yench'ang salt we had brought with us, and I understood why the Pilgrim forefathers put squash on the Thanksgiving menu.

Next morning we were late again, and received a second reprimand from the *kuan-li-yang*, which was what they called the man from the Communications Department in charge of the trip. My two huge lumbering mafoos merely looked at the vociferous little man tolerantly, lighted a cigarette and took their time as before. Mafoos were definitely in the upper layer of Soviet society. They considered their main duties to be toward beast, not man, and it was a condescension on their part even to acknowledge the existence of people. When my bodyguard, who had got the habit of command from being a *P'ai-chang* in the army, showed a tendency toward wanting to give orders they simply grinned at him. It was clear that the command was to be democratic if at all. All during the rest of the trip I was very respectful to the mafoos, and we never forgot to share anything we bought on the way with them, thereby

putting ourselves into their good graces as best we could.

I rode my pony as much as possible that day and had the bodyguard lead him, as my muscles were too stiff to cope with the problem of handling a horse. I found that I became more tired riding an hour by myself than in several hours of sitting relaxed in the saddle while the pony was being led—a useful discovery for me, but not so good for my guard. However, he insisted upon leading the animal when he saw the point, because he was in terror lest I should not be able to carry on. The road led across the mountains, which occasionally produced wildflowers—bluebells, larkspurs and daisies, and a very pretty specimen of pink flower that I had never seen before. I picked some and put them on my saddle and bridle. After that the guard kept the equipage covered with pink flowers for me, explaining that these were nothing compared with the flora in his home in Kiangsi. Once or twice one of the tough mafoos contributed a new specimen or two, which touched me very much. All the Red Army people on the way picked flowers and wore them in their caps—looking a little homesick for the green southlands of their childhood.

We travelled sixty-five *li* to Tao-hsiao-pu that day, and the guard and I made a desperate sprint on the last lap in order to buy some eggs before the village was sold out. We succeeded in this and made a watery custard which with sugar sprinkled on the top, was not bad at all. The *kuan-li-yang* had found two rooms and offered me one for the night, after we had shared our hard-won custard with him. A dozen people came in to *k'an-ping*, looking to be in every stage of disease. They thought every foreigner who came that

way must be a doctor, and I had a difficult time persuading them that I was only a journalist and not a sister of mercy. They then decided to pay me a little social call, and sat down to ask questions and finger all my belongings. I hoped none of them had cholera or typhoid. The two rooms became so populated that my bodyguard had to show them all out—but new ones came in as soon as he left the door. He had a hard life. The occupants of the house we stayed in gave me two ears of corn, parched over an open fire Indian fashion, explaining apologetically that they had nothing else to eat that month. Corn was considered a famine diet in the Northwest, fit only for pigs and horses.

By this time I had begun to value my sturdy good-tempered *t'e-wu-yuan* like life itself, an opinion which rose as the trip lengthened out day after day. Ko Sun-hua was a veteran of the Long March from Kiangsi and only twenty-three. He was no ordinary person, but a graduate of the OGPU's special training school for *t'e-wu-yuan* in Yen-an, and had been selected to take responsibility for me at the front when it was thought that I would go there as war correspondent. A seasoned warrior, he had been in the Red Army since 1932. This "No. 1" soldier belonged to the 1st Squad of the 1st Company of Cheng Ken's far-famed 1st Division of the First Red Army Corps under Lin Piao, and had been *p'ai-chang*, or squad commander, of the 1st Squad for three months, the previous summer. This 1st Division, which had never been defeated in battle, was composed of the pick of the Red Army, including a few veterans from the Canton Commune and the Nanchang Uprising. Ko Sun-hua was one of twenty promising young soldiers who had been recently chosen out of the First Army Corps for their



superior intelligence and sense of responsibility to receive special training as bodyguards for the high command. After fulfilling such responsible positions for a while, which was a liberal education in itself, these *t'e-wu-guan* usually became army commanders themselves. Most of his comrades had already been distributed in the service of Mao Tsê-tung, Chu Teh, Po Ku, Lo Fu and others, upon graduation, while their old *f'e-wu-guan* went to the front as commanders.

Ko Sun-hua had been on the banks of the Ta-t'u River when some of his friends in the 1st Division made the heroic crossing, and had had many adventures during his career in the Red Army. I had great difficulty in understanding his Kiangsi dialect, in which all *h*'s became *f*'s and soft sounds were hard, but we finally had a basic mutual language in working order. Sometimes I even interpreted for him when the Shensi peasants didn't understand his machine-gun rapid Southern talk on the subject of buying eggs, borrowing a fire and such, which was all old stuff to me.

He came from poor tenant peasants and told me he had never had any money of his own. Nobody had ever given him a present, and he didn't even know the date of his own birthday. He had joined the Red Army because it was "the poor man's army." He supposed all his relatives had been killed when the Kuomintang occupied Kiangsi, because one of their number was a Red soldier. He was very enthusiastic about "our revolution" and said philosophically, "Nothing good can come easily." He knew all about Marx and Lenin and Russia and the present international political situation, accurately quoting the phrases from the political lectures he had attended.

On the third day, September 9, when we arrived at Chao-

t'ao-chen after fifty-five *li* up and down mountains, one of Ko Sun-hua's colleagues caught up with us, so I invited him to join the party. This was Teng Pao-shen, whose family had died from starvation in Kiangsi. He was only twenty-one, but had joined the Red Army in 1930 at the age of fourteen. He was voluntarily going to the front to participate in the fighting. Ko Sun-hua was a very serious youth who never sang or wasted any time on trivialities, although he was the soul of kindness and generosity. Teng Pao-shen, however, sang all day and was full of smiles, so he added a lively touch to the cavalcade.

As we left Lochuan on the fifth day, we came upon a big column of Red Army troops marching across Shensi to the Yellow River in order to reach the Shansi front. These soldiers seemed so young and so extraordinarily good-looking that I was impelled to ask more about them.

"This is part of Ho Lung's Second Front Red Army," explained Ko Sun-hua. "Most of them are Hunanese."

"But half of them don't look to be over fifteen." I objected.

"Yes, I have never seen so many *hsiao kuei* in an army before." Ko Sun-hua looked puzzled, too.

Then he asked one of the soldiers: "Comrade, are all these babies going to fight the Japanese?"

"Not all of them," the comrade laughed. "Most of the little-boys will stay in Lochuan in the rear and garrison this area."

It was certainly the most extraordinary army I had seen in China. They had such sweet, innocent and handsome boyish faces that I decided the fighting Hunanese were far and away the most beautiful people in China. They marched in

perfect order and discipline, singing roundelays as they went, the "little-boys" often shifting their ripes from one shoulder to the other.

We were afraid some Japanese planes might come along and bomb the column, and Ko Sun-hua gave me fresh instructions for this emergency, and seemed to look forward to the excitement with a good deal of pleasure.

A squad of Second Front Army soldiers were given to our group—always at the tail end of the caravan—as escort, because a band of 350 daring bandits had their lair on a mountain near Lochuan and sometimes looted the merchants' caravans as they passed. A foreigner would have been ideal for the purpose of ransom. Whenever we went into a narrow defile, good for highway robbery, our guards automatically formed into a column two abreast and had their guns ready for action. The slightest noise overhead caused the column to stiffen tensely, with a rattle of rifles like that of a rattlesnake ready to strike. But nothing happened except that once one of the guards discharged his gun just for fun, to the great indignation of everybody else.

This was a desolate no man's land between the Red and White areas, and some of the bandits were being paid by the Kuomintang armies to harass the Soviet people during their travels.

On September 11 we arrived at the historic village of Tsungpu. Here lay the traditional tomb of the First Emperor, Huang Ti, who is said to have first made the Chinese into a nation five thousand years ago. And here lay an encampment of the Second Front Army, whose young Southerners eagerly made the pilgrimage to the tomb of the First Emperor. The village was in holiday mood and looked like

a meadow of flowers with the gray-blue uniforms and red-starred caps dancing up and down in thick profusion on the streets. The merchants were doing a thriving business and were very friendly and most sycophantic to the Red soldiers and officers.

The village schoolmaster chivalrously lent me his room for the night, and it was soon filled with callers. The inquisitive boys and girls of the Dramatics Society came in first. They were the cutest children imaginable, simply bubbling over with tricks and good humor. We had traveled seventy *li* that day, however, and I was so tired I could hardly keep from collapsing visibly, so my two bodyguards competently showed everybody out and kept sentry at the door after nine o'clock.

It was a strenuous trip, but very pleasant in the cool September mornings. We all enjoyed it enormously—except the mafoos, for whom it was merely a dull routine. We never changed clothes or washed our ears,\* but collapsed as we were at night and before dawn stumbled out on the road half asleep. Nobody ate breakfast, but about eleven we stopped at some village in passing for lunch and again in the evening. I have never seen such poverty as among the peasants in Shensi, where famine is perennial. Except in two or three large villages, nothing could be bought except *shao mi* (millet), corn, a few melons and sometimes eggs. Eggs were scarce, however, and by the time our end of the caravan arrived at night they were usually sold out. How the Red soldiers kept alive on the little they ate, I could never figure

\*I must add, however, that we brushed our teeth. Though not every Red soldier had a gun, every one in the whole Red Army had a toothbrush, and it was one of the strictest regulations to use it.

out. The guards with us ate nothing but a few daily bowls of *shao mi* the whole way, and never complained. At night they slept on the mud floors or on doors taken off the hinges, with only a thin cotton quilt around them.

The Red Army never carries tents, but camps in deserted buildings or in the peasants' houses. They pay for everything, even including a few coppers for the use of a cooking stove for a few minutes. In the Soviet districts payment was made in Soviet currency, but in other places it was in Kuomintang notes. No matter how tired and exhausted they were at night, the soldiers swept the floor and courtyard and cleaned up their quarters before retiring, following army regulations to the letter. We sometimes passed melon patches and pear orchards in a hot, dusty, deserted valley, but the Red soldiers never turned their heads—the price was high, and they were too poor to buy anything but *shao mi*. Their respect for private property was a little startling—in a Communist movement. But, of course, it is this nicety which has kept the support of the peasantry for them all these years. All the people along the way in these "White" areas were friendly to the Red travelers, including merchants and landlords, and the travelers were very courteous to them.

Nearly every hilltop throughout the length of this historic valley was coroneted with an ancient battlement or watchtower—which Genghis Khan used for signaling in his days of conquest. The loess tablelands were cut by great vertical crevasses as unexpectedly as in a glacier, and some were so deep you could hardly see the bottom. We forded rivers and climbed up and down endlessly. All bridges had been washed away, and the road was hardly traceable most of the trip. Fortunately, however, we had clear weather until

leaving Tsungpu. The elements had a vengeance against motor travelers: At Tsungpu our whole caravan, consisting of about thirty persons, exclusive of the escort and mafoos, were piled into some trucks marooned at Tsungpu because there was a stretch of good road to be utilized for about forty *li*. We set out gaily enough, but after having been towed out of the mud twice, arrived on the top of a lonely mountain just in time for a terrific downpour of rain, which continued all night. Tarpaulins were pulled over the truck bodies, and a few of us spent a fairly comfortable night in the tempest. Others had to keep smoothing out the leaky tarpaulin, which every half-hour accumulated a small lake that would cause a deluge in the interior if not taken care of properly. A guard of Red soldiers, however, patrolled the trucks the whole night in the cold rain—in mud almost up to their knees. Just across the way near Yün-t'ai was the tomb of the heroine of the Great Wall, Meng Chiang-nu.

The long caravan had previously been divided into different squads, but by this time we had caught up with the front of the column, which included Liu Chien-hsien, K'ang K'e-ching and Hsiao K'eh's pretty wife, who was taking her famous "Grasslands baby" to Sian, hoping to be able to tell her husband good-by en route. Liu Chien-hsien was going to Sian, too, but K'ang K'e-ching was trudging off to the wars. At that time no Soviet women were permitted to go to the fighting front, but K'ang K'e-ching considered herself in a special category and was determined to be with her commander-in-chief husband in the thick of the fray. We were also keeping pace with Agnes Smedley's fast-moving group. She had been hurt horseback riding a month before and was going to the hospital in Sian for an X-ray examina-

tion, hoping to be able to go to the front later on. She was carried most of the way on a bamboo stretcher. The four carriers moved at a fast rhythm meant to be comfortable, but although she stoically refused to complain, she occasionally had to ride horseback as a pleasant relief! By the end of the trip she was unselfishly insisting upon giving medical aid to her carriers and bodyguards instead of permitting them to assist her.

In spite of the mud, we walked seventy *li* next day and arrived safely at Tungkuan, where the Red column hired a big, dry and comfortable stable for the night, just as in the donkey-travelling days of Joseph and Mary. Food was more plentiful on this lap of the journey—but feet were getting sore, and three of the mafoos were nearly incapacitated by cuts from their straw sandals, while two others were sick from drinking unboiled water en route.

Seventy *li* the following day brought us to Yao-hsien, and 75 *li* more to Sanyuan.

There was no time to be wasted, "because several Red officers and K'ang K'e-ching were anxious to arrive at P'eng Teh-huai's headquarters at Yün-yang before the last of the army marched to the front in Shansi. One of these was Tsai Ch'ien, the young Formosan who had once been Chairman of the Anti-Imperialist League and Commissioner of the Interior of the Soviet Government. He was a descendant of one of the three hundred First Families of Formosa, who settled there under Koxinga. He had majored in sociology at Shanghai University, then returned to Formosa to do Communist Party work, and helped found the Formosan Communist Party in April 1928. When we arrived in Sanyuan, however, the last detachment of the newly named

"Eighth Route Army" was just beginning a night march to the Shansi front, and those who planned to join with them had to cut across country in double-quick time to meet up with them.

Liu Chien-hsien and I decided to pay a visit to headquarters at Sün-yang, so next day we hired a couple of rickshas and made our way there from Sanyuan in four hours, taking only our two bodyguards along. When we arrived the army people at Yün-yang headquarters were very much upset to find me wandering about that way, as lone foreigners were considered legitimate prey for bandits, not to speak of the interest they would have had in getting a ransom for the wife of Po Ku. Without thinking of it, we had crossed one of those dangerous "Red" and "White" no man's lands. The Sanyuan bandits had been active since the majority of the Red troops had left two or three weeks before, and the Eighth Route Army people would not consider permitting us to go back without a military escort, so we had to spend the night there and return next day. Liu Chien-hsien and I found ourselves a room, however, and enjoyed our short visit very much, although I regretted not being able to meet Liu Pei-ch'eng and Jen Pi-shih, who had left Yün-yang to march to the front only the night before.

"Liu-the-Blind," as the old veteran Liu Pei-ch'eng has been known during many years of fighting, was Chu Teh's Chief-of-Staff and had recently been put in command of Hsü Hsiang-ch'in's Fourth Front Red Army, which had been reorganized into the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Like Chu Teh, Commander Liu was a native of Szechuan and had been an experienced general long before joining the Red Army. He was tall and always wore dark



glasses because he had lost one eye during a battle in Szechuan, and I was told that his body was covered with wounds and that because of this he sometimes shook with cold chills even in hot weather. In 1929 he was already a Communist while holding the position of Kuomintang Party representative in Yang Sen's 20th Army. He participated in the Nanchang Uprising as Chief-of-Staff, but when this failed went to Soviet Russia to study in the Red Military Academy for four years, where he was specially commended by Marshal Voroshilov and General Bluecher. He entered the Central Soviets in Kiangsi in 1931 and distinguished himself especially during the Long March, when he usually commanded the vanguard. He led the troops in the dangerous crossing of the Ta-t'u River, and negotiated the first Chinese-Lolo treaty of peace by drinking the blood of a newly killed chicken with the No. 1 Lolo chieftain.

Jen Pi-shih, one of the Fighting Hunanese, was a small, wiry, intellectual type, very alert and active, I was told. He had recently been promoted to be head of the Political Department of the whole Eighth Route Army at the front. After having been graduated from a middle school, he began doing revolutionary work and at the First All-China Soviet Congress in 1931 was elected as one of the seven members of the Central Executive Committee. Mao Tsê-tung had given me a letter of introduction to him when I planned to go to the front as war correspondent, as he was in charge of all kinds of political work.

We had left Yen-an on September 7 and entered the gates of Sian in an official Eighth Route Army truck on September 18—the anniversary of the Mukden Incident and the expiration date of my Sian visa. I had not a day to spare. The whole

trip had passed without any major incident. The most exciting moment for me was in Yao-hsien, in one of the stables in which we passed the nights. These stables along the way were the official guest houses for caravan travelers, and their little mud *k'angs* were alive with every species of lower animal life. Although I slept on my camp cot and in my own sleeping bag covered with smelly oilcloth, this equipment did not effectually discourage the marauders, and I had quite a display of bites after a few days. On this particular night I suddenly developed a high fever and became so dizzy I could not stand. I thought, of course, that it was the dreaded spotted typhus, always prevalent in Shensi, which is carried by the body louse. One of the delegates from the "White" districts had just died in Yen-an a few weeks before from typhus caught in one of these same informal lodgings on the way to Yen-an, and I thought I would surely be the next. My mysterious malady, fortunately, turned out to be something quite different. Tracing back its origins, I found that I had bought a package of cheap cigarettes in a street stall for a few coppers, and just smoked one on an empty stomach when I was in a very exhausted condition. This cigarette was plentifully doped with opium—one of the Japanese products designed to increase sales at a fast tempo.

The Eighth Route Army had secured a special pass for me to enter the gates, and I went directly to their Sian office in the truck. There I met some old and new friends. Lin Pei-ch'u was in charge of this office, and I found also Tsai Shu-fan, the Chinese "Asturian" miner, Li Po-chao and her new baby, and was introduced to two of the most interesting of the Communist women. These two were Teng Ying-ch'ao, wife of Chou En-lai, and Wei Kung-ch'i, wife of Yeh Chien-ying.

In the quarters attached to the Eighth Route Army office, there was hardly space for people to move around in, but Teng Ying-ch'ao kindly put my camp cot into her tiny room for the night. This splendid type of Chinese woman revolutionary, who has had a long revolutionary career together with her famous husband, had just arrived in Sian after an exciting escape from Peking. When the Japanese had occupied Peking, she had been in a sanitarium in the Western Hills recuperating from tuberculosis. Teng Ying-ch'ao was a competent-looking matronly woman about thirty-five years of age. She spoke the most beautiful clear Mandarin I think I have ever heard—it was so easy to understand that I almost thought she was speaking English. She and Chou En-lai had been student leaders imprisoned together in Tientsin during the May Fourth Movement in 1919, after which Teng Ying-ch'ao taught for a while in Peking National Normal University. She was very active during the 1925–27 revolution and was then a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. During the Soviet period in the South, she was one of the three or four most important women Communists, and arrived in the Northwest with Mao Tsê-tung's column at the end of the Long March, very ill with tuberculosis. When I saw her, however, she appeared in excellent health after a year's rest.

Wei Kung-ch'i, the wife of Yeh Chien-ying, No. 2 under Chou En-lai as communist liaison man with Kuomintang, had just a new baby when I met her in Sian. Strong and healthy-looking, with pretty white teeth, she was also a fine representative of Soviet womanhood. Wei Kung-ch'i was born in Honan Province in 1908 and was a graduate of Kaifeng Middle School. During the 1925–27 revolution she joined the

Women's Propaganda Department of Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuo-minchün, then went to Wuhan in 1927 and joined the Communist Party there. When the 1927 Split occurred, she did secret Party work in the "White" districts until 1929, then went to Paris and Moscow for a year's study and special training in dramatics work. She returned to China at the end of 1930 and entered the Central Soviets in Kiangsi. In 1931 she helped organize the Soviet dramatics groups and the Gorky Dramatics School. At the end of the Long March she was made Director of the "Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Dramatics Society" at the rear.

For several weeks I had been worrying about how to avoid confiscation of my precious notebooks and films on arrival in Sian, where the police were waiting to pounce on me. Finally I invented a life belt and wore them around my waist under my coat. I decided to put up a brave front and nonchalantly to think nothing of the whole previous affair. I would telephone my friend Captain Wang and ask him to help ship me out of town as he had been so anxious to do previously. I had not paid my bill when I unceremoniously jumped out of the Sian Guest House window nearly five months before, and my luggage was being held by the police—I hoped they would not nab me on such a technicality.

Next morning I went to the Guest House, paid my bill and boldly demanded my luggage. Mr Chou, the manager, was cordial if not glad to see me. Within five minutes three spies appeared on the scene to "protect" me—two new ones, much tougher-looking than the last. My tried and true bodyguard, Ko Sun-hua, loyally clung to my side, and I thought there would be a renewal of Red and White civil war then and

there—except that Ko Sun-hua had already been deprived of his Mauser.

But Captain Wang had more important things than errant journalists on his mind these days. Just as I was putting in my call to his office, an ominous siren sounded.

"It's the air-raid alarm," exclaimed Mr Chou, "hurry into the bomb cellar to hide."

Surrounded by four bodyguards, I spent the next three hours in a dugout. A squadron of Japanese planes had been sighted seventy *li* from Sian and were expected to bomb the airdrome there, Sian being the Northwest concentration point for military supplies. No bombing occurred, however.

The train was being bombed, but I found that the way to Tsingtao was still open. I decided not to go to the Shansi front, but to make a dash for Tsingtao if possible. Captain Wang did not come to see me, but the Eighth Route Army authorities got busy with the Governor of the province, and between the two of them they fixed up a special military pass for me along the railway.

Ko Sun-hua had never seen a train, a movie or a large city before and had been staring about the Sian streets like Alice in Wonderland. I took the occasion to insist that he see a movie, although he felt it was the most extravagant thing he had ever done. On the way back I had a long complicated argument persuading him to debase himself and human labor in general by riding in a ricksha. At first he refused, but a heavy rain was falling and he could not keep up with my fast ricksha, so he succumbed to the logic of the situation and gingerly climbed into the vehicle. The two ricksha men had listened to our argument with amusement, and thinking us a pair of silly tourists tried to soak me a terrific price,

which I flatly refused to pay. Ko Sun-hua became very much alarmed and thought it was an anti-imperialist insurrection. He began to bargain collectively immediately and to explain to the belligerent ricksha pullers that I was neither rich nor an imperialist and that they should have more *k'ech'i*. Although Ko Sun-hua had had to take off his army uniform in Sanyuan and had bought a Chung-shan student uniform much too small for him, he had a certain air of authority that made an impression on the ricksha men, and stilled their clamor. We left them in a very puzzled frame of mind.

When I went to the railway station, two of my old spies of the April days came down with the three new ones to have a last look at me. They sedulously kept their backs toward me and talked together in a little knot of people. When they saw me looking at them, they blushed and bowed, smiling in embarrassment. But it was not to be my last appearance...

Just as the train was pulling out of Tungkuan that evening about seven hours later, four military gendarmes burst into my compartment, grabbed my luggage and put it off the train, explaining brusquely that they had received a telephone call from Sian asking that I return by the next train. They could not tell me why. I tried to refuse but was pulled off the train just as it started. They then took me through a maze of dark side streets in a ricksha for about half an hour, saying we were going to the China Travel Service Guest House. My passport was examined four times in that half-hour. I think Tungkuan is the most sinister city in China—for some reason. It is a desolate-looking military outpost guarding the important Tungkuan Pass which controls the whole Northwest area strategically. Gendarmes usually search every Chinese passenger on the trains there. I thought they

might be going to try to force me to give them all kinds of information about the Chinese Reds. Or I thought that the old order to detain me, given in April, might still be in effect accidentally. In any case, it was a most uncomfortable half-hour's ride. But there was no such plot. At the Guest House, the manager put in a telephone call for Sian. The voice on the other end of the wire was garbled but familiar. It was the other-Snow in person, whom I had just missed in Sian by four hours. He had come from Tientsin to search for his lost wife. I had not been able to communicate with him in any way after receiving his radiogram in Yen-an three weeks before and was much surprised.

I went back to the station a few hours later to get the first train back to Sian. As I waited there a little knot of local employees and passengers gathered round—as few foreigners every stop at Tungkuan.

“What country do you come from?” they asked.

“America,” I replied proudly. As soon as you announce this in China you usually find yourself greeted with a warm welcome. But it did not have that effect this time.

“America is on the side of Japan now, isn't it?” One of them flourished a newspaper at me menacingly. “It says here ‘President Roosevelt refuses to help China.’”

Roosevelt's pronouncements on observing strict neutrality and not letting America become involved in the war were causing great dissatisfaction, apparently. I denied all their fears, but was glad when the train arrived to take me away from further explanations.

It was lucky for me that I had not gone through on my original train, for it was bombed at the Hsuchow station and the engine and several coaches were destroyed.

At the family reunion in Sian we debated whether or not to go to the Eighth Route Army front in Shansi for a short time, but the London *Daily Herald* was urgently demanding that my husband cover the major war in Shanghai instead, and he had already developed a distinguished number of gray hairs over my previous escapades, so we decided to leave the interior while we could and not risk being marooned at that time for an indefinite period. This decision we regretted very much later, however, as, contrary to our expectations, the big war in Shansi was about to begin, though we did not know it then. The Eighth Route Army's exciting victory at Pinghsingkuan occurred on September 24.

We bade good-by to Jim Bertram, who had come to Sian with my husband planning to see the Eighth Route Army for himself, to Agnes Smedley, who, as the hospital had found nothing seriously wrong, also planned to go to the front, and to the rest of our friends, and took the train to Tsingtao on September 23.

At Hsuehow we saw the wreck of my original train, and were delayed about seven hours. The city was evacuated, and all shops were boarded up. Japanese planes had bombed daily during the preceding three days, without doing much damage, however. Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, had received its first bomb the day before we arrived—together with one Japanese message for Governor Han Fu-Chu. The Japanese had begun their first serious air raids over Shantung, in which province Tsingtao is located, and its neighbouring provinces on September 22. On that day eighty-five planes in eight squadrons raided various cities along the railway, including Chufu, the birthplace of Confucius. So we were in the middle of the fray and had little time to lose.



We spent a few days on the beach at the beautiful German-built city of Tsingtao, where I consumed as many American-style ice-cream sundaes at Jimmy's as possible. It was extremely difficult to secure reservations on the few boats still calling at the port of Tsingtao, but eventually Ed went on to Shanghai to cover the war, and I returned to Peking, then under Japanese occupation, of course, to close our house, pack our belongings and take a few weeks for recuperation. • My precious contraband notebooks were again and again a problem, as on the train between Peking and Tientsin the Japanese carefully searched all Chinese passengers and suspicious-looking foreigners for evidence of carrying around "dangerous thoughts." Apparently I appeared eminently respectable, for the life preserver padded with notebooks which I wore under my coat passed without observation.

The Chinese troops retreated from Shanghai on November 15 after four months of heroic resistance, and I immediately left Peking for the International Settlement in Shanghai on November 21—still wearing my life preserver. When I arrived, the fires set by the Japanese to destroy the Chinese part of the city were still burning in Nantao, but the fighting was over and on December 3 the Japanese staged their Victory Parade through the city.

My long journey was over. As Benjamin Franklin would say: "She suffered much, most of which never happened."

### III. "FOR WHEN HE WAKES . . ."

THE JAPANESE INVASION is fast accomplishing what Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues failed to do in their "forty years of struggle," what the abortive "Great Revolution" of

1925-27 failed to do, what the Soviets in a decade of daily fighting and propaganda failed to do: it is at last awakening the greatest mass of people on earth.

Whether or not the great awakening has come too late, who shall say? Suffering teaches a hard school, but turns out excellent pupils.

The central fact in the fast-moving history of the Far East today is this: If the four hundred and fifty millions of China organize, arm themselves and rouse to action in this eleventh hour, they will not only liberate themselves but break the power of militarist Japan. If they do not, and if neither Soviet Russia, England nor America takes positive action while Japan is vulnerable, a new and terrible imperialism, entrenched on a vast continent as well as its island home, will dominate East Asia and create an era of racial and imperialist wars, involving not only Asia but Europe and America as well.

Will the people of China realize their potentialities before it is too late? There are indications that they will. There are other indications that they will not be permitted to do so. It was to forestall the rise of China that the Japanese are now gambling their own future in an effort to subjugate the multiple millions before any further revolutionary awakening renders this permanently impossible.

Every few years there is a new wave of revolution in China, which somehow loses itself in her ocean of people, but the inner movement is always there. There was revolution in 1911, 1919, 1925-27, 1931 and 1936-38. One class of the population rouses itself—then another. Until the present they have never co-ordinated their efforts except for

a few months in 1925-27. First it was the middle-class and overseas Chinese and the "returned students" from abroad, who supported Sun Yat-sin. Next it was the student movement and "cultural revolution" of May Fourth, 1919. Then it was the modern proletariat in 1925-27. In 1931 it was the peasants who redistributed the land and formed their Soviets. In 1936-38 it was the patriotic soldiers of China who demanded resistance against Japan.

The South became revolutionary first, stimulated by the pressure of British imperialism. The North required the occupation of Manchuria by Japan to make it realize the meaning of nationalism.

These revolutionary movements were each in turn suppressed, at least on the surface. When Japan attacked in North China in July 1937, it caught the people of China unprepared. The Government had an army. The Communists had an army. The students had a thin small voice with which to cry out in the wilderness. But the population itself was completely disarmed, both politically and militarily. For ten years every ounce of pressure that could be brought to bear by the Government was exerted to make its soldiers and the people believe that foreign invasion was neither imminent nor important, that the revolutionary masses must be suppressed before any attention could be paid to external problems. No public anti-Japanese activity was tolerated except for a few months after the occupation of Manchuria in 1931. The Government tightened its dictatorship over the people and aspired to imitate Hitler and Mussolini. Today not only the people but the Government itself is paying dearly for this Fascist aberration. China may have to pay with her life for the past suppression of the patriotic movement and the

massacre of her finest revolutionary youth who might now be leading a conscious people on to victory.

Because the population was totally unprepared, Japan was able to march her army over half of the eighteen provinces of China within a year, just as she had occupied Manchuria six years before. She was able to occupy sixteen of the most important cities of China—Peking, Tientsin, Taiyuanfu, Paotingfu, Kaifeng, Tsinan, Tsingtao, Chefoo and Hsuehchow in the North; Shanghai, Nanking, Wusih, Hangchow, Soochow, Amoy and Kiukiang in the South. At the end of the year China had remaining only seven economic cities of major importance—Hankow, Changsha and Chungking in the interior and Canton, Swatow, Foochow and Ningpo in the South, though the latter two were very much under the eye of the Japanese Navy. In the far Northwest China still held Sian, Tungkuan and Ch'engchow—and of course little Yen-an, not unimportant symbolically. Japan had control of all the railways of North China except the line to Sian. Of North China, the Chinese had left little territory besides Kansu, Shensi and Ninghsia in the Northwest, and the areas under Communist control in part of Shansi and *behind* the Japanese lines.

Then, in October, Japan began her campaign in South China and occupied Canton without a struggle, followed immediately by the fall of Hankow, on the Yangtze River.

Yet the Spanish Republicans still hold Madrid. Why? Because the citizens of Madrid are defending their city, because the population has been mobilized to participate in the war.

In China every one of these cities was occupied by the Japanese troops without any organized participation in the

defense on the part of the population. Only in Shansi were the local citizenry mobilized in armed self-defense—and even there the Communists were not permitted to do this until after the Japanese had occupied Taiyuanfu. Shansi is still being held. It has withstood four or five drives against it, and has cost Japan more trouble than any other province during the war. Yet Shansi is noted as the home of the most docile, unwarlike provincials in China.

Thus after over a year of war the proposition stands out clearly in relief: If the Chinese population is not organized and armed, Japan will conquer China. If the population is mobilized before it is too late, China can still defeat Japan.

This alternative is now belatedly being realized in China. It was well understood by Japan when she first began her campaign of conquest.

The truth of the first part of this proposition has been amply demonstrated. In spite of the gallant defense put up by the professional soldiers of the Government armies, they have everywhere had to retreat. After this retreat they leave nothing behind them with which to carry on the defense, and the local population have no way to protect themselves. And now that the industrial base of the Government has been destroyed, the Chinese Army is much more vulnerable than at the beginning of the war.

But why is the second part of my proposition true? Why is it still possible now for China to defeat Japan, if the people are mobilized? There are several proofs of this, but the conclusive demonstration of the capacity of the people for successful local self-defense has been made by the Communists, first in the defense of their little Soviet Republic and, second, in their activities during the war with Japan.

Let us see what the population of China has already done under the direction of the Communists: After the disastrous defeat of the Nanchang Uprising at the end of 1927, Chu Teh had only 1200 revolutionary soldiers and Mao Tsê-tung 1,000 insurgent miners and peasants. Within four years they had organized a Soviet Republic with a population of 9,000,000. These Soviets defended themselves for ten years against an enemy as much better equipped militarily and economically as Japan compared with China. The Red Army fought against forces ten and sometimes twenty times superior, but because it was supported by the population it was never conquered. It was defeated in 1934 only by an economic blockade and a ring of forts, which Japan could never hope to use for the conquest of China. The Communist movement seemed to have been defeated again and again in China—in 1927, in 1934 and at the ragged end of the Long March. How many of their armies have been annihilated and replaced, nobody knows. But they turned every defeat into a victory—just when their struggle was most desperate, new forces from the masses, roused by the very desperate character of the struggle, refilled the broken ranks. Like the giant Antaeus, the more they were crushed to earth, the more strength the earth gave back to them. For they *were* the people.

The Communists know the strength of the people of China, for they have called it forth. But long before the first young student in China joined the Socialist Youth in 1918 and placed his faith not in armies, but in the awakening of the mass of his people, Napoleon foresaw this phenomenon when he said:

“China? There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will move the world.”

The Soviets were revolutionary, they had an economic base. The people were fighting for their new-found lands and liberties. Will they fight to the last man against Japan as for their Soviets? Yes, the answer has already been given—by the Communists, too. *Behind* the Japanese lines, *after* the occupation, the local population is now beginning to fight spontaneously under the direction of the Eighth Route Army.

While the Kuomintang is still in the "scorched earth" stage of military exigency, the Communists are already building and rebuilding in North China. Since the war with Japan began, the former Red Army of about a hundred thousand men has tripled its size and organized partisan warfare throughout the occupied provinces of Shansi, Hopei and even Chahar and Shantung.

When the Eighth Route Army was originally formed, it was divided into three divisions. The former First Front Red Army from Kiangsi was renamed the 115th Division, of which Lin Piao was given command; the Fourth Front Army became the 129th Division, with Liu Pei-ch'eng in command; and the Second Front Army became the 120th Division, with Ho Lung in command. Their first act on arrival at the Shansi front was to inflict the first defeat of the war upon the Japanese at the strategic pass, Pinghsing-kuan, on September 24, in which they caused the Japanese a loss of a thousand men in a hand-to-hand engagement, and captured seventy truckloads of ammunition and supplies. On October 18 one battalion destroyed twenty-one Japanese planes at the airfield in Yenmenpao. In the meantime they had been busy cutting communications and capturing further supplies. One of their reports stated that by January they had captured about nine thousand rifles and

two thousand horses and pack animals, and destroyed over a thousand enemy trucks and motorcars. In the meantime they were hurriedly organizing the people of Shansi, Hopei and Chahar and by January had under their control forty-two *hsien* or countries in Shansi and Hopei, in addition to recovering twenty-six *hsien* in northern Shansi.

After these spectacular activities, which caused a wave of enthusiasm for the Communists to sweep over China, the Communist troops and political workers settled down to serious work. They avoided engaging in pitched battles with the Japanese, thereby rendering useless the enemy artillery, airplanes, tanks and massed formations, and settled down to the process of driving the invaders slowly mad by constantly harassing lines of communications and by sudden swift night attacks to break the morale of enemy troops. Then, while the Japanese were concentrating on the attack against the Central troops farther south, the Eighth Route Army took the gala occasion to move in at their rear. It was a field day for them. The Communists divided their army into small mobile units which penetrated everywhere, organizing partisan support and arming the people as they went. By July every province under Japanese occupation in the North seemed to have Eighth Route guerillas maneuvering about. On July 7, to commemorate the Liukouchiao Incident, they paid a little social call at the bridge of that name near Peking, and made a raid on Montoukou near by. They have been reported with twenty miles of Tientsin, also.

By the end of 1937 the Communist control behind the Japanese lines was sufficiently well organized to establish a new government, which was given a mandate by Hankow in December as the "Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Frontier Govern-



ment. The Japanese held the railway lines and highroads, but the Communists worked in between these lines, organizing the villagers for prolonged resistance in the future. *Hsien* governments were created on a democratic basis, and local Mobilization Committees organized support for the army and recruited volunteers for the People's Self-Defense Corps. Boys and girls were recruited into the Young Vanguard, women had their own Women's Anti-Japanese Societies, and in general the organization of the people proceeded rapidly. Many schools for training in guerilla tactics, in spying activities, and in various phases of military and political work were established, and at Fuping on the Shansi-Hopei border the Communists had two academies, branches of their Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy in Yen-an, which turned out several hundred students every three months to work among the people. Mass education through the use of Latinized characters was pushed forward in primary schools, also.

The provinces under Japanese occupation were divided into five areas, administered by the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Frontier Government. The head of this government was Nieh Jung-chen, a Szechuanese, age thirty-nine, and an electrical engineer. I met Nieh Jung-chen in Yen-an when he was political commissar of the First Red Army Corps. He is tall, thin and intelligent-looking, with very irregular features. He speaks excellent French, as he studied at Paris University in 1920, then spent two years studying electrical engineering at Charles Rowe's Collegue in Belgium. After that he went to Berlin for a while, then during 1924 spent six months at the Eastern Laborers' University in Moscow and several months at the Red Army Academy there. When he returned to China

in 1926, he was made Secretary of the Political Department of Whampoa Academy. In the Nanchang Uprising he was political commissar to Yeh T'ing's division. He participated in the Canton Commune in 1927, then went to the North, where he did organizational work for the communist Party in Peking, Tientsin and at the Tangshan Mines—useful experience in preparing him for his present work in those areas. In 1931 he entered the Central Soviets in Kiangsi. He is one of the veteran Communists, having joined the C.Y. in 1921 in France.

Within six months after having begun this work behind the Japanese lines, the Eighth Route Army people claimed to have mobilized a People's Self-Defense Army of five hundred thousand, only about one quarter of whom were armed, however, and to have a million villagers participating in anti-Japanese activities only in the Second Area under the Frontier Government, which included seventeen districts in northern Hopei and eastern Shansi. In this Second Area the Government operated a postal system for three thousand villages, had ten radio stations, and claimed to have three thousand miles of telephone lines functioning. It also published seventeen daily newspapers and maintained fourteen hospitals, as well as having several arsenals busy producing ammunition, hand grenades, bayonets and swords and other light arms.

At the same time the Communists hurriedly tried to reorganize economic activities and to help the farmers with the production and distribution of their crops. Land was not redistributed, but the people were relieved of taxes and surtaxes, rents were lowered, a three years' moratorium declared upon all debts, and the land of absentee landlords

living in Peking (which city is almost entirely populated by landlords) and Tientsin was not allowed to lie fallow. A boycott of Japanese goods was enforced, and land formerly devoted to raising cotton and tobacco for export to Japan was utilized for foodstuffs. The Frontier Government also created its own bank and issued its own banknotes, making it impossible for the Japanese-controlled Federated Bank to gain any currency control over these areas.

The Eighth Route Army is also trying to co-ordinate the activities of the Manchurian and Korean volunteers with their work.

In the occupied areas, however, all this organizational work is still on the defensive. It should have been done *before* the occupation of these provinces, instead of afterward. The real offensive on both sides has not yet begun. As soon as their base is consolidated, the Communists will be in a position to wage relentless warfare against the invaders. And as soon as the Japanese campaign in South China is completed, they will turn back to "consolidate" the Northern provinces. Then we shall see a new phase of the Sino-Japanese war.

In the meantime, however, formal fighting was not neglected while this organizational work proceeded. On August 6 Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh published a long statement of losses inflicted on the Japanese during the nine months from September 1937 to May 1938. According to this the Eighth Route Army wounded or killed 34,007 Japanese and captured 1,094 Japanese and Manchukuoans. They had fought in 570 engagements with the Japanese, and captured or destroyed a total of 12,738 pieces of armament, including the seizure of 467 machine guns, 6,487 rifles, and 97 field

guns and trench mortars. They had destroyed 24 airplanes, 5 tanks, 5 armored cars, and 901 trucks and motorcars, and had seized for their own use 190 motorcars and 847 mule carts, together with 3,367 horses and mules.\* In addition to the above, 1,366 "Manchukuo" troops had mutinied and surrendered to them.

Not only in the North are the Chinese Communists active, but in the South another branch of the former Red Army has been extremely busy, under command of Han Ying and Yeh T'ing. Just as in the North, these Southern Reds were not allowed to take any action until after the Japanese occupation—then they were graciously permitted by the Central Government to inherit the areas under Japanese control. For a year they quietly recruited new members and carried on sabotage work and short attacks against the Japanese. Once or twice they nearly reoccupied Hangchow.

Information about this "New Fourth Army," as it is called, is very hard to come by. But I have been able to gather the following information:

When the main Red Army retreated from the Central Soviets centered in Kiangsi and began the Long March in October 1934, two of the most important Communist lead-

\*This list does not include the number of fountain pens captured. In other days the Red Army used to carefully announce the acquisition of this important item. Parker pens were their favorite—they cost about \$40 local currency in China. Once in Yen-an I remember that someone told me about a terrific battle in which he said they captured so many rifles, so many men and "brought down one airplane, two pilots, and two Parker fountain pens." Each regiment in the Red Army had a group of sharpshooters especially trained to pick off the officers—I am sure that those who looked affluent enough to possess Parker pens were the first to be selected.

ers remained behind to create a diversion to protect the main forces in retreat and to carry on guerilla activities in the former Soviet areas. These were Fang Chih-min and Han Ying.

Fang Chih-min, a Kiangsi man, who was one of the earliest organizers of Red partisans in that area, commanded the Tenth and Seventh Red Army Corps, made up of two divisions of some ten thousand men. Both these Corps were completely annihilated by the Kuomintang troops. The Seventh Army Corps, called the "Anti-Japanese Vanguard," in 1934 created a diversionist movement from Juikin to the northeast of Kiangsi, where it was destroyed in gallant self-immolation, while the main forces broke the blockade and proceeded on the Long March. Its commander, Hsiung Huai-chou, was killed in this last stand in 1935. Fang Chih-min himself, directly commanding his Tenth Army Corps, had his base at Yi-yang in northeastern Kiangsi, and after maneuvering about for a while in self-defense, was captured and executed in 1935, when his corps was also annihilated by the enemy.

Han Ying, an expert military and political strategist, had better luck. He commanded the 24th Independent Division from Fukien and partisans totaling about ten thousand rifles. From 1934 to 1937 he held out in the mountains on the borders of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Chekiang—a wonderful heroic story. Several campaigns were directed against him, and even in the spring of 1937 a "final annihilation" drive was announced by the Government, which apparently was never attempted, however.

Han Ying is the No. 1 "proletarian" of the Chinese Communists, and ranks next to Mao Tsê-tung as a combination

of political and military genius. He is a native of Hupeh, now about forty years of age. During the 1925-27 period he was one of the most active leaders of the labor movement both in Wuhan and Shanghai.

It was not until long after the Red armies in the North-west were reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and sent to Shansi to fight the Japanese in the autumn of 1937, that Han Ying's troops were reorganized into the national armies. In an interview with Edgar Snow in August 1938, Han Ying stated that the "New Fourth Army," commanded by himself and Yeh T'ing, was not formed until January of 1938. At that time Han Ying had about three thousand veterans of his original troops remaining. This New Fourth Army, however, expanded rapidly—from local volunteers in the Japanese-occupied areas particularly. At this writing they are variously said to have from thirty thousand to one hundred thousand troops in equally varying stages of armament. The Hankow Government supplies them about \$140,000 a month, and for the rest they depend upon the support of the local patriotic movement. Reports reaching Shanghai indicate that these troops are already well disciplined and popular with the people in the areas in which they operate.

This is a revival of the old 4th Army of Chang Fa-kuei's far-famed "Ironsides" Fourth Route Army, the finest unit of the Northern Expedition in 1926-27. At that time the "Ironsides" army consisted of the 11th, 20th and 4th armies, and two of Chang Fa-kuei's best commanders became Communists—Ho Lung, commander of the 20th Army, and Yeh T'ing, commander of the 24th Division of the 11th Army. It was the 20th Army and Yeh T'ing's division, together with two regiments of the 4th Army, which revolted at

Nanchang in 1927, though some of the original "Ironsides" veterans still remain in the 1st Division of the First Red Army Corps. After the defeat in 1927, Ho Lung went back to his home in Hunan and organized a totally new Red army of partisans, which became the Second Front Red Army. Yeh T'ing, however, participated in the Canton Commune on December 11, 1927, and when this was defeated went abroad. Nothing was heard of him publicly until 1937, when he was given superior command of the newly organized New Fourth Army. Yeh T'ing is a native of Kwangtung and is now about forty years of age.

The above indicates the potentialities of the mass of the people of China, once awakened to their responsibilities. Another reason why it is still possible for China to defeat Japan now is this:

The Japanese lines are at present so extended and vulnerable that it would not be difficult to cut communications and transportation and leave her troops in the interior marooned and isolated, thereby breaking their morale completely, and affording an excellent opportunity of annihilating them piecemeal. But this work can only be done in the rear—by the local populations—as all regular troops have been withdrawn from the most vulnerable places, except the Eighth Route Army units in the North and the Fourth Route Army in the South. Had Japan not rather stupidly covered so much territory, this opportunity would not have existed.

Will the Chinese take advantage of this opportunity in time to make this urgent rear attack effective? Only now, after a year, has the Government realized the importance of mobilizing such reserve forces. Yet the Government army is still kept on a strictly professional basis, and all recruits are

selected and trained through the *pao chia* system of class domination. The local populations are not yet armed and organized to share in the defense, except where the Communist units operate behind the enemy lines at great disadvantage and with insufficient arms and not even enough stores of dynamite to effectively destroy bridges and other strategic points.

Impressed by the success of the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek has been reorganizing some of his Central armies for guerilla warfare, but these units have not had much success, owing to their inexperience and the fact that they do not effectively organize the population to support them. Such individual fighting requires the highest determination and morale and is best carried out as a partisan measure of self-defense by the local population, not by professional soldiers. It also requires the greatest initiative on the part of the squad commanders, which is the secret of the excellent command of the Communist units, and the main weakness of the Government armies. Moreover, the Red tactic is not a simple form of guerilla tactics, but a more scientific type developed over long years of experience and study of Soviet methods as well. The Communist call it "maneuvering warfare based on the principle of the short, decisive attack," and an integral part of its strategy is the mobilization of partisan units to co-operate with the army. P'eng Teh-huai, now in field command of the Eighth Route Army, explained the principles of this maneuvering warfare to me when I was at his headquarters. In speaking of the war against Japan, he said:

"The fundamental idea in our strategy must be to realize a war of maneuver and of annihilation. That is, we must



decisively destroy small units of the enemy. We must chop every advance into pieces as it thrusts forward. This is exemplified by the Red Army's annihilation of advances into Soviet territory. In general, we must avoid formal positional warfare wherever it is possible to maneuver instead, although there may be some exceptions to this. Of course, there must be positional defense of large cities, but the position in the defense plans should be by *points* and not by a *line*—that is, we must hold our stationary points but not the line between them, which we defend by maneuvering in that area, and by annihilating parties of attack. We of the Red Army are against the linear plan of defense. Defense by points instead of by a line makes it possible to use a small force to attract a big force of the enemy, thus a minority can force the enemy to deploy big forces around it, thereby making it impossible to use these forces elsewhere; thus the enemy cannot utilize its men efficiently.

"For individual battles we have the principle of the short decisive attack. We attack one point and demolish it in a short period. The advantage is that the enemy cannot use new equipment advantageously. Airplanes are of little use, poison gas of no use, and tanks of little value. By the time the planes arrive the battle is over—they can only bomb the dead. We attack as quickly as thunder—and leave as quickly. Therefore the enemy has absolutely no preparation at all.

"With the enemy in our own country, we have the advantage that the people support us, so we can know the enemy's every move and they have no information whatsoever. The terrain is always fully known to us. Under this condition we can always concentrate our best force to attack the enemy to advantage. We are always at our best and they at their

worst. Through victories in this annihilating warfare, the enemy supplies us with ammunition, supplies, etc., and several such small victories cause great fear among the enemy troops. They then sent large reinforcements, and we surround and blockade them and break all concentrations. When the enemy is dispersed, we attack; when concentrated, we break them up. Such a blockade is not tactical but strategic. With an armed mass and partisan movement all around the enemy, we can cut their communications while the main force of our army can rest secretly. When the enemy comes out, we attack and annihilate; when they go back (that is, concentrate again), we block up all communications and blockade them. Repetition of this soon tires them out. With no news, sickness, no medicine, etc., their morale is quickly affected. In the meantime the partisans nab all small units that venture out. When another enemy force wants to render help to these, we move out swiftly to attack the helping army. Our forces, being rested, have the advantage over these blind reinforcements. Then the enemy does not know what to do. Help is impossible, but if no help arrives it is likewise impossible to stay in position. This was our common experience in fighting Chiang Kai-shek's forces. If the enemy stay at one point and remain stationary, we can continually disturb and harass them with small numbers, so they get no rest at all.

"From this one can see that it is most important to mobilize the mass of the people to surround the enemy. In order to organize and mobilize the masses, some democratic freedom must be given to them, therefore Democracy is the most important prerequisite to our victory over Japan strategically. If the mass are really mobilized in self-defense, they

will act themselves spontaneously, and volunteer to give information of all enemy movements, as well as to act as guides and guards. As the people of the district are familiar with their terrain, by their help we have great advantages.

"Chiang Kai-shek once gave a good description of our Red Army strategy which might well be quoted here. He said: 'When the Reds move in their own Soviet districts, they are like fish in the sea; we can't find them. When they move outside, they are as elusive as a bird in the forest.' The Kuomintang armies found it impossible to do anything in the Soviet areas while they remained Soviet. It was a no man's land for them. And the Japanese position is much more difficult than that of Chiang Kai-shek.

"We must emphasize one point: the power of the mass is still not recognized by Nanking, but we have experienced it and know its value. In the Fifth Campaign in the South Chiang Kai-shek had one million troops in operation and the Red Army had only one hundred thousand, aside from the Soviet population of three millions. But we mobilized all these three millions against the one million and saved ourselves from being destroyed.

"Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to adopt a policy, which he called 'Draining all the water out, so as to catch the fish.' But he didn't catch us. When we left the Soviet districts to march to the Northwest, we became a 'bird in the forest' to him just the same.

"We can utilize all our ten years' experience together to fight the Japanese, and victory is sure. Now we Chinese have a 'sea' of four hundred millions, and a 'fish' of three million soldiers in it. The enemy can only send from two to five hundred thousand troops against us. Of course, we can win.

"Our defensive plan in China is very different from that of the Soviet Union because our frontiers are gone. Therefore, we can only depend upon the mass of the people. Also because of communications our boundary is passive, not active.

"Another strategical weapon is propaganda. Japan cannot destroy China except by utilizing the Chinese against the Chinese, and she knows she is doomed to defeat unless this plan succeeds soon. The power of the people of a nation is beyond measure. For instance, we Communists in China also learned this through our experience with the tiny nation of the Man-tzu tribe on our Long March. Though there were only thirty thousand of these people, each individual was determined to save himself and his tribe. We had no method of defeating them, and had great difficulty even in passing as quickly as possible through their territory."

A year ago it was generally thought that what the Japanese wanted in China, they could take. The great hope for China was that by a war of attrition it could prevent Japan from consolidating its gains. Today, however, it is generally recognized that if China mobilizes all its population and resources in continued united resistance, Japan may suffer a great defeat. The Japanese campaign has revealed grave weaknesses, the greatest of which is a basic contradiction between her military and political strategy, which is only a reflection of the same contradiction in her crazy social structure at home. The Japanese army and its samurai officer caste has shown itself to be the vestigial remains of feudalism—one of those anachronisms which history inexorably destroys. It is rapidly committing hara-kiri in China by its own hand. It is not even a modern unified force bring-

ing a true imperialism to China. It is not a colonizing force, but a looting and raping expedition in the tradition of the Huns and the Spanish conquistadores. Already it has demonstrated that it is trying to establish, not a true imperialist colony, but groups of feudal Shogunates, all quarreling for power among themselves. It is not impossible that the Manchurian-Korean Shogunate may get into a war with Soviet Russia, while the navy carries out a suicidal adventure in South China and becomes involved with Britain and America. Left to its own devices, there seems to be no limit to the number of stupid misadventures which the Japanese samurai militarist mind may contemplate.

However, one must not forget that China itself is no paradise of sweetness and light. China may yet collapse by its own weight. Chinese history may yet repeat itself. The guarantee of success is only that both the ruling class and the people are fast awakening to the common realization that united they stand, divided they fall; that it is not that China cannot defend herself against any external enemy. It is that always, either actively or passively, one vast bloc of Chinese is opposed to another, and the Chinese conquer themselves by their own internal contradictions. The third-party conqueror steps in and seizes the scepter of authority at the critical moment, and promptly begins to reorganize the internal class struggle in its own interests. It was not the Manchus who suppressed the T'ai-p'ings. It was Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang and the Chinese landlords and bureaucracy. Today it is not the Japanese alone who may conquer China. It is the refusal on the part of the ruling class to permit the mass of the population to participate in the defense—until after their homes are already occupied. They

still prefer the hope of fighting with the aid of America, England or the Soviet Union—instead of calling forth the strength of their own people and fighting shoulder to shoulder with them.

The potentialities of their own people are all too well known to the rulers of China. Too many of them fear the waking giant. The old-world part of the Chinese ruling class is not interested in having their fellow countrymen move the world—for, like charity, world-moving begins at home. And today, faced with national extinction, they still say, "Let him sleep!" This is natural enough from a purely individual selfish viewpoint—if you were one of a few thousand bankers, landlords, militarists, landlords and magistrates whose business it was to keep 450,000,000 under control in order to exploit them instead of being overthrown by them, you would also think many times before putting a gun into the hands of a hungry peasant or laborer, or even before permitting a young middle-school student to tell him the way out already tried and tested in other lands from the time of the French and American revolutions down to Bolshevism in Russia.

Therefore, at the moment China is not only fighting against Japan, but its ruling class is also very actively engaged in keeping "peace and order" in the rear. Where are all the guns in China? Why are they not doing service at the front? The Chinese have been spending their national treasure on guns ever since nearly forty millions killed each other with spears and blunderbusses in the days of the T'ai-p'ings. The country has been overrun with armed soldiers, *min t'uan*, *pao-an-tui*, bandits and police. Before the war, China had a standing army of 2,000,000 and 274,400 provincial *pao-an-*

*tui*, or Peace Preservation Corps. All together, including *min t'uan*, or local landlords' militia, and police forces, there could not have been less than 3,000,000 armed men engaged in policing the country—one to every 133 of the 400,000,000 population, excluding Manchuria.

A great proportion of these guns are still in the hands of the "guardians of law and order," who use them not against Japan, but to keep the peace locally. If every gun in China were at the front, and every firecracker factory were busy making hand grenades instead, there would doubtless now be an answer instead of a question as to who is winning the Sino-Japanese war.

The Communists are leading the movement to awaken the masses of China to their responsibilities and potentialities, teaching them how to beat their plowshares into swords. On the other hand, the governments—both local and central—are endeavoring up to the last moment to keep a monopoly of the political and economic power. They are recruiting the sons of the people for the war, but keeping the status quo at home among the people themselves. After a year of maintaining this delicate gyroscopic balance in China, there has been astonishingly little change in the Government. The governing group has held its monopoly with remarkable success. This is largely due to the fact that London support and American purchases of silver have kept up the government currency—and partly due to the prestige which the Government derives from the former confidence reposed in it by England and America. Chiang Kai-shek has been England's darling since 1927, and so long as there is a hope that he will be a drawing card for possible support to China through those channels, no voice will be raised against his

government. Since the Sian Incident of 1936, Chiang Kai-shek's government has held a mandate from the people, the army, and the Communists on three conditions: first, that it carry out the war of self-defense against Japan; second, that it do not engage in any further civil war against its own people; and third, that it secure help from England, America, France and Soviet Russia as part of the "international peace front"—keeping the present government in power was thought to be a guarantee of some foreign support against Japan, as it has for ten years religiously protected the rights of the foreign powers in China, and may be expected to do so in the future.

The people's movement in China, led by the Left, also demanded democracy, economic reforms to win the support of the peasantry, the arming, organizing and education of the masses, and in general the realization of all measures necessary to achieve a victory in the present war. But these latter were expected to develop spontaneously during the course of the struggle.

So far the Government has kept faith with the people on the first two conditions of its mandate—and has striven mightily to secure active support from the democratic powers and Soviet Russia, but with not much success. If these powers compromise with Japan, then the present Chinese Government must either collapse or turn to a new revolutionary policy to win the support of the masses of its own people—unless it is firmly bolstered up by Great Britain as a puppet police force for British interests in the South in the event of a British-negotiated peace. If such a peace is successfully negotiated, China will be lost as a nation and divided into a Japanese colony in the North and a British colony in the South.



In the meantime the Chinese Communists have been leading a peaceable but real movement to democratize the government and to secure a voice for the people—at least to secure for them the right to arm in self-defense. And they want this in order to realize a true democratic unification of the people so as to base the present resistance upon a firm foundation and so that the central government, in which they hope to participate, will have real power and strength from below instead of being a mere percussion cap as in the past. This is not a trick for them to seize power for their Party. I am convinced from talking with them that they earnestly believe that without some form of democracy, through the medium of which all parties and groups can effectively cooperate, half the battle is lost. So far in Kuomintang-controlled areas they have succeeded only in organizing a "People's Political Council," with purely advisory powers, in which several communists are admitted to membership.

The Hankow Government also spends a great deal of time talking about "unity," but by this it means a centralized dictatorship, expanding its little circle of monopoly only so far as to utilize various elements in a peripheral way. The Communists, on the contrary, by "unity" mean a democratic form of representation through which a fundamental organic unification under a Democratic Republic can be permanently achieved.

The problem of democracy, therefore, has not yet been solved. Only now that over half the country has been lost are questions being asked about the relation of political to military ways and means.

Even Machiavelli saw what happens to a ruler who does not grant democracy to the people when their country is

attacked—they perish, and the ruler with them. His basic strategy in the conduct of wars was this: Dictatorship is best for the offensive to conquer other nations, but democracy is the only way to realize successful self-defense at home.

Why did Napoleon win? It was not his generaling. In command of mercenary troops, he would have been only another first-rate European militarist. It was that he led the democratic Grand Army of the Republic, which was supported in the rear by the people of France because it defended that democracy. Why did little America win the war of independence against the greatest empire on earth? Because the people fought a war for democracy. Why did the Russian soldiers collapse on the German front and die by the millions? Yet when they fought for a Soviet democracy at home, they let nothing stand in their way.

Now, after a year, the war, with all its internal problems for China and with all its external international problems, is reaching its crisis. Each is very much dependent upon the other. Japan is now reaching a point so vulnerable that economic sanctions on the part of America and Great Britain and her dominions alone might break Japan—together with a firm stand on the part of the Soviet Union. In the case of such action in the rear, there is little doubt that Japan would be so justifiably jittery that China could finish her off with a few well-chosen attempts. But do the foreign powers want to break Japan? Great Britain is the stumbling block which may prevent the collapse of this new imperialism, just as it has supported, by compromise at the critical moment, all other imperialisms since the World War.

As previously stressed, the present outlook indicates that it is possible for China alone to defeat Japan on the condi-

tion that the mass of the people are mobilized both in the occupied and unoccupied areas before it is too late—and perhaps provided there is no intervention on behalf of Japan, especially from Mr Chamberlain's government. But there is no other condition upon which this defeat can be realized unless the foreign powers themselves act decisively against Japan. If they do not support China, and if the present Chinese Government continues to fail in its responsibilities of arming and organizing the population, it means that a new liberal-Leftist government must grant democracy to the people and take the leadership in China, which may or may not result in a revolutionary situation.

Such a fundamentally democratic revolutionary government, however, need not alarm British, American and French interests unduly—though it will not be kind to the Fascists who have supported Japan. A removal of all the pathological remains in China, creating a healthy social and economic organism purged of all its slow poisoning would be a tremendous stimulus to world trade and economic intercourse. A democratic people's China free of the injustices and oppression which have kept it in constant civil war could begin to rebuild itself immediately and create a vast new market both for goods and capital. All legitimate economic interests would not suffer but gain by this development—just as nations trading with each other on a basis of equality mutually benefit from the wealth created by humankind in general. Nothing could be more shortsighted than for the democratic foreign powers to take a dog-in-the-manger attitude and sacrifice 450,000,000 customers for a few cancerous growths in Shanghai already in a malignant state.

There is no danger of "Bolshevism" in China for many

years to come. "Yes," the British die-hards agree, "we can give up China to the Chinese. But what of India? If China wins its freedom, India will follow."

The answer to that is to ask which is the greatest danger to the British Empire—the rise of Japan? a world war? the emancipation of India? Britain can choose her tailor, but she must cut according to her cloth. The rise of Japanese imperialism means war inevitably and the simultaneous rise of Germany and the Fascist Supernational in Europe, just as the collapse of Japan means breaking the bullying power of Fascism everywhere. For Mr Chamberlain's government to compromise with Japan now—as certain indications presage—is simply to gratuitously save Japan from destruction and prepare the way for a tremendous war in the not distant future. If, however, Britain and America now give support to China in the rear, China can solve all the problems of the Far East in a way far more satisfactory to all concerned.

Mr Chamberlain's capitulation to the Fascists in Munich and granting of their claims to new colonial imperialism have already directly created a grave crisis in China. Had Hitler synchronized his provocation of a European crisis in exact rhythm to Japan's march over China, he could not have given timelier aid to his Tokyo ally. Had Mr Chamberlain calculated a blow directly at the solar plexus of Chinese resistance and indirectly at the British position in the Far East, he could not have struck with more telling force.

Just at the moment of the Munich agreement, Japan was at the threshold of Hankow. For several tentative weeks previously Japan had hesitated to attack in South China—

afraid of Soviet Russia in the north, afraid to rouse Great Britain, afraid of throwing America and England into co-operative action, either for offensive economic sanctions against the aggressor, or for a firm defensive stand against encroachment on their rights and interests in the Far East. So long as there was the possibility of action against aggressors by the "democratic front"—England, America, France, and Soviet Russia—Japan hesitated; and the aggressor who hesitates is lost. But Japan knew that not one of these powers would take independent action, and as soon as Mr. Chamberlain made it clear at Munich that he wanted peace at any price, as soon as the compromise with the Fascist aggressors isolated Soviet Russia, Japan moved in behind British Hongkong with her reserve troops from Manchuria and occupied Canton in a flash, followed by the fall of Hankow. And now what?

Hankow and Canton were the last two industrial economic nerve centers remaining to China. Hankow was also Britain's strategic point for the control of her great Yangtze River sphere of influence, together with Shanghai on the coast. Canton was the base of British power in South China, the military outpost of which was the fortified island of Hongkong. With Canton in Japanese hands, Hongkong is isolated from the interior and the Rock of Hongkong is only another Rock of Gibraltar—a first line of defense for Singapore.

The time element is of decisive importance to the attacker. The collapse of the democratic front against the aggressors at Munich and the resultant individual paralysis of each power now open up a brief golden period of free opportunity for Japan in the Far East. Taking advantage of this brief opportunity, Japan is moving fast. She now intends

apparently to march over the whole of traversable China and to blast the remaining western cities to the ground. When this is a *fait accompli* no doubt she will turn to face the so-called Great Powers with a toothy smile and ask Mr Chamberlain's blessing for at last having made peace possible in Asia.

This paralysis of the democratic powers is temporary. It will not last long. New political forces in each country will eventually rise to take action. But in the interim, great havoc can be wrought, especially in China.

A hundred years of history is reaching its climax in the Far East today—the hundred years since Japan's Meiji Restoration and China's defeated T'ai ping Rebellion, which resulted in the gradual rise to power of Japan and the gradual colonization of China. China is at bay—but the Chinese fight best with their backs to the wall. One of the basic traditional tactics of Chinese generals is to intentionally put their troops into a trap—and then fight like demons.

Anyone who has seen the Red Army in China, the guerrillas behind the Japanese lines, the soldiers in action under Japanese artillery and bombing, will testify to the potentialities of Japan's intended victim. Once given purpose and direction, the heroism, the morale, the endurance, the sheer ability to create an invincible front out of nothing but human spirit and flesh, of the sons of the common people of China are almost beyond belief.

## APPENDIX

### CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

#### (1) RISE OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1918--founding of the Chinese Socialist Youth, the first organization along Socialist lines in China.

May, 1920--the Socialist Youth becomes a branch of the Communist Youth International.

November 1920--Sun Yat-sen revives the *Chung Hua* Kuomintang as the *Chung Kuo* Kuomintang or "Chinese National People's Party."

1920--the first labour strike in China, organized by the Anarchists in a cotton mill in Changsha, Hunan.

May 1921--founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.

1923--the Chinese Communist Party decides to form a United Front with the Kuomintang.

February 7, 1923--Pinham Railway Strike, marking the first great upsurge of the Chinese labor movement.

January 20-30, 1924--First National Congress of the Kuomintang at which this party is completely reorganized along the lines of the Russian Communist Party, and Communists are permitted to become members.

May 31, 1924--the Treaty between China and Soviet Russia inaugurating a basis of national equality.

May 1924--founding of the Whampoa Military Academy in China, under Soviet Russian direction.

#### (2) THE "GREAT REVOLUTION" OF 1925-27

May 30, 1925--the "May Thirtieth Incident," when the British fired upon a demonstration in Shanghai, causing a great wave of revolutionary activity in China.

- July 9, 1926*—start of the "Northern Expedition" to overthrow the Northern war lords
- November 10, 1926*—formation of the "Wuhan Government," jointly participated in by Communists and the Kuomintang.
- March 22, 1927*—capture of Shanghai by the Shanghai workers led by Chou En-lai, a Communist.
- April 12, 1927*—formation of the "Nanking Government" and the "Shanghai Massacre," when Chiang Kai-shek effected a *coup d'état* and began the "Purgation Movement" against Communists with the massacre of thousands of Shanghai workers who had captured Shanghai on March 22.
- May 21, 1927*—the "Hsu K'c-hsiang Massacre" in Changsha Hunan, when revolutionary peasants and workers were killed by the militarist of that name to prevent the seizure of land by the peasants.
- July 15, 1927*—"The Split" between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, and the Kuomintang break with the Third International

### (3) THE SOVIET REVOLUTION

- August 1, 1927*—the "Nanchang Uprising" among Chang Fa-kuei's "Ironsides" army led by Communists which founded the Chinese Red Army though it was then called merely the "Peasants' and Workers' Army"
- August 5, 1927*—the Chinese Communist Party proscribed by the Wuhan Kuomintang.
- August 7, 1927*—at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Ch'ên Tu-hsiu is deposed as secretary and a new line adopted.
- August 17, 1927*—the first Chinese Soviet organized by P'eng P'ai at Haiofeng, in the East River region of Kwangtung Province near



Canton, which was annihilated on February 29, 1928, after severe fighting.

*September 12, 1927*—the "Autumn Crop Uprising" led by Mao Tsê-tung in Hunan, which resulted in the formation of the "1st Division of the 1st Peasants' and Workers' Army" from peasants, miners and insurrectionary soldiers. This army of a thousand climbed the mountain Chingkanshan in the winter of 1927 and held this base until the autumn of 1928.

*November, 1927*—first permanent Soviet government established at Ts'alin (Ch'alin), Hunan.

*December 11, 1927*—the "Canton Commune" when the Communists seized Canton for three days.

*January 1, 1928*—the "South Hunan Revolt" led by Chu Teh among the Hunan peasantry.

*May 1928*—Chu Teh goes to Chingkanshan to meet Mao Tsê-tung, joining forces as the "4th Red Army," with Chu Teh as commander and Mao Tsê-tung as political commissar.

*July 1928*—P'eng Teh-huai leads the "Pingkiang Uprising" in Hunan and joins the Soviet as commander of the 5th Red Army.

*1928*—Ho Lung begins the formation of a Red Army in the Hunghu area of Hunan, which after several reverses built the "Hunan-Hupeh Soviet" of one million population, finally consolidated when Hsian K'eh's 6th Red Army arrived to join forces with Ho Lung's Second Front Red Army, on October 22, 1934.

*1929*—Lo Ping-hui leads the "Kian Uprising" of *min t'uan* in Kiangsi and joins Red Army, commanding the 12th Red Army.

*1929*—the formation of Soviets in Hupeh and Honan at the first of the year, which spread to Anhui and by the end of 1930 included ten *hsien* with a population of a million, called the "Ouyüwan" or "Hupeh-Honan-Anhui" Soviet. On November 7, 1931, the "Fourth Front Red Army" was organized under command of Hsu

- Hsiang-ch'ien while Chang Kuo-t'ao was head of the Soviet Government then controlling a population of two million—the highest period of the Ouyüwan Soviet.
- 1930—formation of the 3d Red Army under Huang Kung-liu (later killed in action).
- July 27, 1930—P'eng Teh-huai occupies Changsha.
- December 1930 to January 1931—the Red Army defeats the First Campaign against it.
- May 19, 1931—beginning of the Second Campaign, also defeated by the Red Army within a month.
- July to October 1931—the Third Campaign—likewise defeated.
- \*December 11, 1931—first All-China Congress of Soviets which formed the Soviet Republic of China and elected the first Central Soviet Government, with Mao Tsê-tung as chairman, and Han Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao as vice-chairman
- December 14, 1931—"Ningtu Uprising" of the 26th Route Army (formerly Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchun), which became the Fifth Red Army Corps after joining the Red Army.
- April to October 1933—the Fourth Campaign against the Soviets, which was defeated by the Red Army.
- 1933—formation of the "Szechuan-Shensi Soviet" under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien and Chang Kuo-t'ao. In December 1932 the Fourth Front Red Army changed its base from "Ouyüwan" to Szechuan and in May 1933 formed the "Tungkiang-Nanchang-Pachou Soviet" of

\* I had the greatest difficulty determining the exact date of this first Soviet Congress. The date has often been given as November 7, 1931 (anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia), but nearly everyone I talked with gave me December 11 as the correct day—commemorating the anniversary of the Canton Commune. It seems probable that the congress was called for November 7, but that the delegates did not all arrive in time for this, so the later day was decided upon. The "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic" adopted at this congress was dated December 20, 1931.

about a million population, including the three *hsien* of those names. This was soon reorganized into the "Szechuan-Shensi" Soviet.

*October 1933 to October 1934*—the Fifth Campaign, resulting in the retreat of the First Front Red Army from the Soviets in the South.

*January 22, 1934*—Second All-China Soviet Congress in Juikm, Kiangsi.

*October 16, 1934*—the First Front Army's Long March to the North begins, Mao Tsê-tung's column arriving in Shensi in October 1935.

*June 1935*—the First Front Red Army meets the Fourth Front Red Army at T'a-wei, Mo-kung *hsien*, Szechuan, on the Long March, after which the First and Third Red Army corps march on to the Northwest under Mao Tsê-tung and P'eng Teh-huai, while Chu Teh and Lo P'ing-hui remain with the Fourth Front Red Army, and spent the next few months in Sikong (Inner Tibet).

*November 19, 1935*—the Second Front Red Army begins its Long March from the Hunan-Hupei Soviet, meeting with the Fourth Front Red Army in Sikong on June 23, 1936.

*February 1936*—formation of the "Special Independent Government of the Minorities" by the Fourth Front Red Army in six or seven *hsien* of Sikong, including about two hundred thousand population.

*July 14, 1936*—the Second and Fourth Front Red armies, together with Chu Teh's and Lo P'ing-hui's troops, begin the march to the Northwest from Sikong.

*October 1936*—all the Red armies meet together for the first time in Hui-ning, Kansu, as the Second and Fourth Front Red armies, and Chu Teh and Lo P'ing-hui's troops conclude their Long March and meet with the First Front Red Army in Kansu.

*December 12, 1936*—the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek during the Sian Incident, which inaugurates a United Front period of co-operation between "Red" and "White."

*February 1937*—the last battle of the long decade of civil war—between the Fourth Front Red Army and the Mohammedans in Kansu.

*July 15 to October 15, 1937*—the new democratic elections in the former Soviet regions, giving up the Soviet form of government and inaugurating a universal democracy, as the former Provisional Soviet Republic of China abdicates to make way for the "Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Government."

*August 1937*—the Communist armies move into Shansi to fight the Japanese.

*September 22, 1937*—open publication of the United Front manifesto under the terms of which the Red armies are reorganized into the "Eighth Route Army" as part of the regular national forces, under command of Chu Teh.

*September 24, 1937*—the Eighth Route Army's victory over the Japanese at Pinghsingkuan in Shansi—the first Chinese victory of the war

*December 1937*—formation of the new "Shansi-Hopei-Chahai Frontier Government" under Communist control, behind the Japanese line in those occupied Northern provinces













